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CHAIRMAN WALTER M. INGALLS:

Good morning to you.

To-

day's hearings mark the first attempt by the Assembly Transportation Committee to undertake a comprehensive review of the key
involved in automotive transportation in California.

~ssues

During the

next two days we shall examine where we are headed in our efforts
to reduce automobile emissions, improve fuel economy and increase
vehicle safety and shall discuss the kinds of legislative actions
which

~ay

be necessary to accelerate our progress in these areas.

The special relationship between Californians and their automobiles
has, for better or worse, become ingrained in the California life
style.

As a result, the automobile will continue to be the state's

primary transportation mode for the foreseeable future.

It is,

therefore, imperative that we intensify our efforts to reduce the
damaging influence of the automobile on our quality of life.
California has long been the leader in the drive to
eliminate automotive air pollution.

We have consistently set the

toughest standa1·ds possible and have served as an example for the
rest of the country.

But in the aftermath of the energy crisis

increasing attention has been focused on the trade-off between
emission control and fuel economy.

We have a responsibility to

take a hard look at these choices, keeping in mind the critical
health problems which hang in the balance.

But, in addition to

evaluating fuel economy and air pollution trade-offs in the short
term we have an even
greater responsibility to seek and encourage
\
fundamental improvement in automotive technology for the future.
We need to kn0w what the most promising technological options are,

their feasibility and cost, and the benefits which they can provide.

In the area of vehicle safety we need to know whether every-

thing possible is being done to protect our citizens from faulty
automotive design as well as whether we should begin asking citizens
to exercise greater responsibility in the repair and maintenance
of their automobiles to prevent unnecessary accidents.
The organizing of the hearing into four panel discussions
is a new approach to the hearing process which I hope will be productive and successful.
In the past, there has been a rather stormy relationship
between the auto industry and the Legislature, but after our recent
visit to Detroit I think industry has a clear understanding that
we mean business when it comes to air pollution in California and
I think I might add that we, ·parenthetically, that we on the Committee who made the trip have a better understanding of the sincerity of many of Detroit's efforts in this area.

There have also

been serious differences between the Legislature and the Air Resources
Board is now aware that development of air pollution policy must
be a cooperative effort between the legislative and the executive
branches.

We had hoped to have the Executive Officer of the Air

Resources Board or the Chairman here but neither of those gentlemen are here, or able to be here today.

I hope that sometime during

the near future we can have some productive discussions with them.
There will undoubtedly be disagreement and conflict arising from the various issues which come before us
days.

fn

the next two

The purpose of the panel discussions is to permit the
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0

Committ.ee to focus squarely on the technical questions and policy

0

choices which are at issue so that our future policy decisions
are as well informed as possible.
We are most fortunate to have such a distinguished and

0

talented group of witnesses, and I thank you all for taking the
time out of your busy schedules to join us.

As I have indicated

before the hearing, each panel member may take five minutes to
make an opening statement and then we will move to questions and
answers.
Before we get started with our first panel discussion
I would like to acknowledge the important contributions made in
this field by Assemblyman Wadie Deddeh, who sits on my right,
by Assemblyman Frank Lanterman, dean of our delegation this
morning, and by Assemblyman Jerry Lewis, who is soon to leave our
Committee, who have contributed enormously in making these hearings
beneficial and through their legislation have focused attention
on the issues which will be discussed over the next two days.
Before I proceed, I think it is important that we introduce the various members of the Committee and the various panel
members who will join in these discussions today.

I will introduce

the members of the Committee and if you gentlemen will, each of
you and lady, who is participating from the audience as a member
of the panel, will then introduce yourself, starting on my left
with Dr. Edgar Stephens from UCR.

To my immediate right, as I

indicated, is Assemblyman Wadie Deddeh, who is from San Diego,
Chairman of the Public

~Pl?yees ~nd R~tire~ent c~~~ttee

a?d a

long time member of this Committee, formerly Chairman of this
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Committee.

To his immediate right is Victor Calvo, Vice Chairman

of this Committee and a new member of the Committee, a freshman this
year, about whom we have a great deal of confidence, in whom we expect great things as his work in this Committee progresses.

Next

to him is the dean of the Committee and one of the nationally recognized experts in the field of automotive design.

If you don't believe

me ask him, he'll tell you all about it, is our most able and capable
member, Mr. Frank Lanterman from La canada.

To his right is the

gentleman who has the most interest in automobiles since he has to
cover 34,000 square miles, all by auto, in his district, our freshman
member, Larry Chimbole.

To his immediate right is a gentlemen who

would like to get automobiles out of his district as opposed to
getting them in, another freshman, a very good member of this Committee and about whom you will be hearing a great deal when the
Coastal Plan is brought to the Legislature, because he now chairs
the subcommittee on the coastline, the Honorable Michael Wornum from
Marin County.

On my far left and I think inappropriately so, is

Mr. Antonovich, representing the Glendale-Burbank area.

Mr. Antonovich

is a very good member of this Committee and has served with us ably
this year and is very much interested in the field of helping the
handicapped and elderly in transportation.

To his right is another

member of the Committee who has joined us this year, a freshman
member who has become very active in the Committee's work, Mr. Fred
Chel from Long Beach.

I think we are supposed to be joined later

by Mr. Lewis and a couple of other members but until they arrive
we will give further introductions.

-4-

We will start with Dr. Edgar

Stephens.

If you will identify

yoursel~each

of you, and tell

where you are from, who you represent, we would appreciate that.
Thank you.
DR. EDGAR STEPHENS:

I am Edgar Stephens, I am Professor

of Environmental Sciences and a chemist at the Riverside campus
of the University of California.

I am a staff member of the Air

Pollution Research Center there and that's who I am representing
today.
MR. ERIC STORK:

I am Eric Stork, Deputy Assistant Admin-

istrator for Mobile Source Air Pollution Control, Environmental
Protection Agency in Washington.

I am here at the request of the

committee staff.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Thank you.

MR. CHARLES HEINEN:

I am Charlie Heinen, Chrysler Cor-

poration, Director of Vehicle Emissions Plants.
MR. ROGER MAUGH:

I am Roger Maugh, the Assistant Director

of the Automotive Emissions Office of the Ford Motor company.
MR. G. c. HASS:

I'm Gerhardt Hass, Chief of the Division

of Vehicle Emissions Control, Air Resources Board.
MRS. GLADYS MEADE:

I'm Gladys Meade, Air Conservation

Director for the California Lung Association.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

And formerly of the Air Resources Board.

DR. LAURENCE CARETTO:

I'm Larry caretto, Professor of

Engineering, California State University at Northridge, and

als~

a member of the Technical Advisory Panel to your Committee (inaudible).
MR. STANLEY HART:

My

name is Stanley Hart.
-5-

I'm a civil

engineer and am southern California Chairman for transportation of
the Sierra Club.
MR. CHARLES SIMERLINE:

My name is Charles Simerline.

I'm with Volvo of America, Environmental Manager.
DR. ERNEST STARKMAN:
Corporation.

I'm here at the request of the Committee.

CHAIRMAN INGALLS:
men.

I'm Ernest Starkman, General Motors

Thank you very much, lady and gentle-

I want to thank all of you for coming distances, many of you

from Detroit.

At least three of you I recognize as coming from

Detroit, having had the opportunity to earlier visit you during
the fall, and discuss some of these same issues with you.

This,

in many respects, is a follow-up to our Detroit visit which many
of us went on, as part of our Air Quality Subcommittee's visit to
Detroit and we are looking forward to the same kind of valuable
input we got there from you and also from the other members of the
panel.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:

I think we were treated royally

by the automobile industry and every courtesy extended to the
Committee members.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

I would second that, Mr. Lanterman,

and we want to thank all representatives of the three major automobile manufacturers who were so very k i nd and gracious to take
time out of their day to assist us in (machine malfunction) focuses
on emission controls and fuel economy which we are meeting from
9:30 this morning until 2:30 this afternoon.

If you will give us

an opening s t atement we will apprec i ate it.
DR . STEPHENS:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
-6 -

As I said,

0

I am a staff member of the Air Pollution Research Center at the
University campus at Riverside.

We have been involved in air

pollution research for thirty years approximately, beginning with
studies of plant damage.

Many of you are familiar with our Center

so I won't dwell in detail on our history and our organization and
so on.

I invite anyone who wants to know more about it to contact

us or come and visit us.

The Director of our Center, I should

mention, is Dr. James Pitts who is also a professor of chemistry
at the University.
our work at Riverside covers only two of the aspects of
air pollution, one is chemistry, and the other is plant damage.
We have done a little bit in other areas but not a great deal so
we are not involved in studies of health;
studies of stationary sources; we
automobiles.
is chemistry.

we are not involved in

are not involved in studies of

So the main thrust of our work that I have to discuss
My interest for a good many years has been in the

chemistry of polluted air, about twenty years as a matter of fact,
and I have to study this by a number of technical means using different laboratory apparatus.

Now, we are using two large environ-

mental chambers which were built largely with funding from the Air
Resources Board, and in these chambers we try to simulate the
atmospheric reactions in as much detail and as accurately as possible.

Based on this and much other evidence in the literature ·

of the past twenty years we have come to some conclusions about
the best policy and procedure for controlling air pollution.
is based on one important premise from outside our own work.

-7-

It

As I said, we do not do health research.

So we accept

what the health researchers in air pollution have stated in the
literature and that is that the most serious problem of air pollution is the health problem rising from exposure to ozone.

Ozone

levels in much of southern California, as you know, are far above
our health standards and they require lowering to a more acceptable
value.

Taking that as a premise we can review our studies of at-

mospheric chemistry.

I have done this periodically over the past

years and there are several documents where it is summarized that
I can refer to.

One of those was a National Academy of Sciences

Review in which I summarized the chemistry in a nontechnical form
a couple of years ago.
reaction.

My view of the chemistry of the atmospheric

I also have a second paper which appeared in a committee

print from the United States Senate.

It was a National Academy

of Sciences meeting which summarizes in simple form my view of the
chemistry.

A third document is a statement I made to the Subcom-

mittee on Public Works last May and this is very short and it is
available if anyone, all the members have it.

I haven't time to

read it so I'll just state the conclusion in general.
Taking a premise that ozone is the most serious problem
in air pollution, a most serious problem, and a thing that should
be corrected, we believe that the emphasis should be on control of
hydrocarbon emissions.

As we all know, there is a serious prob l em

of a trade-off, both in air chemistry and technology between hydrocarbon emissions and nitrogen oxide emissions.

My view of the at-

mospheric chemistry is that the best way to control ozone is to

-8-

0

control hydrocarbon emissions.

If we really had freedom from other

interferences and could just think about air quality we might say,
"Let's control both to the maximum degree possible." but we recog-

0

nize that there are trade-offs involved in engineering and fuel
economy and so on, and recognizing that, then I have to repeat that
my own view is that hydrocarbon control should take precedence.
In this statement there are same numbers on emission standards which
Dr. Pitts and I worked on at the time this statement was given.
I won't review these at this time but they 'd o reflect the fact of
increased emphasis, or emphasis primarily on hydrocarbon control.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, I think that's five minutes.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Thank you, Dr. Stephens.

You have

raised some interesting points, especially on hydrocarbon control,
and making it a primary factor in our strategy.

We will be back

to you with questions when every one has completed their opening
statements.

Mr. Stork?

MR. STORK:

Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Pardon me, Mr. Stork, before we go

any further I notice that Horace Sheldon is in the audience.

Do

you want to join us, Mr. Sheldon, or are you comfortable there?
Out of the firing line you don't get shot at, I understand.

Be-

fore we go any further, Mr. Stork, I would like to also recognize
that we have been joined by one of the brighter stars in San Diego,
which has decided to come out today and join us, Assemblyman
Larry Kapiloff.

I could tell I was in San Diego even without

having known that prior to my -coming into this room because
-9-

Mr. Kapiloff has a haircut.

Thank you for joining us, Mr. Kapiloff.

Mr. Stork.
MR. STORK:

Our work in EPA focuses on sources of emissions

from mobile sources, including automobiles.

We are responsible for

the definition of emissions from mobile sources; development of
test procedures to measure amounts of these sources; the valuation
of the feasibility of technology to control these sources, and
in that context, my part of the organization is as the primary
advisor to the EPA Administrator on the setting of standards for
automobile emissions standards from the standpoint of technology.
We also make sure that new sources, new cars, meet those standards
once these standards are set.

I am not responsible in the Environ-

mental Protection Agency for the subject that Dr. Stephens discussed, namely, atmospheric chemistry and health effects.

I thought

I would put into context then what I am prepared to comment to
you on and what I am not . personally prepared to comment on.
The subject of the degree of emission control to be
imposed on new automobiles in future model years is, of course, an
extremely controversial one.
in this area.

The EPA has it•s own responsibilities

Section 209 of the Clean Air Act preempts all states

from imposing emission standards on new cars, that provides a
waiver from that preemption under certain circumstances for the
state of California.

The philosophy of EPA has been to grant such

waivers as requested by california whenever possible to do so.

There

are certain constraints on the Administrator in granting waivers but
it is not the responsibility of the Administrator to judge the

-10-

0

wisdom of the waivers requested by California.
the lead time, technological

feasibility~

He must judge only

and whether or not the

standards proposed to be established by california are more strin-

0

gent than federal standards.
In that context then, Mr. Chairman, I have no particular
message to bring to you, but rather propose to be available to
respond, as may be useful, to the Committee on questions--direct
questions--as to the EPA's data on certain issues that I know that
you're grappling with.

One logistical item, tomorrow the Senate

Public Works Committee will be taking up the federal Clean Air Act
on auto emissions standards, and perhaps it is obvious that I have
to be there, so I have to catch a 1:45PM plane this afternoon.
That means I will not be able to come back after lunch.

To the

extent that you have questions for the U.S. EPA, obviously I prefer
to respond to them this morning.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Thank you, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Stork.

We will try to

keep those logistical constraints in mind and, hopefully, get from
you the information we can this morning.
MR. HEINEN:

Mr. Heinen?

About six months ago a new set of standards

for 1977 was passed in the state of California.

I would like to

start my discussion by reviewing what you are getting in these
standards and also give you a progress report on what it is costing you and how we are doing with them.
First of all, what are you getting?

About a five percent

reduction in hydrocarbon, although there is some question about
- how big a reduction you're actually getting in terms of reactive
-11-

hydrocarbons.

You are getting a ten percent reduction in oxides

of nitrogen.

I am not going to comment on either the health or

amenities effects because I haven't seen any study which has described what effect that five percent of one model year might have
on the atmosphere.

Presumably, such studies were availabl e to t he

decision-makers, although at the time of the decision I did not
hear them quoted.
at present?

These are the benefits.

Now, what are the cos t s

We have to look at this not only in actua l cost but

ability to meet the numbers, field servicing, reduction in models,
fuel economy, drivability and performance.
system itself.

Let's start with the

What we in the industry generally have done for '77

is to take what we call the kitchen sink approach.

In other words,

it is to throw everything into the control systems that we know will
in any way help to meet the numbers, whether they are cost effective
or not.

By this, I mean bigger catalysts, as a matter of fact, two

catalysts instead of one; power heat valves; air switching, more
and more complex exhaust gas recirculation; OSAC, maybe double OSACS,
generally a more complex heat installation system, because we will
have added heat, with the system that we are describing and possibly
one or two replacements of the catalysts at fifty thousand miles,
and I know that one's a fighting issue.

Why do we take this approach?

Well, very simply because with the lead time available to us, and
this lead time question is very important and with the knowledge
that we have not yet managed to meet the numbers that are required
with any degree of certainty with any system, there is nothing we
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can do but to throw on everything that might help.

Perhaps I

should remind you that in California we not only have to meet
the certification numbers we must also meet a ninety percent conformance requirement.

Which means that we have about half of the

required level as our certification target for hydrocarbons and
about two-thirds for oxides of nitrogen.

So this is the reason

that we have chosen the approach that we took.
substantial effect on cost.

This will have a

In fact, the most recent costing which

was given to me just before I left indicates that the average unit
in California will cost about $215 over the system required to
meet the federal numbers.
Thus far, I regret to say we have been more than justified
in throwing the kitchen sink at the particular california numbers
for • 77.

Of the four vehicles that we have star·t ed on the fifty

thousand mile certification we have one clear fail, one marginal
fail, one near miss, and one respective pass.

Namely, one that is

approximately the margin required to meet the ninety percent conformance.

Naturally, we are going to keep on trying, and I hope we will

be able to certify a respectable number of models for California.
One thing is certain, California will have a lot less models available
than the rest of the country.

For example, we are not even going

to try on four of the ten engines.

They just aren•t even close.

We are only going to try on 19 of the 35 basic engine-body combinations which we will offer federally.

Unfortunately, the models

that we have had to give up because we don•t see a chance of meeting
the standards i nclude our most fuel-efficient models.

-13-

Namely,

those with relatively small engines for the size of the vehicle.
We will be giving away quite a bit on drivability and performance.
I think that goes without saying.

You have already experienced

that with this year's models in California, and it will tend to be
more negative as we rush into trying to make these '77 models.
The fuel economy penalty will not be a great deal more percentagewise compared to the federal's than it was last year.

In our case ,

that was 12 percent; industry-wide it was between 10 and 12 percent.
I expect that it won't be much more than about ·15 percent poorer
than the 1977 federal vehicles since they, too, will lose fuel
economy or at best break even next year because of their more severe
oxides of

nitrog~n

requirements.

I suppose you could call that a

case of good news and bad news.
I am sorry I can't give you a more glowing report on our
progress but unfortunately it is getting to be too close to introduction date for me to try to kid anybody.

We will continue to try.

We will do our level best to give california the best possible cars
under the circumstances.

Unfortunately, there was not much lead

time available to refine the systems and that is the penalty that
must

always be paid when lead time is cut down.

About the future,

the next four years or so I hope we will have a bit more stability.
I hope we don't have any decisions in March of '76 for introduction
in the fall of '77.

I hope that in the very near future some con-

tinuity will be provided by establishing firm requirements that have
to be met with firmly established test procedures for the whole
- perioa between ·now and 1980.

It is very, very difficult to develep
-14-

a system to its maximum when the requirements for it are constantly
changed.

We are not and will not be satisfied with the job that we

are doing for the people in California until we have control systems
that have been given a thorough engineering development and have
been tested in the field before they are submitted to the customer,
and this, gentlemen, is impossible when you have the lead time that
we had this year.

We will also not be entirely satisfied and I

realize that this is more your business than ours but we can't help
but look over your shoulder until there are some really firm health
bases for changes in the exhaust emission requirements, until there
are some really good quantitative atmospheric measurement information that says an additional five percent will help this much, not
just that it will help in a nice abstract way but help this much,
or an additional ten percent will help that much in health.

This

whole field really is still in an absymal state of ignorance and
as far as quantitative results are concerned, in a general way we
can agree as I agreed some twenty years ago, that we did not like
the smog situation, that it can't possibly be good for anybody.
We can also agree that the automobile contribution should be controlled, and we have tried to control it for some twenty years and
I have been part of that whole history.

But now that we have gone

eighty to ninety percent of the way it becomes time to ask seriously
not in terms of rhetoric but in terms of hard technical fact, how ·
much additional control is worthwhile, or, if necessary, can the
next step be deferred so that the total cost to the citizens of
Califofnia can be

reduc~d~

In a sense, it is more of our business
-15-

.

I

since the costs are borne by the people of California.
that in the last

I bel ieve

couple of years we, at Chrysler, at least have

demonstrated in a most painful manner, let me assure you, that the
costs of control don•t come out of profits.

The benefits also

accrue to the people of California, so, really both things are
decision.

But as I say, having been involved all these years in

a broader sense we feel a duty to provide you with the best pessible system for control purposes and to advise you on the costs
of these systems and how they can be kept to a minrnum.

We also

believe that we should help develop the techniques for evaluation
and control of these systems.

TO the best of our ability, we

believe that we should help to develop data for the establishment
of the medical requirements so it leads to a better understanding
of the atmospheric chemistry and the pollutant measurement.
will continue to do all of these things.

We

After all, we have been

doing it for many years and I guess it is too late to change.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:
MR. MAUGH:

Thank you, Mr. Heinen.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Maugh?

It is a pleasure

to be here today and have the opportunity to discuss the important
issues of emission control and fuel economy.

I would like to say,

at the outset, that Ford Motor Company has always recognized the
unique and severe air pollution problem in California and has endorsed the concept of more stringent vehicle emission control
standards in California wherever they were feasible and practical.
We are particularly pleased that the Legislature has scheduled
this hearing tQ discuss the near-term relationship between emission
-16-

control and fuel economy, because we believe that the overall
assessment of the effects of the 1977 emission standards by California has not been made and should be undertaken as soon as possible.

In this context, I would also like to preface the follow-

ing report by noting that Ford is not here to find a way to avoid
the added task imposed by the very low hydrocarbon and NOx standards of 1977.

We are working as hard as we can to meet the 1977

standards and have essentially passed the point of no return regarding the commitment of our resources for the engineering facilities and tools needed for 1977.

The question really is whether

the standards are solved from the standpoint of the people of
California.

Early this year, when the '77 standards were being

established Ford indicated its belief that the proposed standards
of .4, .9 and 1.5 for hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, and NOx
respectively, were added beyond the limits of technology for 1977.
The minor gains in air quality associated with such tail pipe
standards did not justify the associated reductions in fuel economy,
drivability and model offerings.

Ford also indicated its concern

that the added initial cost and cost of ownership would have a
depressing effect on the economy and the job market in California.
At that time, the California Air Resources Board projected that
the 1977 standards would reduce hydrocarbon emissions for the
Los Angeles Basin by only 4 percent by 1985.

Ford reported that

the fuel economy loss would be between fifteen and twenty-four
percent versus the 1976 standards and the 1977 California emission
- controls would cost between-- $1.00 and - $125 more than the--' 76
-17-

systems.

Ford also reported that it could not have high confidence

of being able to certify a full line of cars in 1977, due to the
difficulties of meeting the emission standards.
Since our last report in March of 1975 we have been working hard to meet the 1977 standards and have had little success
in minimizing the fuel economy and cost penalties associated with
those standards.

We currently project that fuel economy of our '77

California models will be about 20 to 25% below their 1977 counterparts.

This is a modest improvement from our estimate last spring.

The retail price equivalent cost difference for 1977 is currently
estimated at $100-125.
With regard to drivability and model availability, our
engineers are having more difficulty than we expected, and we remain
concerned that many of the fuel-efficient, manual transmission and
lower power-to-weight ratio vehicles wil l not be capable of certification for sale in California.
Of course, these problems must be related to the improvements in air quality before the appropriate trade-offs can be selected.

The attached chart (Figure 1, page 21) shows the historical

and planned reductions in hydrocarbon emissions related to the
automobile in california.

Prior to controls, cars were emitting

about 20 grams per mile in the form of tail pipe, evaporative and
refueling emissions.

By 1975-76, these levels had been reduced

to 2.7 grams per mile or an 81 percent reduction of the original
uncontrolled level.

The 1977 tail pipe standard move from 0.9

grams per mile to 0.4 grams per mile provides a further reduction
of only 2.5 percent of the original levels.
-18-

This is also less

than one-third of the 14% additional hydrocarbon reduction that
is currently scheduled for 1977-78 in California, when the planned
SHED test standard for evaporative emissions and the refueling
loss controls that will be accomplished by Assembly Bill 2293 are
included.
In contrast, our experience to date suggests that with
today's engines and known emission control technology, fuel economy
is reduced markedly as emissions are lowered.

Figure 2, page 22,

shows that at equivalent 1977 technological levels, moving from
the 1975-76 California levels of .9, 9, 2.0 of the 1977 levels
of .4, 9, 1.5 will lower fuel economy by more than 15% (to a position 20-25% lower than 1977 federal levels).

This 1977 California

penalty of 20-25% contrasts sharply with the 5-10% penalty that
has been experienced in California in 1974-1976.
on Figure 3, page 23.

That is shown

Over time, new technology may reduce the

fuel economy penalty with low emissions, but we do not see any such
opportunity for 1977 or 1978, as lead time requirements will not
permit development and utilization of new technology for these model
years.
Clearly, the air quality in California is not good enough.
However, it has been and will continue to get better, with or
without the 1977 tail pipe emission standards.
The purpose of this report is to provide Ford's current
assessment of the trade-offs
standards.

asso~iated

with the 1977 emission

We think they are a "bad Buy" for the people of

California at this time.

Accordingly, we would urge California to

conduct a thorough review of our report, as well as those of other
-19-

manufacturers, so the total picture can be evaluated in light
of the latest development information from industry, the current
assessment of air quality needs and the current state of the
economy in California.
I will be happy to respond to any questions the committee or the panel members have regarding Ford•s work on emission
control and fuel economy.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Thank you.

I think it might be ap-

propriate since we have heard from two of the automobile manufacturers involved that we now hear from Dr. Starkman and then from
Mr. Simerline to get the perspective of other manufacturers that
are represented here, then we can hear from the board of panel members, from the Air Resources Board and the general public.

Dr.

Starkman.
DR. STARKMAN:

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee,

as you well know, California has historically enforced more stringent automotive emission standards than has the rest of the nation,
and we, at G.M., support this because of a special air pollution
problem.
May I intercede here and say that I am going to cut my
statement quite short from what is being submitted officially and
may I request that the full statement be placed in the record.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Your request is granted.

(Appendix I,

page 150) .
DR. STARKMAN:

But these more stringent standards in

California have not been realized without penalty to the California
customer.

Fuel economy data obtained during emissions certification
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testing by EPA for the last three years of GM vehicles show penalties
associated with meeting the stringent California standards.

For

1974, it was 5%, '75 and '76 10% and this penalty is compared to
49-state models at the same time.
The 1977 California vehicular emission standards will
entail fuel economy losses over and above the 10% disadvantage currently experienced with California cars.

The results from our proto-

type cars, now being certified, designed to meet the '77 California
standards show considerable fuel economy losses of an additional
10% or more and maybe up to 20% in some cases.

Of course we are

working hard to meet these more stringent standards in the most
effective way we can to provide the minimum fuel economy penalties
to California.

We are no more pleased with this current situation

than is Californiai you may be assured that we will do our utmost
to reduce the losses wherever possible.

However, we are unaware of

any system or any manufacturer who now can or will be able in the
future to provide cars that will not lose fuel economy increasingly
at more stringent emission standards that are set •

.

In subsequent model years we have plans to continue to
improve fuel economy, by other alterations to the design of passenger
cars.

On a sales-weighted basis, nationwide, we project more than

a 50% improvement in fuel economy over 1974 cars by the 1980 model
year.

That's for sale outside of California, assuming a continuation

of present emission standards for those 49-state cars.

These fuel

economy projections and the penalties that I discussed earlier are
shown in the figure attached to what you have in your hands here now
as figure 4.

(see next page)
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address the penalties associated with meeting standards more stringent
than those established for the 1977 model year in California, it
does show them as a wide range based on data we now have developed
from our experimental systems.

At least for the next few years the inI

ternal combustion engine and the catalytic converter clearly stand
as the best technology to give us both cleaner air and improved fuel
economy.

More complete definition of the emission/fuel economy situa-

tion is included in the GM testimony of April 29, 1975 at the California waiver hearing, which is an attachment to the statement we
have submitted.
Based on the evidence to date, which includes over 35
billion miles of customer driving in converter-equipped GM cars,
- 26-

the massive effort of installing catalytic converters on the entire
1975 GM domestic production has been an outstanding success.

Known

converter problems of all kinds represent only a very small fraction
of 1% of General Motors converter car production.

The warranty rate

has been no greater than we would have experienced on mufflers and
exhaust systems for these same cars.
A criticism of the catalytic converter has resulted from
concern for sulfate emissions.

General Motors decided to conduct

an extensive research experiment to determine whether sulfate emissions from catalytic converters on automobiles could accumulate to
a harmful level under localized adverse traffic and weather conditions.
In order to obtain data with the widest possible application and
maximum acceptability by the scientific community, GM solicited participation by the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department
of Transportation, other government agencies including the California
Air Resources Board, other automobile manufacturers, oil companies
and catalyst manufacturers.

This testing has been conducted during

October of 1975 and it is now concluded.

In a number of months,

when all data have been obtained and analyzed, GM and EPA will announce the results of the program.
California has historically been a leader in environmental
concerns, particularly in the field of vehicular emission control,
and it can be observed that Californians, as a consequence, have
suffered greater fuel economy penalties than has the rest of the
country and in part, the disproportionate purchase of smaller cars
in California may have somewhat offset this differential in fuel
-27-

usage.

However, it still remains a fact that a fuel economy penalty

exists as emission control becomes more stringent.

We see no relief

from this "history" of fuel penalties in the near future, either with
conventional or with alternate engines.
In summation, our fuel economy and emissions progress
are closely linked, and indeed . interdependent.

The trade-offs

discussed in this statement must be considered by all of us involved
in the research and development, or in the regulatory process.
There is much at stake, and if mistakes are made they can be extremely
costly to either the environment or the energy resources, or to
both.

Thank you.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Thank you, Dr. Starkman.

Mr. Simerline,

could we hear from you at this point?
MR. S !MERLINE:

Good morning.

CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Speak into the microphone would you

please, it is being recorded.
MR. SIMERLINE:

I am Charles Simerline, Environmental

Requirements Manager of Volvo of America Corporation, Rockland, New
Jersey.

We appreciate this opportunity to share with you Volvo's

position with regard to future emission controls and fuel economy.
Even though Volvo is a comparatively small automotive company with
a total annual production of approximately 250,000 passenger cars,
approximately 30% of our production is exported to the U.S.A. and
this is our largest single market.

Our current emissions and

(inaudible)-related budget is $10.9 million a year, which is 31%
of our total R&D budget.

Volvo's position:
-28-

No. 1.

Our assumption

is that Americans wish to retain the automobile as a practical
convenience and economical form of private transportation.

No. 2.

Our aim is a logical, long-term program for the reduction of automobile air pollution at an economical cost; the development of alternative power sources will be decisively influenced by legislative NOx levels.

No. 3.

Our belief is that marketing pressures

will reduce automobile fuel consumption without the need for legislation.

No. 4.

Our need is a reasonable, obtainable, long-

term and, above all, a stable

regulatory program.

Our proposal

is that with, in terms of federal emission standards of HC 0.9,
CO 9.0, NOx 2.0 gm/mile, starting at the 1978 model year and continuing for the five years, California will remain at HC 0.41, CO 9,
NOx 1.5 for the same period.

No. 6.

Our control system is what

we call Lombersom, a feedback control fuel injection system,
plus a three-way catalyst.

In proposing the standards .9, 9, and

2.0, we have assumed that the current regulatory criteria will
be continued, thus useful vehicle life is, we find, 5 years or
50,000 miles, and we also assume that future productions for
(inaudible) programs will not require a further reduction in
engineering goals.

It is very difficult to meet more stringent

standards with presently available technology.

Along with such

technology as we can foresee for the immediate future it would
certainly involve extra cost and increased fuel consumption,
and we have considerable doubt regarding the long-term liability
of such · a system when it's actually put into use.

In order

to be cost effective from the point of view of average emissions,
regulations should be set up by which that can be achieved.
-29-

with control systems which do not invite tampering.
add-on systems, such as spark retards and

E~R

We feel that

are pretty easy to

disconnect, which results in an improvement in vehicle performance
at the expense of emission control.

It is also important to set

regulations at levels which do not inhibit the vast investments
needed for the development and production of alternative engine
types, such as diesel, stratified charge and jet turbines.
is introducing two new engines for model year 1976, a

Volvo

fo~-cylinder

overhead cam 2.1 liter and six-sylinder overhead cam, or aluminum
engine displacing 2.7 liters.

Both engines have averaged higher

miles per gallon than their counterparts.

Performance has also

been improved significantly, especially for the California models.
Both California models for 1976 are equipped with manifold air
injection catalyst, an (inaudible) ERG and continuous fuel injection.

For your information, Volvo's federal emission control

system consists of manifold air injection, on-off ERG on automatic
transmission VJW-ARB and continuous fuel injection for 1977.
During the last four years, Volvo has been developing the socalled Lombersom, or closed unit, fuel control system, also called
VJW-ARB conversion.

In close cooperation with our sub-suppliers

for the fuel injection system they tell us the development of
this system is now being finalized for our four-cylinder in-line
engine in order to be applicable or of benefit to our '77 California market.

Due to the requirement of a hot positioning of the

oxygen censor near the engine to achieve averaging of the exhaust composition of a-l l cylinders, considerably more development work is
-30-

0

0

required before this system can be applied successfully to our sixcylinder engine.

Volvo's four- and six-cylinder back-up systems

for California will be similar to 1976 systems except that the

0

catalyst will be improved and there is a possibility that a catalyst
change will be required at about 30,000 miles.

In conclusion, I

will attempt to respond to any questions from the Committee or
other members of the panel.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Simlerline.

I have

been told that we are not picking up some of our testimony in the
back and I found, having attended a number of hearings, that you
often have to talk directly into the microphone; ala Judy Garland,
you almost have to swallow it so if you will keep that in mind
when speaking, it will assist those in the back of the room when
they wish to hear, and also it will assist the secretary when she
has to transcribe all of these hearings, and, so, if we get each
and every word clearly into the microphone, which is not only for
our benefit today but for a future benefit of the record.

Shall

we then go back in order with Mr. Hass from the Air Resources Board ,
then Mrs. Meade and Dr. Caretto and then Mr. Hart.
MR. HASS:

Mr. Hass.

Mr. Chairman, Committee members, I would just

like to use my time to input some fuel economy and emission numbers
for your consideration.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Hold the microphone closer to you,

Mr. Hass.
MR. HASS:

The model year 1976 have given us an opportunity

to make a comparison between two alternative systems that are in
-31-

their second year of development.

Neither the federal nor the state

standards have changed during the past year so there has been some
degree of optimization and system improvement from one year to the
next.

The result is that we are able to look for once at a compari-

son of emission levels, required emission levels, and relative fuel
economy between these two different systems, and that is what I
would like to offer you today.
There are different ways of comparing the fuel economy
and I am going to give it to you in two different ways.

First off,

I think I should state the two standard levels I'm talking about,
the federal being 1.5 hydrocarbons, 15
level being .9 hydrocarbons, 9

co, and 3.1 NOx,

co, and 2.0 NOx•

California

There is a sub-

stantial difference in the levels of the hydrocarbons and all three
contaminants, in particular.

In comparing these cars you have to

make certain assumptions since the model makes are substantially
different in California than nationwide, so with that the most
basic way of making a comparison that we know of is to do a modelby-model comparison.

That is to take the California car, find its

federal counterpart as nearly as possible and compare their fuel
economy and on a sales-weighted basis, sum it up for the entire
California population.

Now, on this basis, in 1975 there was, ac-

cording to our calculations, about an 8% fuel penalty paid for the
extra control that California was getting.
that has shrunk somewhat to about 5-1/2%.

In the 1976 model year
The improvement from

1975 to 1976 was substantial in both federal and California cases.
It was 7-1/2% for California and 4. 6%
-32-

fo~

the national versions-. -

0

0

Now, one other basis has been used.

I don't recommend it too

highly, but I guess it is expressing the real life situation in
one way and that is to look just at sales-weighted fuel economy,

0

take the fuel economy figures for each model and weight it by
the number of sales in California and on this basis, in 1975 the
California miles-per-gallon figure was 15.2 and it increased to
17.1 in 1976.

The national was 15.6 in 1975 and increased to 17.2

so it is almost a stand-off in fuel economy when you take everything into consideration, including the fact that Californians tend
to have lighter motor vehicles.
We have done one other thing to try to relate this data
to what might happen in the future, we took 17 1975 model California
user families which certified below the 1977 California standards
level.

Now, the manufacturers will tell you if I don't so I'll tell

you that they will say that they have to design it lower than that
in practice in order to be able to meet our assembly line standards,
but we just took these numbers at face value and these 17 families
on certification met the 1977 standards.

Now, these would have had

a 7% average fuel penalty relative to 1975 federal standards.

Now,

the fuel panel penalty for individual families range from minus 2%
to 20%, so the midrange figure there is somewhere in the neighborhood of 10%, using that data.

We did one other thing, we looked

at the 1976 model Chevette from General Motors, which is a new
vehicle and was designed at the same time at both the federal and

•

the California standards, although they did design a separate one
for California.

Now, it turned out," I hope by design, that they

came very near to meeting the '77 California standards with the new
-33-

California Chevettes, and the 49-state versions had substantially
higher NOx emissions.

Now, here again the comparison becomes a

little tricky because there is a difference in axle ratio between
the 49-state version and the California version.

This, in turn,

I believe is related to the power put out by the engine in each
case, but we tried to compare it with the same axle ratio in the
federal and state version and carne out with about a 9% difference
in fuel economy.

Now, when the axle ratio effect is thrown in

that penalty about doubles by about 18%.

So, these are just ways

of looking at the data; they have their limitations; they are not
firm predictions; they support the estimate the staff gave the
Board back last spring when they considered the '77 standards so
the fuel penalty might be on the order of about 10% or thereabouts
relative to current federal standards, and as the federal standards
come down the margin, of course, _shrinks because the federal fuel
economy would get a little worse so there would probably still be
something on the order of a 5% difference in fuel economy.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:
MRS. MEADE:
the Committee.

Thank you, Mr. Hass.

Mrs. Meade.

Thank you, Mr. Ingalls, and members of

I am happy to have come at your invitation today

to address the problems that are facing this Committee.

I should

congratulate the Committee in just starting in that I know you are
facing not only this kind of a problem and holding hearings on it
but you are dealing with the other and very serious problems of
purlic transportation in California and having to look at that a l so.
Our concern is with that area but I real i ze that you must make
decisions in various areas that will be difficult .
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0

0

The air pollution health effect question keeps coming
home or keeps coming back like a bad

pen~y.

I do not think that

there is any study that has been done over the last ten years that

0

has not added to our knowledge of the health effects of air pollution
and has not reinforced the need for achieving federal air quality
standards or our own state air quality standards.

It may never be

possible to quantify results on health effects to tell you exactly
how many bodies will be carried off or how many people will be taken
to the hospital on a given dose of oxidants on a given day, it may

0

never be possible for the medical community to give you that kind of
quantification.

They have not been able to do it in terms of other

diseases or malfunctions of the human body.
to depend on medical judgments.

We will have to continue

In that area, we are most fortunate

in having medical committees in both the EPA and our state, whose
reports, as I say, are continuing to add to the information we already have.

I recommend to the Committee a recent report from the

EPA by Dr. Nelson.

The title is "The Acceptance of the Current

Scientific Bases for Achieving Cleaner Air in the United States".
I am sure this will be available to you, a letter from your staff
will take care of it.

The recent report is now almost a year old,

however, the National Academy of Sciences again went to the holding
firm on air quality standards.

This has nothing to do with the

emissions standard problems today, but if we can define what is
clean air, then perhaps we can work towards how to achieve it more
easily, and certainly achieving it even at a 5%, a 2-1/2% reduction
from the tail pipe is the kind of incremental reduction - we have to
-35-

satisfy ourselves with in California, and I think it is the only
way we can go.

There is no percentage that _is so small that we

needn't grab it because we need every percentage of reduction we
can get.

A final word in terms of the health effects, a recent

report of the EPA, "The Control for Chemical Oxidants", again from
the research efforts of the federal government, indicates that the
control of oxides of nitrogen may be more important in the photochemical reaetion than we previously thought.

Dr. Stephens per-

haps is available to us to get a copy of this report and evaluate
it from the California viewpoint.

He mentioned that reactive hydro-

carbon control was the most important.

I would like to have his

view, at a later time, of the newest report from the EPA, that
NOx, because it is transportable long distances, may be equally
important as controlling the reactive hydrocarbons.

This is im-

portant to you gentlemen or anyone else in control situations because you must choose one, two, or three of these pollutants from
the tail pipe if you wish to emphasize control.
I have a second item that I wish to bring to your attention and although I do not believe in government decision-making
by public opinion polls, I do find this helpful at times.

The

recent poll by Opinion Research indicating that the public is wi lling to pay a cost, either a fuel penalty or a dollar cost in the
purchase of a new car or equipment, I think it's most interesting
and should be read by all of you.
search or from the EPA.

It is available from Opinion Re-

It was taken, I might add, before the c itize ns

who were to be polled were besieged by the seven-thousand - dollar
-36-

0

advertising campaign which appeared in our major newspapers across
the country, indicating that the "big four" automotive manufacturers
coul d not achieve the emission standards as they are now statu-

0

torily put down.

However, I think even if the public hasn't been

able to read that advertising campaign perhaps the poll results
of Opinion Research would not be very different.

0

On fuel economy,

which is certainly of great concern, I recommend to you the report
on "The Confidence of Air Quality in Automotive Emissions", May 5,
1975.

0

There was a large section there which suggested fuel economy

and emission controls do not fight with each other in the design
of the car, and they suggest that great improvement in fuel economy
could be achieved in such things as reduction of the weight of
vehicles, the change in the vehicle mix to include a larger proportion of small cars, reduction in the ratio of engine power to
vehicle weight, use of more efficient transmissions, such as those
that lock during cruise, the use of radial tires and improved suspension systems.

The list goes on, gentlemen, and it has nothing

to do with emission control problems; these are things that can be
done in the design of the vehicle and they should be done now and
should have been done perhaps many years ago.

In terms of the testi-

mony that you will hear today, I would not question the sincerity
or the veracity of any of the speakers, and I would like to point
out to you that the EPA did a heavy report on the good faith effort
that was operating within the vehicle manufacturers, among them as
to whether or not these standards could be achieved.

This is ob-

tainable also as part of the record should you wish to get it.
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I

would not want to have produced all of this on a Xerox machine and
inundated you in San Diego to carry all this back to Sacramento
with you.

But the summary of this EPA survey of a good faith effort,

the survey team found that not every reasonable, technical alternative which had potential for achieving the desired goal for meeting
the statutory emission standard of .4 gp/m NOx emission was fully
explored by an individual automotive manufacturer nor by the industry as a whole.

I think that merely reinforces what the public has

felt for some while.

Because perhaps with that report and other

efforts a former colleague of many of you gentlemen, who is now Congressman Waxman, is introducing or has already introduced, an amendment to assure the attainment of the standards without further delay
beyond 1978 at the federal level.

Congressman Waxman was not that

active in the vehicle emission field while he was in California but
I think that the introduction of this amendment will make him a
star for California in Congress.
As a final point and I don't wish to take more than my
five minutes, but I will be available for questions afterwards, I
would suggest to you that in a little over 15 years of testifying
on various regulations before governmental bodies at the city, the
county, the state and the federal levels, it has been my persona l
experience that regulations precede the technology.

I have testified

rarely when the other people who were also testifying did not say
technology was not available to produce the desired results.

All

the other items, "It will cost too much.", or, "The trade-off is not
worth it."

Yet, when the regulation became a fact, technology met the
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0

0

challenge, the cost was not that great and could be acceptably borne
and the trade-off idea somehow disappeared by the, meeting the challenge of technology.

0

you would be clear.

I think the impression I wish to leave with
We have a strong 1977 emissions standard in

California, I would not want to see it changed and I would hope that
the results of this hearing would in no way jeopardize that very
stringent standard or the future stringent standards for vehicle
emissions in California.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Thank you, Mrs. Meade.

We next have

Dr. Caretto, whom I might note for the record for those of you who
don't know, I understand was formerly a student of Dr. Starkman's.
DR. CARETTO:

Now, you flatter me.

He taught me every-

thing I know and I still don't know anything.
DR. STARKMAN:

Is that a compliment or is it not?

DR. CARETTO:

Either that or you are a bad teacher.

DR. STARKMAN:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, if Larry and I

did teach each other something, why, hopefully, we both benefited.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:
DR. CARETTO:

Dr. Caretto.

I have already circulated to the

Committee through Assemblyman Lewis a brief statement and

~he

big

thrust of my statement, which I won't bother to simply reread here,
is simply that emissions and fuel economy are both important goals
and both can be achieved simultaneously.

I think it is important

for this Committee to recognize that one does not simply have to
give up on emissions control because there are fuel economy penalties.
Over the past three long years we have seen improvement in both,- we've
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seen continuous improvement in fuel economy while improving technology.

All speakers in the automotive industry here today have

affirmed the fact that the industry is in the program of improving
fuel economy.

They also claim that the increased emissions stan-

ards will not let them carry this program through as fast and as
far as they would like.

That, of course, is true.

There may be

some penalties due to increased emissions control but it is important to keep these things in perspective.

Emissions controls are

really sort of like a form of public air conditioning.

If you buy

an air conditioner for your car you are going to suffer fuel economy
penalty but you are going to get a benefit by not having to drive
around in the California desert or some such a place on a warm day
without being comfortable.
ditioner.

Emissions control is a public air con-

It might have an initial cost, it might have a fuel econo-

my penalty, but I think your panel, your Committee has to weigh this
in order to appropriate benefits.

There are certainly going to be

in some forms of technology some kind of fuel economy penalties, but
there are improvements, there are other ways of improving fuel economy
and I think that we see these being done right now, and we should
keep in mind that fuel economy is not a red flag that has to be waved
to offset improvement in fuel emissions control.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Thank you.

Thank you, Dr. Caretto.

We will get

back to you and some of your provocative thoughts.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:

Does this paper, Mr. Chairman,

have the other ways that he points out that this can be achieved?
DR. CARETTO:

Yes.
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0

CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

0

MR. HART:

Thank you.

Mr. Hart.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee,

thank you very much for the opportunity to speak here today.
0

first remark is a rebuttal.

My

I've heard several times that the fuel

economy penalty, and it has been stated as an absolute, is not an
essential attribute to cleaning
mobiles.

up the emissions of California auto-

As evidence, I would like to submit an article from a maga-

zine I have obtained from Dr. Caretto to my right here, which l ists
the various manufacturers and a change, as they state, from 49-states
to California fuel economy in meeting fuel emissions standards:
General Motors 12%, Ford 9.7%, Chrysler 13.5%, American Motors 11.9%.
These are losses in fuel economy because of, presumably you have got
some fuel emission standard requirements.

Volkswagon +3.4% and I

skip further down, Fiat +4.8%, and I would like to read briefly from
the text •••
ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:
MR. HART:

What's the article from?

This is a publication entitled "Passenger Car

Fuel Economy Trends through. 1976", published by the Society of Ameri can Automotive Engineers and the address, of course, and the authors
are give Austin (inaudible) Service.

This is on Page 10 and 11 of

that publication.
"On a fuel consumption weighted average, the California
models have 10.7 lower fuel economy than their 49-state counterparts.
Note, however, that some manufacturers do as well in meeting the
California standards as in meeting the 49-state standards.

This

can occur if the emission- control system is effective enough to allow
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the more stringent standards to be met without compromising the
basic engine calibrations that affect fuel economy.

Volkswagen,

for example, has .chosen an emission control system for some models
which allows them to achieve compliance with the California standards
without compromising their fuel economy performance.

As you see from

the list of numbers here, fuel economy at Volkswagen has actually increased.

For this reason, Volkswagen chose to use no special calibra-

tions optimized fuel economy of cars which also use the same system
to meet the less stringent 49-state standards.

Volkswagen's Chief

Engineer explained this in the public record during the last series
of EPA's suspension hearings, etc."
I would like to go to my notes now.

One of you talked of

the UAW speaking in Beverly Hills Saturday, said that " ••• when the
automobile industry is asked to improve its product in public interest
it always responds in three ways.

First, it says the technology is

not available, it isn't ready yet and will take years to develop.
Secondly, the change will ruin sales, jobs will be lost.

Thirdly,

the change will increase prices the public will have to pay."

I

agree with Mr. Woodcock, that has been my experience with the auto
industry.

And

I

would like to offer an illustration of the results

of this attitude on the part of the executives in Detroit.

The

energy-absorbing steering column was invented in 1923, the need was
evident.

Steering columns were known to increase the death and in-

jury rate of head-on impacts.

The steering column penetrates the

chest and abdominal cavities and causes very severe injuries frequently
in this type of impact.

One author says that 25% of all deaths
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0

were caused by penetration of the chest and abdominal cavity by
the steering column.

The industry waite4 until 1968 when federal

law was certain to demand it to adopt the energy-absorbing steering
0

column.

During that 45 years of delay, 250,000 Americans died of

steering column inflicted chest and abdominal injuries.

I think that

number compares very interestingly with all of the war deaths of the
United States in

its entire history, the deaths from heroin, the

deaths from other sources.

We see a {inaudible) on every occasion

when design changes in the public interest are discussed.

There are

few, if there are any, industries which are so important to the public
interest.

One of six workers in this country are employed in its

many aspects.

Hundreds of thousands of workers are hostage to the

industries and the franchisers.

As a consequence and despite his

fine words, Mr. Woodcock and UAW have jumped into bed with G.M.,
Ford, and Chrysler, which is a price we pay for our neglect of our,
that is, society's responsibility.

The "big three" in Detroit do not

want to change and most of all, they are outraged at the notion of
government inerference, even to enforce the least deference to the
public interest.

The cost of labor as we all know is a great cost

in the manufacture of automobiles.
fabricate a Chevrolet as a Cadillac.

It requires as much labor to
The difference in manufactur-

ing costs at G.M. is about $300, probably in luxury fittings, but
the yahoos, I say we yahoos, will pay about $3,000 more for the
Cadillac.

G.M., therefore, makes $1500 more per Cadillac sold, $200

for Chevrolets, the difference is probably the cost of advertising
and retailers. The profit margins in small cars is even less, 4%
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to 5%.

The Japanese, of course, are more experienced in the manu-

facture of smaller cars.

Our industry is

fr~ught

with the necessity

of competing with low-profit units, a field in which it has done
very poorly in the past.

Detroit is springing to a low quality,

over-sized and high profit product.

The industry has chosen solu-

tions to the emissions and to fuel economy problems which are optimal
for the industry.

They are able to do this, of course, because the

Department of Transportation has chosen to use a performance specification.

As we have seen from the Volkswagen incident, the industry

is free to choose the solutions they wish to choose provided they
meet performance standards, and they often and frequently do not
do that.

To choose solutions which are optimal for the public interest

is unhappily not in the books as long as we continue in the way we
have chosen, and particularly when we appear to be allowing the industry to follow what appears to be a voluntary path.

There is a

great deal of technology which would be both cost effective and efficient in correcting obvious abuses in both (inaudible) emissions
and excessive fuel consumption, and I list these:

reduce the size

of all vehicles in our auto population to rational dimensions and
reasonable weight; mandatory radial steel tires; mandatory manual
transmissions or at any rate, more efficient transmissions; eliminate
power optionals, including air conditioning; mandatory fuel injection; improve the fuel system, location of the fuel system, location
of the gas tank, for instance, the filler pipe.

It's of interest

to note that the location of the gas tank and the filler pipe is instrumental in causing hundreds of deaths each year. - We've had such
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an incident

not many weeks ago in which the car was struck from a

moderate rear end collision, two of them died, were incinerated in
that car because of the location of the gas tank.

The gentleman who

drove the car which struck them has been indicted for, as I believe,
.felony drunk-driving, or for perhaps only manslaughter, I'm not certain.
I submit that the person and the firm who designed that car had at
least an equal part in the deaths of the two who had been involved.
Incidentally, the location of the filler pipe and the gas tank also
contributes substantially.

One estimate is 100 tons of gasoline and

hydrocarbon vapors per day in the Los Angeles area alone, due to the
spillage which results from the inefficient location of the filler
pipe; 100 tons a day is a very large proportion of the hydrocarbon
burning in the Los Angeles atmosphere.
engine choices.

I haven't mentioned alternative

My suggestion is that many of these things are suit-

able for adoption by the Legislature by the regulation of the auto
industry and ought to be considered in the Legislature's deliberations.
Hopefully, the industry will change its position.

If it were possible

it can be envisioned that a committee representing the public interest
as well as the industry and government could easily form a portion of
the criteria-making process, that is,to form a code of standards to
establish design parameters for the auto industry.

It is quite clear

that our protheses to date have not been effective.

Government and

the industry apparently are combined in a delaying action, partly because of fears of effects on the economy and I think those are of

0

course justified.

Nevertheless, the correction of the abuses of our

automobile design are worthy of an enormous effort and perhaps even
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enormous sacrifices.

There are few steps which can offer such great

benefits to the publ ic interest.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Thank you, Mr. Hart.

I think all of the

statements have prompted questions and I have written down a number of
questions myself and members of the Committee.

I think the following

format should be followed as much as possible that before speaking
either from the Committee members or from the panel members who have
joined the Committee, we should try to have recognition by. the Chair
so that we can maintain a certain amount of order.

One person is al-

ways exempted from this standing rule of the Committee and that is
Mr. Lanterman,who I've never tried to control.

But in any event,we

should try to follow that orderly process although I understand that
we--it is the desire of many of us, the Chair included, to be more
informal in this hearing than we do at a traditional hearing where
each of you comes forward, one at a time, and makes a presentation.
We are, of course, looking for and I have seen developed already a
certain conflict amongst the panel members that have joined us and I
would like to pursue some of those with, between the panel members,
sort of watching like they did in the old gladiatorial combat days to
see whose ideas are going to win out, but I think we should start with
some questions if we do have them of the Committee and then
I would like to have questions of one another amongst the panel members.
Obviously, what Mrs. Meade, Dr. Caretto, and Mr. Hart are saying are
somewhat in conflict with what the representatives of auto manufacturers
are saying, and we have expertise from the ARB and EPA and the Statewide Air Pollution Research Center to put in that mix.
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I w0uld like

to see some give and take and some interchange of ideas.

I'm not

saying who is right or wrong, I think that is something that will
require a great deal of reflection before making our choices as
decision-makers.

We will start off with Mr. Lanterman and then any

other member.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

I want to ask you a question.

Yes, Sir.

ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:

Mr. Stork says he has to leave and

can we get the testimony through otherwise he may run into the point
where he will have to leave before we can get to his questions.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

I think that might be appropriate.

Does

any member of the Committee have a question of Mr. Stork on what he
said in his brief presentation?
ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

What is his schedule?

He has a 1:45 flight and he will have to

leave by at least one o'clock at the absolute latest, more like probably, 12: 30.
MR. STORK:

I can certainly stay with you for whatever length

of time it takes to get to the airport and catch the 1:45 flight and I
gather that you will probably go on until 12:30 or 1:00 o'clock.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

12:30 probably.

ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:

Well, we could get you into five

o'clock asking the other questions first, but it seemed to me that your
priority in time ought to be recognized.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Does anyone have a question that Mr. Stork

is here, not as a decision-maker as someone who has a particular point
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of view to express, but I hope as a resource person and we don't want
to put him on the spot except to ask him resource questions.

Mr. Chel

and then Mr. Kapiloff.
ASSEMBLYMAN FRED CHEL:

Mr. Stork, does the EPA have any

kind of authority over the advertising news by the automobile manufacturers pertaining to their supposed attainment of miles per gallon?
MR. STORK:
advertising.

No, sir, Mr. Chel, we have no authority over the

That is something that the Federal Trade

authority over.

Co~ssion

has

We work very closely with the Federal Trade Commission.

The Federal Trade Commission has recently promulgated a guide which is
not a regulation, calling on the industry to use EPA fuel economy estimates if they give any kind of estimate or make any kind of claim for
fuel economy that is enforced by the FTC.
ASSEMBLYMAN CHEL:

As you know, the automobile manufacturers

are utilizing the EPA figures extensively.

Now I gather, at least from

some of the people here that as far as California is concerned those
are not accurate.
MR. STORK:

I would not agree, sir, that the numbers are not

accurate •••
ASSEMBLYMAN CHEL:
MR. STORK:

Well, they are based on the 49-state cars.

No, sir.

We separately measure and separately

publish fuel economy estimates for 49-state cars and for California
cars.

Presumably national advertisements which goes on T.V. would pre-

sumably be based on 49-state cars, yet I'm quite confident that local
media advertising, California newspapers, California editions of Time,
etc., presumably -would use California data, yet I am not in a position
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to speak to advertising practices.

I am in a position to speak to

the basis for the data and we believe the data are accurate.
ASSEMBLYMAN CHEL:

Now, how do the foreign cars measure up

in terms of meeting the standards set by California and the federal
standards?
MR. STORK:

All cars that are sold in the United States

meet the standards applicable to them, otherwise they don't get sold.
ASSEMBLYMAN CHEL:

What I have in mind here though, is their

fuel penalty which is equivalent to those of American cars?
MR. STORK:

That's a very

vague~

difficult thing to say, sir,

if what you have in mind is whether there is a fuel economy penalty
for a Volkswagen sold in Germany and a Volkswagen sold in this country.
We do not have data on Volkswagons sold in Germany; therefore, I am not
in a position to give you data on that.

However, the data on the 49-

and 50-state cars that Mr. Hass cited are essentially either our data
or the same as our data, so we have no dispute with Mr. Hass

on his

analysis.
ASSEMBLYMAN CHEL:

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Mr. Kapiloff.

ASSEMBLYMAN 'LAWRENCE KAPILOFF:

Mr. Stork, does your agency

engage in any experiments with mixtures of fuel and the effects of
those mixtures on both emissions and performance?
MR. STORK:

Sir, as part of our program this year we will be

endeavoring in our jargon to characterize emissions of alternative
fuels, particularly fuels such as petroleum distillates and shale oil
distillates.

That work is only planned to get under way.
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We are not

yet in a position to give you data on the emission by-products of
the combustion of those fuels.
ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF:

Will that, will you be testing mix-

tures of methanol as well?
MR. STORK:

We have, in the _past, _tested methanol mixtures,

methanol gasoline mixtures as well as pure methanol.
ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF:

Yes, sir.

Is there any way of getting those

figures on your tests?
MR. STORK:

Oh, surely, I've got them for the public and .•.

ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF:· Can you give me some idea of where
I could write, communicate?
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Perhaps, Mr. Kapiloff, Mr. Stork could

provide that information to the Committee and we could provide it in
turn to you.
ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF:
MR. STORK:
reports on that.

I

Fine, I would appreciate it very much.

would be pleased to provide you with our test

Basically, sir, we are adding methanol to gasoline,

which has the same effect as leaning-out of the carburetor and therefore CO and to some extent HC tends to go down but also fuel economy
goes down because thermal value of methanol is substantially lower than
that of gasoline.
ASSEMBLYMAN KAPILOFF:

That's kind of interesting because

testimony before the Energy, the now-defunct Energy Committee on one
of my bills where methanol mixture by some representatives from the,
it's the corporation that is owned by the United States Air Force,
does not tend to agree with that statement at all.

-so-

On long-range

testing of methanol, about 15% as mixture.
MR. STORK:

Well, I can only speak to the data that we

have generated, sir, and that, in effect, is what our data shows.
We've also mude estimates on the possibility of using methanol and
as I recall the numbers, we have it in our test report, if all of
the grain grown in the United States were used to make alcohol in
use of fuel, it would provide maybe 20% of our fuel needs.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Thank you, Mr. Stork.

I believe

Mr. Wornum has a question.
ASSEMBLYMAN MICHAEL WORNUM:

The EPA can require the auto-

mobile manufacturers to satisfy the fuel consumption.

Is that not

right?
MR. STORK:

I didn't catch the first part •••

ASSEMBLYMAN WORNUM:

The EPA can require the automobile

manufacturers to certify the miles per gallon on the sale of the car
or not.

Is this - something that you can require them to do or not?
MR. STORK:

We are not yet required to do it, sir, although

a bill that I believe has cleared Conference Committee in the U. S.
Congress wi l l, in effect, require us to do it, but so far it has been
a voluntary effort on the part of the automobile industry to allow us
to test our cars for fuel economy but it is not all that voluntary
because they would have a hard time explaining why they wouldn't let
us test them.
ASSEMBLYMAN WORNUM:

,We ll , the point I am making is I had

a bill to require the posting on the sale of the car, the fuel consumption.

We heard

test~mo ny

t hat t hough the manufacturers are
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doin~ ,

i s natur a lly putting those certificates on, the dealers are just
as regularly ripping them of f, so t hat t h e fin a l , t he consumer
d oesn ' t , isn ' t able to make t h a t c onsump tio n a h ead o f t ime , a n d I
am just wondering if the EPA h as the power t o require, like t hey
d o in pricing and the pollution

cont rol have actua lly the fue l

consumption so the buyer can see when he buys the car, at leas t
has a basis of judgment between mode l s, etc .
MR. STORK:

We do not now have that author i ty , sir, i f

t he bill that's currently before the U.

s.

Congress becomes law, we

will have that authority, beginning with the 1977 Model Year.
ASSEMBLYMAN WORNUM:

And you would be able to see that

that actual consumption was on the final car as on the sale?

That

no one could remove it before it was sold?
MR. STORK:

If the law so provides it will be a question

of enforcing it and making sure the dealers don't take it off.

Now

a number of manufac turers to their credit have for the 1976 Model
year included the fuel economy data on the so-called Mongolin label ,
a label that is not permitted to be removed by law except by the
purchaser and to that extent, of course, the fuel economy data are
not removed, but without legal authority to require it, sir, we are
s i mply not in a position to require it.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:
CHAIRMAN INGALLS :

Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Lanterman.

ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN :

In the reference to Volkswagen,
~

a re you r efer r ing t o the Beetle air-cooled engine or the new waterc oo l e d t r a ns ve r se e n gine t hat is transplanted and is used on the
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Rabbit and the Dasher and the Scirocco or whatever their names are,
but it is all the same engine, it is a little (inaudible) watercooled engine.
The bugs

Now what, how are you comparing, what mode l Volkswagen

are the ones that are being phased out with the old air-

cooled job?
MR. STORK:

Reference to Volkswagen, sir, was not mine,

it was one of the other speakers citing an SAE paper prepared by o u r
technical staff.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:
MR. STORK:

Well, what did they refer to?

And I do not have it at my fingertips , that

paper, so •••
ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:

Well, why do you supply this lan-

guage?
MR. HART:

Sir, the reference to the, in the paper, it is

the comparison, comparably year for year.

I am not certain what year

because I just •••
ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:
MR. HART:

Well, what model was it?

It is the same model as both in California and

in the other 49-states.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:
MR. HART:

All right.

In California, the Volkswagen shows, despite

the fuel emission requirements, a 3.4% increase in mileage ability.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:

Did it give the car a year, is that

covering the year •••
MR. HART:

I would have to

~eflect

audible) for 1976 models .
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on that.

On the (in-

CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Dr. Starkman, do you want to give him

that ••.
DR. STARKMAN:

I want to straighten the record out and I

would like to have in your records these two documents which are
put out by the EPA, 1975 Gas Mileage for new car buyers in California,
and similarly for new car buyers in the other 49-states, and '76 as
well and if you will examine the Volkswagen,

you will find that in

an exclusive way all models in California a catalyst is part of standard
equipment but is not in the other 49-states.

If you listened to my

testimony or read it, you will find you are able to improve the fuel
economy by supplying the catalyst but you also increase the price.
There is nothing strange or mysterious about what's happening at
Volkswagen

and we go through the same thing, but to the detriment

of the other 49-states.

So may I please have the numbers put into

the record, including the fact that the catalyst is supplied on
California cars and is not on the 49-states, and that is equally
true of many other cars, the numbers that we find being compared
are apples or oranges.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

The documents you referred to which are

publications by the Environmental Protection Agency will be incorporated into the record by reference.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:

Can we get copies for the Committee

Mr. Chairman?
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

The Environmental Protection Agency,

Mr. Stork, could we have enough copies for every member of the Committee.
-53b-

MR. STORK:

I think you should have.

MR. HEINEN:

I happened to be Chairman of the particular

meeting at which this paper was given.

I think it is not only im-

portant that you get a copy of the papers that were submitted at that
time, but also of the discussion which, incidentally, brought out
the point that Mr. Starkman made.

It also brought out the fact that

many times when there are comparisons between the federal and the
California system when it is said, "See, there is no loss. " ; it is
because over the same system, I might also add parenthetically, that
when you are comparing small cars, you have a somewhat different situation.

If you will remember, we have a situation whereby all cars

are supposed to give the same emissions per mile.

Now, if you were.

to compare that in terms of dogs, the SPCA would get after you.

There

is a much more difficult job to be done in terms of fuel economy on
a larger car than there is on a smaller car, and, incidentally, while
we are talking about smaller cars, let me put in one personal large
objection.

I have a family of seven kids, and I will be darned if

I want to haul around two little cars in order to get them around
the country.

There are needs for large cars as well as small cars.

Now, later on in the discussion I will have a good deal about some
of the points for improving the weight of cars to which I have been
devoted for many, many years as head of our materials laboratory,
i.e., at Chrysler.

That is a different subject, but as far as the

size, cars are guilt because people are that size, not because of
any structural whim on the part of the American automobile industry,
and, incidentally, because of a cost differential or profit
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differential.

In some cases, we have lesser differentials on some

of the bigger cars than we have on smaller cars.

That is an account-

ing issue and I don't think we need to bring that one up.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Thank you.

The reason we had this

particular structure is so you get some of these ideas out, and
hope in the competition of ideas free society brings out is truth,
but I think we want to make sure that we have asked Mr. Stork all
the questions that the Committee members or panel members wanted
to ask him.

Any further questions to Mr. Stork from the EPA?

Yes,

Mr. Hart.

MR. HART:

Mr. Chairman?

CHAIRMAN INGALLS:
MR. HART:

Yes, Mr. Hart:

Is it appropriate for panel members to ask such

a question?
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Yes, I think the Committee members have

all completed their questions.
MR. HART:

Yes, Mr. Hart?

My question is a little difficult to state but

I would like to know whether the EPA takes an active interest in the
solutions which the auto industry uses to meet EPA standards.

That

is, if the industry proposes, for instances, to use a catalyst and
it is found that the catalyst or spark retard or whatever have another undesirable effect, does EPA approach the problem with a study
taken, say, a cost-benefit

compari~on

of all alternatives which are

necessary for achieving the same result?
MR. STORK:
diffiGult

t~

stg.te ~

You said, sir, that the question is a little

Ill the . 9g_:rr~~xt

_Q~ __ yg~r

earlier comments which

I understood to support the idea of design standards or the government
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specifying or at least requiring certain types of designs.

If that

is related to your question, we do, in fact, review all aspects of
the technology used by the industry and we regularly publish a comprehensive technology assessment report which I am sure are available
to this Committee through their staff.

We have published cost

analyses for the various alternatives that the industry could use.
However, we do not believe that it would be wise public policy for
the federal government to specify the types of technology that should
be used to meet standards.

We believe that that would be an unwise

policy because it would be a stifling innovation because our ability,
the ability of my staff, to be so all wise as to pick the right
technology and then reply that it should be used.

Modesty is not

usually my strong point, but I don't think I, or my staff, would have
the ability to do this job wisely.
It is for that reason, that the EPA is committed to the
use of performance standards.
criteria, which

We do, however, look at performance

may, of course, involve such issues as emission by-

products from catalysts.

We learned belatedly, obviously, about the

potential sulfuric acid emissions from oxidation catalysts.

We are

very much concerned about the potential of other unregulated emissions
from freeways or from reduction catalysts used to control NOx.

And

the EPA is engaged in a major effort to attempt to quantify, to
identify and to quantify the types of emissions that can occur from
all types of emission-control systems, not only under normal operating conditions but also under reasonably predictable malfunction conditions.

So, it is in that sense that we expand our concern about
- 56-

performance not only to meeting the regulated pollutants but also
to evaluating the potential of the causation of other pollutants.
Perhaps I have talked all around your question and not answered
it at all.

But, as you said, it was hard to state.
MR. HART:

No, I think you certainly have answered it,

but I would like to enlarge on it, expand on it just one little
bit if I may, sir.
MR. STORK:
MR. HART:

Certainly.
And that is, if you are convinced that the

public interest is not served by the choice made by the industry,
do you then take a public position or do you otherwise debate the
question?

How is the public interest served then if the industry

chooses to be (inaudible) about their solutions?
MR. STORK:

Well, I suppose when, as, and if we were con-

vinced that a particular choice of emission control technology by
the industry were contrary to the public interest and equally convinced that there were available an alternative choice which would
be more in the public interest, at a minimum we would be heard from.
Yet, we are at the moment not convinced of that kind of a situation
except, as we publicly stated, we are very much concerned about a
connnitrnent to NOx catalysts in the absence of a complete characterization of the potential unregulated pollutants, and the scientists
come up with a

lo~g

list of hazardous substances that may or may not

come out of these catalysts.

We would be concerned about a connnit-

ment to NOx catalysts in the absence of a complete inventory of
po~lu~an~s th~t

_may come out of such

~evices ~
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CHAIRMAN INGALLS:
0

DR. STARKMAN:

Dr. Starkman .

Just one smal l comment on that.

The EPA

does exert an influence, they don't demand any particular kind of
equipment.
0

On the question of suspensi on of 1975 standards that

rose in 1973 , Mr. Ruckelshaus stated very clearly that he was
establishing standards where he was establishing them for the purpose of forcing the catalysts on the cars.

0

Those are not his exact

words but it is pretty close.
MR . STORK:

His exact words, Dr. Starkman, were that

former Administrator Ruckelshaus found that catalytic emission

0

control devices are effective and available technology and should
be used.

He established standards that he believed would require

them to be used--would cause them to be used--but he did not require
0

them to be used.
DR. STARKMAN:

That is a little bit like saying, you can

get across this river without using a bridge, but I'd advise you
not to swim.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Thank you.

Mr. Hart, did that answer

your question?
MR. HART:

Ei t h er way, i t does Mr. Chairman, but I sug-

gest that there are other possibi l i t i es of getting across that river ,
boats and what have you .
CHAI RMAN I NGALLS:
nology from t he bridge .

Thank you.

That is a different tech-

Mr. Che l and then Mr. Calvo have questions,

Mr. Stork.
ASSEMBLYMAN CHEL:

Mr. St ock, has the EPA done any kind
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of comparative studies on alternative engines?
MR. STORK:

Yes, sir, until quite

r~cently,

the beginning

of this year, the EPA was responsible for the federal government
effort to explore the potential of or to develop alternative automotive power assistance.
ASSEMBLYMAN CHEL:

In connection with those studies and

considering the current state of the art on the various other engines
available, what is the most likely alternative that would provide us
with maximum fuel economy as well as low emissions?

In terms of your

study, I'll qualify that by saying, that can be produced well within
the state of the arts.
MR. STORK:

That question, sir, is an inordinately difficult

one to answer without your specifying the time frame in which •••••
ASSEMBLYMAN CHEL:

At the present time.

engine being produced in Germany and Japan.
MR. STORK:

We have a Wankel

How does that stack up?

Okay, what alternative engines can be produced

now?
ASSEMBLYMAN CHEL:
MR. STORK:

Yes.

Practically none.

The rotary engine, which is

being built in Japan, still has a long way to go in matching the fuel
economy performance, conventional Otto cycle engine.

Near-term alter-

natives that would permit meeting low HC and CO standards without
catalysts would be the stratified charge, would be the Honda version
of the stratified charge, but that also would require a good deal of
lead time for the industry and a commitment on the part of the industry to go in that directien.

One of the main obstacles for the
-59-

industry is going in that direction is uncertainty

0

about the alter-

nate NOx standards; these stratified charge engines, by their
nature, operate very lean and, thus, are not capable of being controlled for NOx through catalytic means and, therefore, would serve

0

no purpose for the industry unless the ultimate NOx standards , or
I guess I don't like the word ultimate--like ultimate solution,· there
are no such--but at least the NOx standard for the foreseeable decade
was not much lower than 2.

So, in the near-term , technologically

and feasibly, there are no alternatives.

For the substantially longer

term, 10 to 20 years, there are, of course, a lternatives which may

0

or may not prove up.
ASSEMBLYMAN CHEL:

At the present time--! presume that

the Wankel engine that is being introduced into the United States
either from Germany or Japan .•.
MR. STORK:

From Japan, sir.

ASSEMBLYMAN CHEL:

And there are no Germans being produced

on the market?
MR. STORK:

No, sir.

NSU, for instance, does not certify

cars for the American market for rotary engines.
ASSEMBLYMAN CHEL:

Well, the Japanese, in many of them,

meet our standards in California as we l l as EPA.
MR. STORK:

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN CHEL:

In terms of fuel economy, how do they

compare?
MR. STORK:

In terms of fuel economy, Mazda of America or

rather Toyota o f Tok yo has made r e markable improvements on the 1974-75

-6 0a-

model year in fuel economy.

It's getting quite close, I think,

for the weight class to fuel economy from

r~ciprocating

engines,

but it is still not as good as the best reciprocating engines.
ASSEMBLYMAN CHEL:

Doesn't GM have some sort of a license

in the Mazda?
DR. STARKMAN:

Yes, Mr. Chel.

I think it is well known

pragmatically to bring the rotary engine up to the state where we
could compete in fuel economy and emissions at the same time.

Pain-

fully so, we came to the conclusion just before the 1975 model year
that mach as that engine has a lot going for it in terms of size
and weight, it still didn't meet the criteria that we have to face
for '75,

1

76 and could be '77, so we have not withdrawn from our

agreement with the NSU organization who owns the basic patents.
We are still continuing to work on an engine to try and get its
emissions and fuel economy compatible enough so that it will be a
viable competitive engine in the market place.
ASSEMBLYMAN CHEL:
documentation here.

I notice you do not list it in your

And in this documentation, the one that was

just provided here, you list the Stirling, diesel, etc.
DR. STARKMAN:
possibilities.

Well, that's oversight.

We haven't dropped it.

It is one of. the

It is more, I would say,of

a conventional engine perhaps than the Stirling and the Brayton,
or gas turbine, if you will, but, again, it's a question of the
competitiveness in the market place, whether or not you can get
that engine up to the point where it will compete satisfactorily
in environmental and energy concerns.
-GOb-

I cap

~ay

this in all candor,

given the situation we had five years ago, we might have said in
the long run, we will put up with low fuel economy as long as we
can make emission standards.

We can't do that anymore.

has been a very painful process for us, believe me.

So, it

But nonethe-

less, we are not at that point where we can put it into production
yet.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Assemblyman Lanterman.

ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:

Mr. Chairman, I don't think it

is generally known that General Motors puts their money

~here

their

mouth was and was true of up to the extent between $500 and $600 million dollars for the production of the rotary engine.

That on the

basis of the economy and all of the rest of the factors involved,
it had to be shelved.

When I say they are not willing to put up

their money, they did put up their money, $50 million for the licensing,
is that correct?
DR. STARKMAN:

That is correct.

ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:

And between $5 and $600 million on

the tooling.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Thank you Mr. Lanterman.

Mr. Hart,

would you like to make one brief comment before we go to Mr. Calvo
for questions?
MR. HART:

Yes.

We have omitted two other alternatives

which are entirely present technology.

One is the diesel engine,

which may have some first cost disadvantages, but on a larger scale,
scale production, I am sure those could be reduced substantially,
but

ha~

enormous advantages in operation,
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maintenanc~

is much less,

fuel is substantially less by a very large amount, the reduction
of hydrocarbons is certainly excellent, the only difficulty is NOx,
and perhaps for the other benefits we might get for it, perhaps our
society might be willing to accept that, but certainly diesel engines
are not future technology.

It is present.

It is here.

And it is

available.
The other alternative is fuel injection.
the benefits of the diesel engine.

Which has many of

It can use a less volatile fuel.

If we had universal fuel injection, we could do away with carburetors.
There might be some first cost disadvantages, but the advantages in
the long run operational-wise to the public would be very substantial
and certainly a very large reduction in hydrocarbons insofar as air
pollution is concerned.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:
DR. STARKMAN:

Mr. Starkman, you wanted to comment?

Yes.

CHAIRMAN INGALLS:
Mr. Hienen wanted to comment.

Mr. Starkman wanted to comment, then
Then we will get back to Mr. Calvo's

next question.
DR. STARKMAN:
ments of Mr. Hart.

I would like to respond to both of the com-

First, in respect to diesel engines.

The demand for diesel engines historically in the United
States has been low, and for a number of reasons attendant thereto.
For the same size engine, one gets less power from a diesel, and
there is no alternative apparently to that prospect at a reasonable
price.

More recently, however, with the energy considerations that

we are running _into, the diesel engine is becoming more attractive.
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Consequent to that, in part at least, is the announcement we have
made that we intend to go into

producti~n

of a diesel engine a little

more disposed towards the American market than those that
available in the European market.

mig~~

be

I might say, parenthetically, we

produce a four-cylinder, two-liter diesel engine in Germany, but
we have in the works now, are moving forward with a diesel engine
that will be based upon a presently existing V8 engine, small base,
with the intention that it will be applied to light-duty trucks and
to some of our passenger cars just as soon as we can fuel up.
Now, at the moment, that particular diesel engine which is
a modification of the passenger car engine would be too expensive
to make to the kind of criteria which was just quoted.

Namely,

hundreds of thousands of miles of durability would be wasteful.
But that particular engine is producing about two grams per mile
of NOx.

When it is held to the hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide

levels, which we face in the next few years, particularly in California, we would like to offer the engine in California and we are
trying to get its NOx level "down so that we are able.
fuel injection.

There are a number of fuel injection cars on the

market, including some of our own.
injection.

It regards

There is nothing magic about fuel

The main thing one wishes to do is to gain anything by

way of emissions control or fuel economy that one can for reason of
price.
Fuel injection has its attributes.
attributes.

Carburization has its

And we are hoping that we can work in a direction of

whichever kind of fuel preparation system is the least expensive and
most suitable and fight.

We have no qualms about fuel injection
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That's the best way to go.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Thank you.

Mr. Heinen had a question

or a comment on this.
MR. HEINEN:

I just wanted to comment on one thing.

At

today's panel I believe we are talking about what's available in
the framework of 1976-1980.

One thing we must not forget is that

in order to change over the engines of this nation to anything else,
four years is essentially no time, as we will hear in tomorrow's
discussion.

This is true if we want to set up the facilities for

a hundred percent fuel injection, which heaven forbid, people would
be real sorry if they had to go through the complications of full
size, cylinder injection; or, whether we are going in the direction
of diesels to convert the production lines between now and 1980 is
absolutely zero as far as the possibility is concerned.
may get out an individual model.

Yes, you

I guess I am not in a position

to mention anything about the price of his plan.

But let's say

it is not beyond the realms of possibility that we might be thinking along that line.

I don't know whether Roger wants to comment.

But we do have rather parallel thinking as soon as good ideas come
up in Detroit, as you may have found out.
The point I want to make is, when we are talking about
changing over, we are not talking in the time frame of '76-'80
for ninety percent conversion of our production lines.

It is just

not in the cards.
MR. HART:

Mr. Chairman, may I •••

CHAIRMAN INGALLS:
MR. HART:

Mr. Hart.

Dr. Starkman used the question of cost.
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Yes,

there is a cost disadvantage.

Diesel engines cost more, but in

the total picture, that is the total operating purchase price cost
of an automobile, a · diesel engine is a very large cost saver to
the owner.

There is no question about that, and I dare say Dr.

Starkman and Mr. Heinen will agree with this.
Mr. Heinen has mentioned the fact that it would take four
years to change over to alternative engine configurations.

Perhaps

that is true, but I would like to point out that this debate didn't
start yesterday.

If we had started four years ago to make some

rational decisions about our engine alternatives, we probably could
have a much more reasonable automobile population today than we have
now.

This is not
an argument that started yesterday.
\

It has been

underway for at least ten years to my knowledge and I wonder where
the decisions were during that period of time.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Thank you.

ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:

Mr. Lanterman had a question.

Yes, Mr. Starkman and Doctor,

I have always been curious about the by-products of the diesel exhaust,

particularly the particulates and the benzo-pyrene and those

of a carcinogenous nature.

Is it anything that we have to worry

about essentia l ly to the degree that if we increase the diese l production for motor car and truck use, are we going to have to put
an after-burner of some kind or a converter on it, or can we take
care of that?
DR. STARKMAN:

I was afraid Mr. Lanterman was going to

call Mr. Stork's attention to some of these other things that a
diesel engine puts out before we ever get it to marketplace.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:
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We l l, the aldehydes we al l

know, and they stink to high heaven.
DR. STARKMAN:

In all sincereness, while a diesel engine

does have its characteristic

odor and while it is noisier and .•.

ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:
DR. STARKMAN:

Heavier.

And it is heavier.

Nonetheless, I think

that the energy situation we have, we are willing to move ahead and
see if the market will take it.
Now, on particulates, there was at one time a proposal from
EPA, and Eric Stork may wish to comment upon this, to limit particulates from internal combustion engines used for automobiles and that
then was subsequently put aside because of more pressing matters,
but if the EPA were to impose such a control standard for particulates as they recommended to adopt a few years ago, the diesel engine for passenger cars would not be a possibility.

We just couldn't

have ••.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:
DR. STARKMAN:

Trucks the same way.

ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:
DR. STARKMAN:

Is there any difference with trucks?
We have a problem.

You're bluffing .••

As you constrain the emissions from diesel

engines by whatever mechanism, the smoke problem, a particulate
problem

becomes increasingly more difficult.

We are able to control

the engines at the moment to the standards which exist and hope to
be able to continue to.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:

I should think that should bother

the Sierra Club.
DR. STARKMAN; _ Let me say something about carcinogens.

One,

these are large molecules that are produced by any combusion process.
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0

The generation of these large molecules by gasoline engines, by

0

diesel engines , by barbecuing, is a fact of life.
to them all the time.

We are exposed

It is true that the polynuclear aeromatics

in the exhaust of the diesel are higher in concentration than they
are from the gasoline engine.

Let me say also, however, that the

presence of a catalyst in the exhaust of a gasoline engine reduces
the concentration principally of those very heavy molecules, selectively so.
Now, as far as health dangers are concerned, I rea l ly
can't comment.

There should not be one from the population of the

diesel engines as I envision it.

I don't know whether there are

studies yet which would define if the total population of automobi l es
were diesel engines if then the polynuclear aeromatics that were
produced would pose a health problem, and I don't know if there is
anybody who could answer it, Mr. Lanterman, but it is a point to
think about.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:

Are we going to have to have a

sulfur-refining schedule for the oil used in diesels?
DR. STARKMAN:

You are making reference to the production

of sulfuric acid and sulfates in diese l engines.

Indeed, the tail

pipe concentration of sulfates and sulfuric acid from diesel engines
is higher than that from gasol i ne.

It would be rather tragic if we

wound up by having to put a catalyst on the diesel engine exhaust
after we had got it up to the point where it is in production, but
again, that

is o n e way to control these thing.

But eventually you

run out of spa ce and capability to carry al l these emission systems
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around.

We don't want to have to do these kinds of things if we

can help it.

We would like to build an

eng~ne

that is inherently

a clean engine, to whatever emission levels are necessary with high
fuel economy, with good durability, with a capability for being
controlled in such a way that the driver can drive that car like
any other car.

That is the kind of alternative thing we are seeking.

Thank you.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Thank you.

Mr. Calvo has a question

on another area relating to something EPA is doing.

Does anyone

else have any questions or comments to make on this general area of
technology which we have presently been discussing?

Yes, Mr. Lewis.

The Chair would like to recognize Jerry Lewis, who is the Assemblyman
from San Bernardino counties, my neighbor in Southern California
who is now chairing our Subcommittee on Air Quality.
ASSEMBLYMAN JERRY LEWIS:

Dr. Starkman, on the point which

you were just making regarding the thought that you hate to see us
have to put some kind of a device upon a diesel engine that had gone
into production, if the industry has a responsibility, in your judgment, to evaluate these things, then what have you done, if anything,
to measure the potential impact of sulfur from the diesel mass production.

Have you thought about planning ahead enough to prevent

that difficulty or evaluating it before we get there?
DR. STARKMAN:

To answer your question, Assemblyman Lewis,

yes, we have measured all of these things from many engines which
we have under study or, hopefully, to put into production in case
~he

diesel actualLy takes and ••.
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ASSEMBLYMAN LEWIS:

We don ' t really know about diesels

physically that ..•
DR. STARKMAN:

All right.

The concentration of sulfates

with diesels does run higher than the concentration of sulfates from
the gasoline engine without a catalyst, without a

pum~.

It is that

kind of a production process.
Now, in part, the experiment we just finished , we are
reducing the data on, will give us the answer with respect to the
extent to whi ch a diesel engine might be expected to impact upon
the individual who is very, very close to a heavily trafficked freeway, so we are going to get the answer to that one, knowing what
the ratio is between the sulfates from the cars we ran, the 352 cars
we ran on our test, and the kind of sulfate levels we get out of
a diesel.

We don't have that answer .

there is any problem.

At the moment, we don't think

We don't think there is an immediate problem.

We don't believe there is a long-term problem, but we wouldn't be
running the test if we didn't want to be sure.
ASSEMBLYMAN LEWIS:

Well, you commented that you would hate

to see this production-wise, the diesel and to have the prob l em.
DR . STARKMAN:

Yes, sir.

ASSEMBLYMAN LEWIS:
doing exactly that.
catalytic converter.

So many times in the past we were

After the fact, we had a problem like the
Somebody didn't do their homework then, and

I was just wonderi n g if that has had an effect upon the pattern,
if we can reduce it.
DR. STARKMAN:

Assemblyman

-69-

L~wis,

we still don't think

we have a problem in sulfates, but we have got to prove it.
we are setting up to do that in an open

man~er.

But

We invited prac-

tically everybody we could think of to participate so that there
would be no question of credibility.

Now, if it evolves that we

have a sulfate problem from catalyst-equipped cars, we may have a
problem as a consequence of the high sulfur levels in diesel fuel.
I don't want to throw rocks at other people but it is possible to
reduce sulfur in fuel.

I will just say that much.

ASSEMBLYMAN LEWIS:

All right then, Dr. Starkman, just

transfer that to a historical perspective; awhile ago you were
talking about catalyst technology and wanting to make sure we know,
if we are going to work on NOx, to make sure we know what other
kinds of emissions from the catalyst could cause problems.
is EPA doing in that regard,

What

so that you could require, play a

role in those kinds of measurements, the kind of long-term research
which is needed.

If the diesel has potential problems, does EPA

have the responsibility there as well?
MR. STORK:

Well, staff have characterized emissions from

diesel engines and we agree that the sulfuric acid emissions from
diesels are substantially higher than they are from noncatalyst or
non-air pump automobiles, as Mr. Starkman said.

As far as emissions

from freeway catalysts, dual catalysts are concerned, as we do have
a program underway to characterize those emissions.

Among the prob-

lems in running that kind of program, of course, are getting samples
of these kinds of catalysts to experiment with and then do the
experimentation.

I do not have at my finger tips at the moment
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0

0

of our research group ' s work on this particular subject but I can
assure you t hat it is a high priority part of the overall work.
ASSEMBLYMAN LEWIS:

0

Al l right, if it is difficult to

make those k i nds of measurements and give them meaningful data,
what kind of time frame would you project for us might be involved
in evaluating, for example, the diesel, to tell us, by computer

0

mode l or o t herwise, what the factor might be.

Could that be done

in a year ' s time, five years' time?
MR. STORK.

0

Well, five years' time, Assemblyman Lewis,

would be much closer than a year's time.
ASSEMBLYMAN LEWIS:

Let me stop you right there.

In

view of the fact that most people have suggested, at least as I

0

read it, that the diesel may be an extension of the Otto engine
but at best are stop-graps between now and more effective alternative energy sources .

Five years makes this 1981.

It is my under-

standing that if we were going to employ top priority on other
alternative things such as the turbine or the Stirling, they could
be available in production form by 1985.
be moving ahead on these studies?

All right, shouldn't we

For five years from now we find

out that we were wrong about the use of the diesel and somebody
else is trying to get into production, you know, answers come up
too late.
MR. STORK:

Well, I understand, si r , that this wi ll be

discussed tomor r ow to some ex t e n t.

I will not be here tomorrow so ,

if y ou l i k e , I wil l provide the comment that we provided to intere~ted

made i

Con g r essmen and Sen ators o n the question of t h e proposals
the J PL r e p o r t of t h e Stirl i ng and ga s t u rb i ne engines .
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Basically, what we suggested to one Senator who has
proposed holding hearings on this is that we have some uneasiness
in the point of view reflected in that report: a point of view
which says we have sufficient petroleum resources left to use
another generation of heat engines which use petroleum.

It has

been our suggestion to that interested Congressman that hearings
on this report focus not so much on which technology hold the most
promise, but rather focus on the question of what kinds of fuels
are likely to be able to be used, or are likely to be available,
so our children and grandchildren 20 years from now can make an
informed judgment on the types of fuels . that are likely to be
available for the purpose of providing automotive type transportation, and then to engage in a national effort, if such an effort
is considered appropriate, to do the basic science to make energyconversion systems, engines if you like, feasible for the kinds of
fuels that may be available.

We would not want to see a prejudg-

ment that 20 or 30 years from now we will be using gasoline or other
petroleum distillates to the extent we are currently using them
to provide transportation.
ASSEMBLYMAN LEWIS:

One more question, and then I am

through.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:
ASSEMBLYMAN LEWIS:

Yes, Mr. Lewis.
If the auto engine carries through

the furtherest development that we can imagine, at least at this
point, involving the extension of the catalyst (inaudible)

a~

so on,

is most likely one of the significant stop gaps. _ In view of your comment regarding NOx control and other kinds of problems that might
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come from that, what kind of money is EPA putting into that kind
of specific research and within what time frame do you feel you
must have it?
MR. STORK:

It is our view, Mr. Lewis, and it is cer-

tainly a view that reflects the view of the Congress, that efforts
to develop emission control technology on new engines are primarily
the responsibility of the industry, and that the establishment of
performance standards is an appropriate function for the EPA.

Now,

the Energy Research and Development Administration has some charter
to develop alternative engines, yet the degree to which that charter
is to be exercised will, of course, depend on congressional appropriations.
It is my view that the government should not go beyond
supporting basic scientific work, and that the expertise to develop
engines which exists in the automobile industry, is an expertise
that the government does not have.

Presumably, we could hire en-

gineers from the auto industry and build competitive facilities,
although that would be difficult because we •.•
ASSEMBLYMAN LEWIS:

Now, wait a minute, awhile ago you

were saying, before we go further into NOx and particularly using
catalyst devices that we have no feel of what's going to happen
out there.
MR. STORK:

We are doing that kind of research.

ASSEMBLYMAN LEWIS:
MR. STORK:

Well, at that (inaudible) specifically .. .

I'm sorry ••.

ASSEMBLYMAN LEWIS:

If we are going to use the auto engine
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and your catalytic devices are a logical additive, an extension
of that technology in order to be able to use it under (inaudible)
efforts what are we doing in terms of dollar volume and in what
time frames did you want the answers.

I wonder if you have those

kinds of calendar requirements?
MR. STORK:

I will, you are now talking about, if I

understand you correctly, let me be sure of that, what is the EPA
doing to evaluate the technology that is likely to be used on an
auto engine?
ASSEMBLYMAN LEWIS:
MR. STORK:

Yes.

And to evaluate it from the standpoint of

other possible adverse side effects.
That work is not done under my direct jurisdiction, so
I don't know, at my finger tips, the dollars and timetables.
can provide that for you subsequently.

I

I will have my staff get

that from our research and development group and provide it to
you.
ASSEMBLYMAN LEWIS:
MR. STORK:

(inaudible)

We will be very pleased.

CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

I think Dr. Starkman and then Mr.

Heinen had a question of the Chair at one point.
DR. STARKMAN:

Yes, just a couple at this point, one

is that shortly after the first of the year we will have a pretty
good idea as to what will be the impact of sulfate emissions from any
kind of an engine on which we have made measurements.

If it were

10, 15, 100 percent of the automobile population, so it won't take
five years to get a better handle on the potential sulfare problem.
-74-

Secondly, I think we are in consonance with what Eric
Stork said with respect to the job which the federal government
or local government and the automobile industry should be engaged
in.

There is no trick to putting together a diesel car and proving

it will run, as will an electric car or a gas turbine car.
do that.

We can

But we think knowledge is necessary in a number of areas.

One, the basic medical effects of these pollutants with which we
are concerned.

We think and I believe and hope that the medical

people agree with us that we could use a lot more knowledge in this
particular area.

Two, are those parts of the technology which

restrict the application of alternative engines, for example, the
gas turbine,

the Stirling cycle, and there are others that should

be named, particularly, the matter of battery power for automobiles.
Although that has its own problems from the standpoint of pollution, but to try and sum it up, we believe that we need help in
order to move on to alternatives if that is where we are going,
and the help we need is not in demonstration vehicles but is is
in the materials and development that has to do with the components
with those processes that we don't know enough
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:
MR. HEINEN:

about yet.

Mr. Heinen and then Mr. Hart.

I am just going to make a couple of

comments that are somewhat along the lines of Dr. Starkman.
I was going to point to the specific situation that
exists in sulfates because it is very similar to the situation
that has existed in this whole field of air pollution for some
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time.

Right now, as of this moment, we have not got a

~ood,

com-

pletely reliable technique for measuring the sulfates out of the
exhaust.

We can make a guess.

We have not got a good, agreed-

upon technique for measuring the sulfates out of the exhaust.

We

do not have the report from the medical men from the EPA, and,
indeed, we won't have for another two years on the effect of particular levels in the atmosphere and third, as Dr. Starkman has
pointed out, we do not have the translation between a certain exhaust derived by whatever method of analysis we have; what that
effect will be on the atmospheric concentration.
key points, we are making estimates.
has existed all along.

So, on the three

This is the situation that

People who are not immersed in the process

of developing devices, of developing standards, quite often give
us too much credit, let us say, for what we in the engineering
and medical professions know and don't know in a quantitative
sense.
I was trying to get at that a little bit this morning
when I was pointing out that you could get a five percent improvement, whether that five percent improvement is translatable into
anything.
tion.

Certainly, anything quantitatively is a very good ques-

The sulfate situation is one where we know that a certain

concentration is not going to do you too much good.

We don't

know what that concentration actually will be that you are exposed to, and we don't know how to translate that from the tail
pipe into the atmosphere.

Finally, we don't know what that
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concentration is in terms of health effects iri that thing that an
engineer needs, which is quantitative information,and you must
remember that an engineer, even an evil-minded low-browed character like an engineer from Detroit, does have that thing to
determine, has that decision to make.

What is the best choice

of alternatives, and it is always a question of alternatives.
It has always got to be based on quantitative information and
the quantitative information in the sulfate area is deve l oping
but it is just not here and I would look just as askance a t somebody in the automobile industry who learned to say, "We have
indeed a

problem~

Some of us who haven't been enthusiastic about

catalysts sometimes attempted to do, as I would at someone who
says, "No, indeed, we have not a problem."

I'd say either one o f

they just plain doesn't know what he is talking about.
a potential problem.
cinogens.

We have

We have a potential problem maybe in car-

We have a potential problem maybe in carbonyls from

the oxides of nitrogen captured.
of potential problems.

We have a whole heck of a lot

People can jump up and down and over-

emphasize those potential problems, but until you have some quant itative information, you cannot make the final judgments or decisions, and this has been the story, Mr. Ingalls, for some 22
years that I have been following engine modifications.

In each

case there has been a very serious question as to how big the
problem was, how much of this nation's goods 23, as presumably
respons i b e engineers, should recommend be cone.
hec k to get oqt and

s~y,

incide~tally,
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It is easy as

Mrs. Meade talking

(inaudible), "What in the devil makes you think that we would
give California a lower fuel economy just for the heck of it.
As if it were not, because there really is a difference as a
result of (inaudible)."
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Mrs. Meade, you have the right to

claim as personal preference that your name be •••
MRS. MEADE:

I don't believe the automotive manufacturers

do anything just for the heck of it, but I think that it is difficult for those who look at public policy decisions and cry that
the length of time we must go through the hearings, the discussions
and so forth, somehow assume that perhaps corporate management decision-making is a very efficient, logical, speedy process.
happen to feel it is not so.

I

All decision-making is difficult and

I think the corporate decision-making is slow, not for the heck
of it, it is exceedingly slow based on input of a variety that
is sometimes hard to identify.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Mr. Hart, one brief point, and then

we will go to Mr. Calvo's question to Mr. Stork.
MR. HART:

Mr. Hart.

I would like to make two points which I con-

sider to be very important.
First of all, I think we should look at the benefits of
these alternative types of engines.

Looking again at an SAE
I

publication and I could give you the same publication, by the way,
Mr. Lanterman.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:

What was the serial number on

it?
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MR. HART:

The serial number is 750957 and this is on

page 14 of that publication.

It shows a graph indicating the fuel

consumption for a prototype diesel and for a Peugeot diesel as
compared to gasoline types and I judge that the difference is on
the order of 20 percent.

In other words, a diesel engine is some

20 percent less, requires 20 percent less fuel than the equivalent,
on a

gall~nage

basis than does a gasoline engine.

ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:

Well, that's because it has a

higher BTU content, isn't it?
MR. HART :

That's correct, sir.

MR. LANTERMAN:
MR. HART:

All right.

And, secondl y, it requires less fuel to dis-

till diesel fuel and, therefore, instead of 12% of the oil required
for manufacturing gasoline, we have a very substantially less requirement.

Therefore, I think that a 20% saving, if the automo-

bile population were entirely diesel, is probably conservative.
Translated into barrels of oil, that amounts to 400 million barrels of oil per year necessarily imported, of course, as we know,
or almost $5 billion in foreign trade in dollars, certainly a
very large contributant to the cessation of inflation in this
country.
question.

I suggest that a worthy benefit to be looked at in this
Of course, fuel injection has a somewhat lesser benefit.

Let's assume that it is 10%.

The difference then would be half

of that or about 2-1/2 billion dollars and, of course, a very substantial improvement on both cases of the level of hydrocarbons

-
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in our air pollution, so there are great benefits to be obtained
for looking at these alternative sources.
Now the question of sulfates, of course, has entered
this argument.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:

How did you arrive at those

figures, those quantitative figures, if all the cars were diesel?
MR. HART:

Yes, sir.

ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:

Or the new production of what?

(inaudible) years.
MR. HART:

I am assuming that by some magic, Chrysler,

General Motors and Ford four years ago, or let's say ten years
ago,had entered into, which should have been obvious at that time,
had entered into the production of only diesel engines, we now
would have a total diesel fleet and we would certainly import
substantially less oil than we are now importing.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:

I think they would have been

out of business before now.
MR. HART:

Well, I think that question is arguable,

sir.
The second point that I would like to make is on the
matter of sulfates and I would like to cite a personal experience.
The question of sulfate scrubbers for coal and for oil fuel plants

.

has been a question which is similar to the one that we are
debating here today.

Industry has universally said that they
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are far too expensive, technology is not here, etc., etc.

Suddenly

comes the question of building coal plants on the Utah plateau to
be fueled by coal mined locally, which apparently has a level of
sulfur which is undesirable.

The utilities understand that the

law is now established that they must not, in fact it has been
established because the utilities insisted on using low-sulfur
oil but this coal doesn't lend itself to that but they want to
build the electrical plants in Utah.

All of a sudden, and I am

speaking from a certain amount of personal experience, scrubbers
become feasible, inexpensive, ready to go.

I suggest, sir, that

if it is necessary and if the law and the Legislature is determined
enough the technology can be found to cure any sulfate problems.
I am sure that it is not an insuperable problem to remove sulfur
from oil.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:

It takes a lot of energy to re-

move that sulfur, however.
MR. HART:

But it still may be possible.

MR. LANTERMAN:

We have to vouch for that and you men-

tioned this morning the impact of the car down at Malibu.

One

was the Falcon and the other was either a Cad or a big Buick and
the moral there is that if you are riding in a light car and you
are rear-ended by a heavy one you are in trouble.
MR. HART:

Assemblyman Lanterman, I agree, but you well

know my hypothesis and that is if we had removed the Cadillac
from the highway and had substituted a Falcon perhaps those two
- -81-;..

old ladies would still be alive.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:

Quite possibly, or if they had a

bladder in their tank.
MR. HART:

That's also possible.

CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Thank you.

I didn't want to move on

at this point because Mr. Stork has to leave us this morning and
there are a couple of questions from members of the committee yet
on different areas.

We may want to come back to this.

We are

going to have a substantial part of the afternoon also devoted to
this.

I've talked to Mr. Lanterman about this, whose bill we will

be discussing in terms of gas tank ruptures and it's a very important question.

It is the intention of the Chair to recess

this morning's session at 12:30, come back promptly at 1:30, and
I know that's very rarely done in legislative sessions but I
will be here at 1:30 and I would hope everyone else would be here
at 1:30 so that we can continue.

We've got 20 more minutes of

this morning's session to go and then we will come back at 1:30
and go to about 3 o'clock or 3;30 with this discussion if we have
areas of discussion that merit our continuing that long and then
go to Mr. Lanterman's gas tank rupture bill for at least an hour,
but we want to get the questions to Mr. Stork out of the way since
he does have to leave us at 12:30.
ASSEMBLYMAN CALVO:

Mr. Calvo.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Now, that

I have my foot in the mainstream here, I want to make a few observations and comments and then ask a question of Mr. Stork.
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Let

me start out by saying that I recognize the problem, Mr. Heinen,
that is certainly here and you will find no diversion from that
conclusion among any members of this Committee but I just want to
make a few comments on some of the testimony that I've heard and
how I have been reacting to it as an individual who doesn't have
a high degree of technical knowledge but who has been involved
in the regulatory aspects of air pollution control for at least
ten years.

I hear some comments being made, for instance, Dr.

Starkman talking about the sulfate resulting from the diesel engine.

We are not sure just where that is and the comment made

after that, that there might have to be a converter attachment to
it and that this is not desirable.

I would have to agree that

this is not desirable but it may be the way to go and I am certainly not going to want to discard any process because add-ons
might be needed.

When Mr. Ruckelshaus made his controversial

statement, we are only talking about 2-1/2 or 3 years ago and yet
we have these devices in line, so I think that that isn't necessarily an

aspect that should be detrimental to the solution of

the problem.

Along the same lines, there was a report I read

this morning, and reference was made to the number where the
Volkswagen engine was mentioned and there was a comparison made
as to economy between the 49 states and California and I think
that it referred only to that economy.

There was testimony

rebutting the validity of the report by saying that, yes, a
converter was attached to the California models but that really
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I think is irrelevant to the thrust of the report which was,
can you have a fuel economy and control and I think that's all that
report was saying.

Certainly there may be some economy factors

as to the price of the product and some other losses but that report as I heard it read was only speaking to the economy of the
vehicle and the absolute control and that, I think, is important.
To Mr. Stork at this point, first of all, are you speaking for yourself or for your agency when you make statements here
today?

Are you allowed to say that you are representing EPA or

your department?
MR. STORK:

I suppose that in a job like mine, I am not

entitled to express personal opinions unless I have reasonable
confidence that they reflect the views of my agency but I will not
insist that every word that I utter will, to the last dotting of
the "i" represent formal policy.
ASSEMBLYMAN CALVO:

Okay, then that opens up some addi-

tional questions that I would like to ask.

I gather from your

presentation today that you would support the President's stand
for the 5-year delay of further stringent controls or increasing
the controls program.
MR. STORK:

As an administrator trying to testify,

Mr. Calvo, the EPA, of course, supports the President's recommendation.

The President, in making his recommendation, had to take

into consideration and did, in fact, take into consideration
broader issues than solely environmental protection.

The Ad-

ministrator of EPA, under the law, is neither required or, for that
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matter, permitted to take into consideration issues of fuel economy
and economics in making his decisions on the suspension.

However,

from a strictly environmental protection point of view and d i sregarding the broader considerations that the President necessarily had to consider, from a strictly environmental protection
point of view, we do not believe that it would be appropriat e
to have standards more stringent than 1.5, 15, and 2 unti l there
can be confidence that the sulfuric acid emission

pr~blem

either

does not exist as it very well may not exist, or that it can be
solved through technology.

Administrator Train last March stated

in making his recommendations that he recognized that he might
be erring on the side of caution.

If it has been my decision

which really it was not, it was his decision, I also would have
erred on the side of caution and avoided taking the step of introducing into the atmosphere a pollutant about which so little is
known but so much medical concern is expressed.

So, we do sup-

port the President's recommendation from the broader point of
view but if you have from strictly an environmental viewpoint,
we would stand with Mr. Train's recommendations of March 5.
I hope that's responsive to your question.
ASSEMBLYMAN CLAVO:

I think it is and, well, expanded

using those same two criteria, how would you respond to the
California recommendations for '77?
MR. STORK:

The issue of sulfuric acid is one on which

reasonable men can differ and California authorities have elected
to make a di f ferent judgment on the potential health hazards
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of increasing sulfuric acid emissions.

As Mr. Heinen sketched,

I think quite well, there are more unknowns than knowns related
to sulfuric acid emissions from catalyst-equipped cars.

However,

one of the knowns is that catalyst-equipped cars with air pumps
or, more precisely, catalyst-equipped cars with ample excess oxygen
will emit substantially higher levels of sulfuric acid than either
non-catalyst cars or, for that matter, catalyst cars that do not
have much excess oxygen, catalyst cars without air pumps.

We

would not presume to pass judgment on the judgment of California
authorities in evaluating the relative health effects of slowing
down the program to reduce HC and CO or rather oxidant and CO and
running the risk of increasing sulfuric acids.

We also do not have

sufficient data to speak authoritatively or conclusively on which
is the wisest choice so it is just a lot of words per se,
not going to presume to know better than you.

11

We are

We have expressed

our view and you have a right to follow yours under Section 209
of the Clean Air Act. ·~
ASSEMBLYMAN CALVO:
your position is.

All right then, I think I know what

I am not going to get a clear

11

yes 11 or

11

n0 11

on that one.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:

It's like the corporation.

It

is a little different though.
ASSEMBLYMAN CALVO:

Let me just make one further comment

along that same line of thought and that is that as far as I know,
there isn't an ARB member here today; I think, Mr. Hass, you are
the only .xepresentative from the ARB.
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MR. HASS:

Larry Haas is here also, legislative repre-

sentative of the Board ,is here.

We hope we will have the Execu-

tive Officer sometime today or tomorrow.
ASSEMBLYMAN CALVO:
on this matter?
spring decision?

Is the ARB holding any hearings

Is it their intention to stay with their early
What is the testimony that is being developed

as the evidence that is being compiled there?

Are we working

at opposite ends by holding committee hearings such as this that
aren't being monitored necessarily by the ARB?
different tack?

Are they on a

These are things that interest me.

We are talking

now about reviewing and possibly changing the California standards
if the testimony points in that direction.

At least that is a pos-

sible result of our hearings and I'm just wondering where we are
on this matter chronologically and politically and how we relate
to the ARB.

Maybe the Chairman will talk about this as we go on

with the experience but, at this moment, I know where the EPA is.
I have heard Mr. Stork speak, have heard some of your comments and
I think that you will have quite a few questions asked of you but
just on this issue alone, the '77 standards, where is the ARB at
this point?
MR. HASS:
they have done.

Well, I read the ARB as being firm on what

The present level of standards was submitted

actually twice to the Board, adopted the second time and on the
one particular issue of sulfates, I don't think it has been brought
out, but the Board's reaction was, well, if there is a sulfur
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problem, we can either do it by technology on the car or by removing sulfur from gasoline so they felt secure _that one way or
another, whatever the sulfate problem turns out to be, could be
dealt with separately so other than the Board being a creature
of the Legislature and responding to your wishes, I know of no
self-generating move here to adjust those standards.
ASSEMBLYMAN CALVO:

But they are convinced then that

the standards are achievable and are proper with the evidence that
they consider.
MR. HASS:

We also have Eric Stork's agency con-

firmation that they are achievable.
ASSEMBLYMAN LEWIS:
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:
ASSEMBLYMAN LEWIS:

Mr. Chairman •••

Yes, Mr. Lewis.
Mr. Maugh, in a previous conversa-

tion we had you placed great emphasis on the difficulties in the
NOx area, moving from 2.0 to 1.5 technologically.

Could you just

outline that for us and I would like to ask some other panel members as to how they react to that.
MR. MAUGH:

Well, we have had conversation with respect

to the difficulty of meeting the 1977 standards and to be sure
the NOx is a problem in going from 2 to 1.5.
troubles.

We are experiencing

It requires additional and more complex EGR con-

trol and requires more retarded spark which have manifested themselves into the problems of drive and fuel economy but in quizzing our engineers again last week prior tc corning out here today,
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why it was very clear to me that they recognized the hydrocarbon
problem as the more severe situation with respect to meeting the
standards and that while they have some confidence in being able
to solve the NOx problem, they have little confidence in total
solution to the hydrocarbon problem.
ASSEMBLYMAN LEWIS:

So they're--if they can evaluate

they're shifting gears once again.
MR. MAUGH:

Shifting gears, of course, to me the .4

standard on hydrocarbon requires a development target of approximately .2 of a gram per mile and we are there on one or two of
our packages most at this point in time they are still unable to
achieve that level with high confidence.
ASSEMBLYMAN LEWIS:

Interestingly, this is a very fluid

reaction, for about six months ago one of Ford's representatives
indicated to me that 1.5 was feasible.

A few weeks ago we were

talking about maybe it not being feasible and now we are wondering again.

I understand where you are but .•.
MR. MAUGH:

There is an inner relationship, of course,

between hydrocarbon and NOx in that, you know •..
ASSEMBLYMAN LEWIS:
MR. MAUGH:

Of course there is .•.

... if you elect to meet the NOx standard

first and then calibrate to meet the NOx standard, then it makes
the hydrocarbon the difficult one to meet.

On the other hand,

with some of our packages, if we took the other approach and met
the hydrocarbon standard and then elected to try and see what we
could do to meet NOx_, we would probably
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~ay,

11

Well, on that package,

NOx control."

It depends on where you start, so it's chicken

and egg to some extent.
ASSEMBLYMAN LEWIS:
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:
ASSEMBLYMAN LEWIS:

Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lewis.

In view of Mr. Gay Hass• comments

regarding the California standards and the position of the aoard,
it might be appropriate to close down this morning by having
Dr. Stephens give us some reaction from his viewpoint as to
the air quality impact of 1.5 or 2.0 and maybe Mrs. Meade will
give us some health reaction to that move.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

We have four minutes to go.

think that might be appropriate.

I

I wanted also to get on the

record from Mr. Stork one brief question, if I may interrupt
this process before we close down the meeting with these last
two observations.

Mr. Stork, was EPA or .ARB the first agency

to require auto manufacturers to have 50,000-mile guarantees
on their catalysts?
MR. STORK:

was EPA or ARB the first agency to

require auto makers to do what, sir?
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

To guarantee 50,000 miles dura-

bility for the catalyst.
MR. STORK:

Oh, the EPA does not require 50,000

durability on catalysts.

The EPA permits one change of cata-

lysts in 50,000 miles.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

The ARB requires that too, Mr.

Hass, the 50,000 miles durability or whatever.
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MR. HASS:

No, the ARB permits one change in 50,000

miles but requires the manufacturer to collect for it ahead
of time.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

And what is EPA•s position as far

as the manufacturer collecting for prepayment.
MR. STORK:

Mr. Ingalls, we considered that subject

very thoroughly over two years ago when we were in the process
of promulgating regulations that specified the allowable main'

tenance during the 50,000 miles of the catalyst.

One of the

issues that we considered was requiring prepayment, in effect,
by the car buyer of the catalyst change.
for quite a number of reasons.

We rejected that alternative

They included very strong opposition

from the after market manufacturers who are concerned about increasing monopolistic tendencies of binding automobile owners
to their dealers; also, because we saw no really feasible way
of administering such a program without causing far more problems
than were created.

If, for example, each car owner were to be

given a coupon good for one catalyst change, if that coupon were
bound into the owner•s manual, that coupon is just like money,
it would quickly be stolen from the glove compartment.

If he

were given a separate certificate, that would probably not be
available two or three years later; furthermore, labor costs
in particular different parts of the country.
a

s~tuation

We could foresee

in which most catalyst changes for cars in the

country would be submitted to the manufacturers from New York
and San Francisco creating a new racket, if you will.
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All of

the fixes for such schemes seemed far more complex and far more
onerous than advantageous." and for that

re~son

since fundamentally,

as we saw it, there would be no net saving to the driving public.
That's why we rejected that alternative.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Mr. Lewis has a question, Mr. Stork.

ASSEMBLYMAN LEWIS:

Yes, we discussed this question in

Washington.
MR. STORK:

Yes, but Mr. Ingalls asked me ••• .

ASSEMBLYMAN LEWIS:

Okay, but we suggested at that point

in time that maybe the government once again is being much more
complex than they need to be.

It would satisfy the secondary mar-

ket and, otherwise, if somebody just simply said a catalyst has
to be replaced, then the producer of the automobile would be billed
for that, whether a secondary market provided it or whether the
industry provided it, and I recall your reacting, saying, "Well,
we hadn't thought about that."

I don't, and from all the reading

and the comments you have, I do not see any reason why the EPA
should not be building in that cost somewhere.
able.

It is underwrite-

You have got millions of cars, it is like life insurance.

It's feasible.
MR. STORK:

I do not say that what we thought about two

years ago is the final answer nor what we think about today is
the final answer; however, it was our judgment two years ago and
it remains our judgment at the moment, at least, that to require
prepayment of catalyst change is more complex that it is worth
and

i~

is for

tha~

reason that we have not

not plan to require it.
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requir~d

it and

d~

ASSEMBLYMAN LEWIS:

In the last year, has EPA reviewed

that policy in depth?
MR. STORK:

In the last year and particularly in view

of California's interest in the subject, we have reviewed that
policy.

I don't know how to define "in depth" but to a suffi-

cient depth where it is that we do not at this point in time want
to change that policy.
ASSEMBLYMAN LEWIS:

I would like to have had the people

who were reviewing that policy be out here to experience in
California our NOx controversy not so long ago.

I think maybe

they, you know, there is a lot of difference between 3,000 miles
away and where the kitchen is •.•
MR. STORK:

Obviously, I had a part in the review of

that policy and we have heard about your NOx controversy, Mr.
Lewis.

We simply don't think that is the way to go on the basis

of information available to us at this point in time, and as we
learn more and we may very well learn more through the leadership
that California often provides in this field.

We may very well

change our minds.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Thank you, Mr. Stork.

If we can

close now with Dr. Stephens' observations about the difference
between 1.5 and 2.0 grams per mile on NOx and the effect it might
have on ambient air or the air in Southern California and then
Mrs. Meade, her observations on some health implications, if there
are any.
DR. STEPHENS:

I will have to be
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consi~tent

with my

statement that I made before that to, to me, hydrocarbon control
is the primary objective because I still consider ozone to be
the primary health hazard.

Mrs. Meade mentioned the fact that

there was a new report from EPA about increasing hazards from
nitrogen oxide.

I am not quite sure what that is but I would

take the view that until they change, until the medical people
change the ambient air quality standards either by revising
their opinion of the toxicity of N02 or setting a new standard,
say, for nitrate, if they have some evidence for it.

Until

they do that, I will go on the basis that ozone is the most toxic
thing, and, therefore, we should control hydrocarbon to control
ozone.

As far as the difference between 2.0 and 1.5, I know that

is important to an automotive engineer but that's a little hard
for us in a chamber experiment to see a very big change from that.
As I said earlier, if there were no question of the engineering
problem or the fuel economy problem, it would be a different ballgame.

I might say, "Well, it is worthwhile to reduce it." but

I just don't regard that kind of reduction as important from the
point of view of controlling oxidant.

I think it might actually

be counter-productive and it would be a very small productivity,
that small a change, so I would not strongly support that difference.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Dr. Stephens, have you any chamber

experiments on the difference between 1.5 and 2.0 on the air?
DR. STEPHENS:

One problem we have is translating that
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emission standard into a concentration as it goes into our chain.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:
DR. STEPHENS:

I appreciate that.

WE do run over a whole range of

concen~

trations so if you tell me where 2.0 is, I'll tell you where 1.5
is and vice versa.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

I suppose you have to know the answer

before you can ask the question.
DR. STEPHENS:

Well, we could make a judgment but that's

the problem.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:
MRS. MEADE:

Very good.

Mrs. Meade.

If Dr. Stephens is looking for a base line

before he can start out giving you an answer, I think in the health
field we also look for the base line.

I understand from recent

testimony that I received from Dr. John Goldsmith of the State
Health Department that an N02 standard has been set on a one-hour
basis.

I have that testimony with me and would be glad to submit

it for the record.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:
MRS. MEADE:

Would you please.

I also have testimony that was submitted

from our national organization, the American Lung Association
at congressional hearing, the testimony prepared by Dr. Carl Shy
and he, too, suggests an N02 health standard and this does not
translate down into the atmosphere of chemistry how much NOx
is and how much other chemical substances, how bad and how do
you measure all of that, but at least there is a health standard
I understand now being accepted in California and was suggested
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at the federal level from our organization and I will submit both
of those for you.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Thank you, Mrs. Meade.

And Mr.

Lewis before the break.
ASSEMBLYMAN LEWIS:

Gladys, you know if we are talk-

ing about the Board establishing public policy, as publicly on
a

platform arguing about 2.0 and 1.5 and add X group to support

or not support, you know you would need some help.

How did

you go about making that decision for your organization in terms
of health?
MBS. MEADE:

In terms of a decision, I see there is

a series of decisions.

I ended my testimony earlier indicating

that I would in no way wish to see any change made in the 1977
vehicle emission standards, no way would I wish to make that
kind of a decision.

I think the question was thoroughly aired

at hearings of the Air Resources Board and that all of the
testimony that came at that time from the manufacturers and from
EPA indicated that the '77 emission standards could be achieved.
Now, we may have a certain selectivity in the cars or vehicles
available for sale in California, but that is a small price to
pay for the majority of those cars being better equipped in
terms of emission control.

If it is a question of the catalytic

converter being the technology of choice for '77,which I am sure
it will be, then I think the hearings that were also held by the
Air Resources Board on the sulfate problem and the solution arrived
at there is a simple one to state, perhaps more difficult for the
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refinery to carry out but the answer is, get the
gasoline.

Only the sulfur

sulfur out of

that is in gasoline can come out

the tail pipe in whatever form.

It comes out in one form if

the converter is on but it is still coming out without a catalytic converter and we can get the

sulfur out of gasoline.

Those are the two solutions that have been arrived at, two decision points, you know, like '78 standards or '79 standards or
'80 standards, 1980.

I say, those are other decision points and

so the discussion here today certainly indicated there are
other solutions available, the fuel economy ones certainly have
a number of solutions aside from
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

any vehicle emission control.

I would like to adjourn now, but

before we do, I would like to give a question.

It is a tough

question, to everyone on the panel when they come back.

Given

the fact that we have certain conflict in national goals, air
quality and fuel economy; given the fact we have varying standards that are proposed by state and federal authorities in
the

field~

we have our statutory standards; we have the federal

statutory standards; given the fact that there is pressure
at the federal and state level to revise some, if not all, of
these standards in order to accommodate present technology
and our goal of fuel economy, where would you, if you were a
decision-maker, make adjustments in the 1977 California standards if you had to make, and obviously you have different

0

constituencies or different prejudices, if you had to
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make some realistic trade-offs between fuel economy and air pollution and emissions control.

It is not to say that the com-

mittee will accept anyone's proposed amendments but I would like
to see your proposals and your arguments for those proposals and
be prepared to defend them because I think that Mrs. Meade and
Mr. Starkman may disagree on the proposed solutions to that
problem and I would like to see defense of the individual positions.

Thank you very much.

We will be back here at 1:30.

This is an exciting meeting.
(Recess for lunch)
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

I think what we would 1 ike to do

now is go through each of you in a way of using our last hour.
I would suspect that we would use at least an hour.

It is my

intention to adjourn this part of the session by 3:00 because
I understand some of you have to catch planes and have other
commitments for this afternoon.

~is

panel will be recessed

at 3:00 o'clock, adjourn at that time and then we will have
our other panel on Mr. Lanterman's bill on gas tanks.

But I

thought we would start where we left off with my question
which I posed each of you and asked you to think about over
the noon hour which is essentially, do we need to change our
standards?

We have the '77 California standards which have

produced a certain amount of controversy.

I would like each

of you to comment on whether or not you think there needs to
be any change in those standards.

If you do have changes, what
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are your reasons for the changes and be able to defend them.
If you don't think there should be any c?anges, also be able
to defend the standards and why we should have the continuation
of the standards, and I don't want this to imply, because I have
already had one question from the media that this committee is
in any way entertaining a change in those '77 standards, but we
are asking for input because there has been a controversy and
there has been presented earlier this morning some testimony by
the automobile industry that there ought to be a modification
of those standards.

Let's start with Dr. Stephens, who represents

nobody in particular and I hope everybody in general.
DR. STEPHENS:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Stephens.

I did as you

suggested and I thought about the question over lunch and I
would like to make an answer which I hope will be consistent
both with what I said this morning and with what's in the testimony that I gave to the Senate last spring, and that is that
hydrocarbon control is the main objective as I see it, the most
important thing, and, therefore, I would like to see that emphasized
in any trade-offs that are made in the future or that might be
made.

So I would like to say that the .41 hydrocarbon looks

good to me from the point of view of the air chemistry and to
me that is a lot more important than further reductions in
the NOx standard, at least for the immedi ate future.
I made one other point in my Senate testi mony that I
didn ' t mention this morning and that ' s a l i ttle numerica l thing,
.4

as _ compa~ ed

to, sayL .9 which we have now, l ooks like it is
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2-1/2 times better or 2-1/4 times better, but there is another way
to look at that and that is to visualize .4 grams per mile car replacing a car on the road that might be emitting 8 or 9 grams per
mile.

I don't know exactly what it would do, but it's somewhere

up in that range probably.

And then you can subtract .4 from, say,

8 or you can subtract .9 from 8 and then those differences are
what you are gaining by putting the new car on the road and those
are not very large.

That is a pretty small percentage to be gained

by a more stringent standard.

Well, that may seem to argue against

my own position but I have to recognize that that is something that
should be considered.

I made the other point that it is important

to get those cars on the road.

It is ironic to me and I recall that

I went to my first meeting on auto exhaust catalysts in 1956 and
20 years later approximately, cars with catalysts were being sold.
And it is ironic when they were being sold they weren't selling
very well.

So here we went to all that trouble to get them on the

cars and we couldn't sell them very well.
only to build them but to sell them.

So it is important not

And I am reminded of a story

I heard a long time ago about a Boston society matron who was being
interviewed for some purpose or other and she was a member of a
group and this group was famous for having very fancy hats and so
the interviewer was talking to her about her hats and asking her
about them, and the interviewer said, "Well, where do you buy your
hats?" and the Boston lady said, "Oh, we don't buy our hats, we have
our hats."

And the point of the story is that Californians already
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have their cars.

They are not really buyers, they are traders.

So if you want to persuade a Californian to get a low emissions
car and give up an old one that's higher in emissions, you have to
recognize that he is a trader and not a buyer; he is asked to
give a car that he has for something else, which if it's made as
a compromise with performance or with size or with something else ,
why it may not be too effective.

It may not be too easy to sell.

And certainly last year Californians, and Americans in general,
proved that they could keep their cars for awhile.

So that is an-

other factor that I think hasn't been brought out very forcefully ,
that it is important to keep the car market moving.

Someone this

morning mentioned the fact that we need every few percent that we
could get in reduction in emissions.

While there was a loss in

sales last year, a loss in sales of clean, relatively clean, 1975
cars did cost air quality control something.

Those cars that were

not sold were much cleaner than the ones that they would have replaced.

So, speaking as an air chemist, I support the standards

and especially the low hydrocarbon standard, but I recognize that
it is important to sell the cars and to get them on
ASSEMBLYMAN LEWIS:

th~

road.

Dr. Stephens, remember the old

adage, there are liars, damn liars and statisticians.

Well, I

was amazed to find that we were actually at new car sales 40%
in a smaller car--foreign product--which is a very significant
item in terms· of statistics.

Forty percent of the cars sold in

California were foreign products.
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DR. STEPHENS:

Yes, while you mention that I should

recommend something that bothers me, it is the tendency among many
of us, politicians, newspapermen, to refer to the auto industry
as "Detroit".

I think it gives people the impression that either

foreign cars don't pollute or they pollute less, or that foreign
car manufacturers are somehow born virtuous or less recalcitrant
or something like that.
ASSEMBLYMAN LEWIS:

Whether American cars are made in

America.
DR. STEPHENS:

Yeah •.•

ASSEMBLYMAN WORNUM:
ASSEMBLYMAN LEWIS:
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:
ASSEMBLYMAN WORNUM:

Mr. Chairman.
Go ahead.
Mr. Wornurn.
Well, I was going to ask you,

when you talk about the fact that new car sales were off and
that there was more pollution as a result because the older models
pollute more, I can accept that and, in fact, we talked with
the United Auto Workers in Detroit when we went there and that
was one of the messages they gave us.

But forgetting employment

and prosperity and the rest for just the moment just concentrate
on energy and pollution, has any study been made about the
cost of producing a new car to replace an existing car that
might be obsolete but still has a lot of useful life in it.

In

other words, cars aren't sprung out of the earth like trees without
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0

a lot of energy being used in their production and
pollution being used in their

productio~

~

lot of

and shall we say the

average life of an American car could be kept going a great deal

0

longer and of course the whole advertising pressure of the industry is obsolescence and you need a brand new what-not to replace your old klunker even if the old klunker theoretically
could have a lot of useful life in it, a little care being put
to it, and I just wondered if the trade-off had ever been calculated by anybody on the value of the fuel used, shall we say
extra, in the new car and the pollution as against throwing it
out before its useful life has been fully expended.
DR. STEPHENS:

I don't think I am a good man to address

that question (inaudible)
MR. HEINEN:

Yeah, here I can answer that.

CHAIRMAN INGALLS:
MR. HEINEN:

Mr. Heinen.

That happens to be one of my enthusiams

and we put out a very financial technical paper on the subject.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:
record.

I will introduce Mr. Heinen for the

He will be our next speaker and he is going to answer

not only Mr. Wornum's question but the central question we were
asked to think about and ruminate over lunch and that is, if we
are going to change the '77 standards and that is really open
to debate, I am not advocating that, where we would or where
should we, to accomodate your point of view.
MR. HEINEN:

In answer to your question.

We did a

. . rather substantial study -tracing back all of the cos·t s, production
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costs, in terms of energy, not in terms of dollars, back to the
point of oil refining and so on up the line, and we came to the
conclusion that a new car, the energy required to get a new car
out is between 9 months and a year's worth of its fuel usage,
which is a fairly simple way of stating it.

Now, as far as the

cars being phased out of service, the primary reason for phasing
out of service is mechanical problems brought about by abrupt
contact with other vehicles or poles or something of that general
nature, combined with corrosion.

Those two are the twin bug-a-boos.

As far as the cars staying in service is concerned, however, the
cars are good for somewhat over ten years in almost any atmosphere
in the country.

About that time, it is unsafe enough so that it

probably should not be driven.

This, of course, is with noticeable

exceptions where particular care has been taken of the vehicle.
Those are some of the statistics that have been generaged in answer
to your question.

So, unless there is something of the order of

10 percent improvement in fuel or about 7 or 8% of improvement in
fuel, economy between the car that is 10 years old and the brand
new car, you cannot justify it on a fuel economy basis.

However,

again let me go one •.•
ASSEMBLYMAN WORNUM:
MR. HEINEN:

Getting the new car over the old car on

a fuel economy basis strictly.
little bit.

We cannot justify what?

However, let me add to that a

The national average for cars in the field is some-

thing of the order of 14 miles per gallon and that is an average
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6-year-old car.

The fuel economy of cars as they are currently

being produced even by the EPA system is something like 15.5 to
16.

So that it is a pretty good trade-off on fuel economy.

How-

ever, on emission numbers there is just absolutely no comparison.
Even the EPA which normally understates the case, agrees that we
have achieved better than, as close to 90% on hydrocarbons over
an uncontrolled car, about 80% . on carbon monoxide and something
of the order of 50% on NOx, just depends again on which set of
statistics you use.

The way this one says that the new car, I

mean, that the base car was 5.5 grams per mile, they have had statistics ranging anywhere from 6.1 to 3.7, so you take your choice.
The 5.5, however, is a rather realistic figure to what happens
if you take the control off which is a very good way to estimate
what it would be with the control on.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:
MR. HEINEN:

That's NOx you're talking about.

Pardon?

CHAIRMAN INGALLS:
ASSEMBLYMAN WORNUM:

The

(inaudible)

What you are really saying then

is that, in other words, if I have a 10-year-old car, I am being
I won't say patriotic, in the public interest by keeping it for
eleven years.
MR. HEINEN:

By doing what?

ASSEMBLYMAN WORNUM:

Well, if I have a 10-year-old

car and I am debating on whether I should buy a new car, it is
a trade-off if I kept that car for another year as against buying
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a new car.
MR. HEINEN:

Your patriotism is in question as far as

fuel consumption effects are concerned.

It is unquestionably

not in question as far as emission control affects it.

Mr. Heinen, in this bicentennial

CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

year Lord Wornum is always suspect.
ASSEMBLYMAN WORNUM:

You see, because of that suspicion

I have to be more patriotic than anyone else.

I don•t know

whether to keep my 10-year-old car for 11 years or buy a new one.

MR. HEINEN:

Well, I think you would be patriotic from

a fuel consumption, from an air pollution point-of-view which
is what we are talking about here, primarily, from fuel consumption as much as I would like to say that if that were the case,
I could not recommend it as a matter of fact.

Even in spite of

everything we have tried to do, in spite of all of the improvements, the emission controls have taken enough that on fuel consumption it is not enough to justify the total fuel consumption
picture, and we have a very, very thick and thorough report on
this subject if you are interested in pursuing it further.

As

I say, it got to be one of my hobbies about two years ago.
ASSEMBLYMAN WORNUM:

Do you have a digest of your

thick report?
MR. HEINEN:

Well, it always has an executive summary

in the front of the (inaudible).
Now, in answer to your basic question which you wanted
me to answer, my answer would have to be to continue the .9, 9,
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and 2 in recognition of the fact that California has more difficult problems; that California should lead the country as far
as the control degree, but also with recognition of the fact
that getting these cars, as you will get them right now with the
absolute minimum lead time that w'e had, which I might say for
all practical purposes was zero.

Because we get them in March,

we have to start submitting them for tests· in about July or
August.

Hopefully, we haven't gotten around until November now

because we haven't anything that looks like it might pass.
There just plain was no lead time to give you a decent job and
I mean that I will say that publicly that you are not going to
get a decent job.

I can't believe that anybody could do the

job that the engineers in Detroit are capable of doing with that
kind of lead time.

So, for that reason if nothing else.

How-

ever, there are other reasons; other, I think fairly persuasive
reasons that you heard this morning.

Namely, that you have ques-

tions about the sulphates that are up in the air; that you have
questions, actually questions, directional questions as to the
oxides of nitrogen that have not been determined, but certainly
magnitude questions; that you have health questions; that it is
going to be a major economic blow to the people here in California,
not the automobile industry in Detroit, the people in California
who are going to have to pay the shot.

With all of those questions,

for heavens sake, a year or two to give everybody a chance to do
a decent job on the health studies on the air pollution, air
reaction studies, _ on the device studies, on the fuel economy studies, .
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seems like the only intelligent thing to do.

I did not intend to

give you an opinion here, except the task force directly because
I am well aware that any opinion coming from Detroit is viewed in
that particular light.
it.

However, there you are.

I don't apologize for it.

There you have

I would be happy to defend it any

place, any time.
ASSEMBLYMAN CALVO:
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Mr. Chairman.

Yes, Mr. Calvo has a question, Mr.

Heinen.
ASSEMBLYMAN CALVO:

You went quickly from Dr. Stephens.

I wanted to ask a question of Dr. Stephens.

Can I go back?

I

think I have a basic understanding of how ozone is created, you
have a mixture primarily of hydrocarbons and NOx, cooked in sunlight, usually there is an inversion layer of some sort prevailing,
it takes sunlight and a stable air mass to cook up this aerial
composition.
DR. STEPHENS:

In time.

ASSEMBLYMAN CALVO:
moving one element.

In time, yes.

We talk about re-

Your comment is that we should concentrate

primarily on the hydrocarbon aspect and that the NOx will more
or less take care of itself.

I suppose that as Mr. Heinen has

said, we would reduce that on the average by SO%, so that we
are making some progress there.

But I can't visualize in my

mind what happens when you reduce one and the other stays relatively unattended.

For instance, if you reduced your hydro-

carbons censiderably .and you got even .below the 90%

~ontrol

that we now have because I think you are suggesting that we
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continue working with the hydrocarbons since they are easier
technically to control.
DR. STEPHENS:

That's not my reason but (inaudible).

ASSEMBLYMAN CALVO:

Oh, that's not your reason, all

right, anyway that's what you are saying, that we work in that
direction.

Then, what happens with NOx if that remains relatively

uncontrolled and we have larger amounts of NOx in the mix, are
we then concerned about the health effects of NOx,

a~e

we pro-

ducing a different quality of ozone, what is the resultant condition?

That is a question in my mind that I haven't been able

to answer.
DR. STEPHENS:

Well, let me start out by saying that

it would be tem?ting to simplify air chemistry by saying smog
products are proportional to the product of the hydrocarbon times
the nitrogen oxide.

In other words, reducing hydrocarbon by half

and NOx by half would reduce the total problem to a fourth.
would be attempting to simplify things that way.

That

My whole position

is that is an over-simplification and everything I have seen from
chemistry, from smog chamber data and this goes back many years
and it covers many laboratories, incidentally, is that that simple
model has to be rejected.
ASSEMBLYMAN CALVO:

Yet many people are using that

simple model, when I hear discussions they seem to treat it that
way.

I am sorry to interrupt .••
DR. STEPHENS:

_a minute.

I will get my train of thought back in

I have to reject that model.
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As a matter of fact,

one thing that we have measured in our chambers, and other people
have done this, too, is to plot a contour of ozone-formed versus
hydrocarbon-started with, or

{inaudible)

and nitrogen oxides

on a third axis, vertically on the ozone, hydrocarbon this way
and NOx that way, and, those contours do not fit with that
simple product assumption.

As a matter of fact, there are im-

portant regions in that contour where ozone actually decreases
when you decrease ••• ozone actually increases when you decrease
nitrogen oxide.

ozone actually gets worse when you (inaudible).

ASSEMBLYMAN CALVO:

You alluded to that earlier to-

day when you made (inaudible) comments.
DR. STEPHENS: Yes, I did ••• now you can debate and
we do debate in air chemistry about well, how important is
this for the real atmosphere.

One of the problems you have

is you have this contour made from a laboratory study and
you want to know.

Where am I on it.

Am

I now at a place

where if I decrease nitrogen oxides will I go up the contour
and make ozone worse or I'm on the other side or if I decrease
it I'll go down.

I believe we are in such a situation that

we will probably stay about the same and we might make it a
little worse by controlling nitrogen oxide, that is the ozone
only.

But everywhere on that contour that you reduce hydro-

carbons no matter where you are, you will make the ozone
better and that is really the key element in my support of
hydrocarbon control as opposed to nitrogen oxides control.
ASSEMBLYMAN CALVO:

Everywhere on that curve when
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you improve the hydrocarbons, even by a small percentile, then
you can say that the ozone is less •••
DR. STEPHENS:

Right, that's what .•.

ASSEMBLYMAN CALVO:

••• whereas if you decrease NOx you

are not sure, you may decrease ozone or you may not.
DR. STEPHENS:

Yeah, and if you do both right and simul-

taneously you may cancel the benefit of one by the other and that
came out in our studies in connection with the retrofit program.
We got down to calculating from these contours that we developed
what decrease in ozone we might see for various modifications of
their various assumptions about the retrofit program and the retrofit program had both hydrocarbon benefits and NOx decreases in it,
but if you could analyze what was going on you could see that it
was the hydrocarbon control that was giving you any oxidant control
which you were getting and the NOx control was actually unproductive
or counter-productive.
ASSEMBLYMAN CALVO:

You seem to say you are not quite

sure what happens when you reduce that NOx, you think certain
things occur, are you continuing work in that area, so that you
can say you know in the near future?
DR. STEPHENS:

Well, let me mention two

uncertainties~

one is that you can either plot your contour, based on maximum
ozone formed in an experiment or you can plot it on the basis
of overall ozone dosage in six hours and those are not exactly
the same.

They are of similar shape but quantitatively they
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are not quite the same, so there you have problem number one,
do I evaluate this on the basis of the maximum ozone or the integrated ozone?

Problem number two is to know exactly where I

am on that diagram now so I have a study point and that is why
I had a problem answering Chairman Ingalls' question this morning.

He said what is the difference between 2 and 1.5 for NOx?
ASSEMBLYMAN CALVO:

to that one.

Let me ask another question related

If you have a reduction in the ozone by working

with the hydrocarbons in a continual reduction based on our
present approach but you don't reduce ·the NOx, is there extra
NOx?

That is, NOx that isn't being consumed or equated to the

ozone with the hydrocarbons that existed is, in itself, a health
problem and is a visable, aesthetic pollutant.
DR. STEPHENS:

Yeah, that's the other factor that I

haven't stressed very much and it is an important one.

Nitrogen

dioxide is one form in which this will be present in the atmosphere and it has a nice, rich, reddish-brown color which I think
you can see from time to time in our air.
ASSEMBLYMAN CALVO:
DR. STEPHENS:

In Riverside County frequently.

Yeah, and this is a health hazard.

Mrs. Meade brought up the question this morning of a standard
for that and there is a California standard.

I got the impression

from what she said that she thought there wasn't, I am not
sure I understood her correctly.

There is now a California

standard for nitrogen dioxide and it is a quarter of a part
per million for one hour • .
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CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Mrs. Meade probably voted on that

one. (laughter)
ASSEMBLYMAN CALVO:

There might very well be a separate

reason for controlling NOx than the ozone factor.
DR. STEPHENS:

Right, and the reason I take the position

I do is that that health standard for N02 is a quarter of a part
per million for one hour and we violate that much less frequently
than we violate the oxidant standard.

Now, if the physicians make

a breakthrough and tell me that that ought to be reversed and say
"We have got our toxicities backwards, that N02 is a lot worse
than we said before." then I will have to change my whole attitude
and I will, but so long as they say the ozone standard is a lOth
of a part per million or .08 and we are having .2 or .3 in Riverside
and they say that the N02 standard is .25 and we rarely get there
I have to say, focus on oxidant, which is ozone, and to do that
you control hydrocarbons.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

If I might follow up your question-

ing, Mr. Calvo, for just one question, Dr. Stephens, before we go
on to Mr. Maugh.

Since Mr. Heinen made the comment that he would

like to see the standards retained at the '76 standards which are
.9 hydrocarbons, 9.0 CO and 2.0 NOx, as opposed to the .41 hydrocarbons which are the '77 standards 9 CO and 1.5 NOx, if you were
to give us numbers and you have those options in front of you,
.9, .41, 2.0 and 1.5, would you concentrate then on lowering, is
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this a correct assessment of your testimony--you would concentrate
on lowering the hydrocarbons from .09 down to the .41?
DR. STEPHENS:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

That's where you would concentrate

it and do you have any opinions on the CO or the NOx?
DR. STEPHENS:

CO isn't particularly involved in the

photochemistry, a very minor role if any at all, and my reading
of the comparison between ambient levels and the standard is that
we are not in that much trouble for CO since hydrocarbon control
and CO control, maybe they will quarrel with this, but my understanding is that it does tend to go together anyway, so if I set
a stringent standard for hydrocarbon, CO will be attainable too.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:
versus the 1.5.

What would you say on the NOx, 2.0

We went over this a little bit this morning but

would you concentrate on or not concentrate on moving that down
half of a percent?
DR. STEPHENS:
of .41.

Not if it would jeopardize the payment

I would not consider moving it down and I think the

comments we heard about the availability of models that they
mentioned if that's in jeopardy too, that affects sales which
comes back to the other point I made.
MR. HEINEN:

Let me expand •..

CHAIRMAN INGALLS:
MR. HEINEN:

Mr. Heinen.

••• a little bit here in view of the
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fact that hydrocarbons have been particularly mentioned.
0

Right

from the beginning, I've agreed to recognize the fact that hydrocarbons were more important than NOx as a first attempt and,
indeed, that was the gist of the whole program over the last 20

0

years.

Now, I am not saying don't do anything about hydrocarbons

in the next few years; I am saying hold the exhaust to .9.

That

does not mean don't do the fill requirements which are going to
be perhaps bigger for hydrocarbon control.

Don't do the Shed,

that control requirement, I mean, continue on those two.

Those

two are positive progress until we learn two things, first of all,
how to do the hydrocarbon requirement and, incidentally, secondly
how to measure it with sufficient accuracy so if we don't get
ruled out just on measurements along.

When you are measuring

down to the .2, .3 region you are in real trouble.
I'm not saying stop on hydrocarbons.

The point is

I agree entirely with Dr.

Stephens on hydrocarbons.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:
MR. MAUGH:

Okay, very good.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Maugh.
First of all,

I would like to preface my remarks by indicating that I am
making these recommendations with respect to the short term in
the next four or five years and under the assumption that we
do not have a technological breakthrough, dealing with today's
technology.

Secondly, you made reference to the conflicts in

goals between nationwide and California objectives so I would
like to start, first of all, with our views regarding the
-1-15- --

national goals.

Essentially, we agree with the EPA's position

that the standards ought to be set at 1-1/2, 15 and 2 for the
'77, '78, '79 model years and .9, 9 and 2 for 1980.

We believe

this provides an appropriate balance between the nation's air
quality energy and economic goals.

It recognizes the issues with

respect to sulphates and the lack of a definitive position.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Could you go over those numbers

again, I wasn't listening.
MR. MAUGH:

1-1/2, 15 and 2 for '77, '78, '79 and point

.9, 9 and 2 for '80 and '81.
of us.

That covers the five years ahead

With respect to California, we agree that the problem

here in terms of air quality is more severe, that the standards
should be set lower in California than they should be nationwide
because of the different set of needs in California.

With re-

spect to a specific set of standards and for a moment, I would
like to pass 1977 and just deal with the five-year period in
general.

We think that there ought to be some relaxation of

both hydrocarbons and NOx·

We think that a standard somewhere

in the neighborhood of .6, 9.0 and 2.0 is a more appropriate
standard, given today's technology.

First of all, with respect

to NOx, we have heard testimony to the effect that there is
some question as to the benefits for the half a gram of NOx
going from 2 to

1.5~

secondly, NOx in the atmosphere is im-

portantly a function of stationary sources.

The car is not the

largest single source and this particular reduction in NOx has
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0

0

about a 5% fuel economy loss associated with it and we think
probably is not justified.

California

h~s

indicated that there

is no major CO problem so we think 9 grams of CO is an appro-

0

priate standard for

co.

With respect to hydrocarbons, I would

refer you to the figure 1 in the testimony -that I passed out this
morning.

This is a chart that shows the total automotive hydro-

carbon emissions from the uncontrolled levels of 1966 to the
scheduled levels for 1978.

By 1978, the total automotive hydro-

carbons will have been reduced from about 20 grams per mile,
the uncontrolled levels down to 1 gram per mile if you proceed
with the standards that are now on the books.

That's a 95%

reduction.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:
MR. MAUGH:

These are federal standards?

No, these are California, in California,

this is total hydrocarbons for automobiles in California and
by 1978, when you will have essentially controlled the refueling and losses, you will have reduced the evaporative losses
with the Shed test requirement and at a .4 standard for the
j

tail pipe, you will have essentially a 1 gram per mile total
hydrocarbon from cars and that is only 5%, or a 95% reduction
from the 20 in the early pre-controlled days.

What we're

suggesting is that going from .9 to .4 is a reduction of
a half of gram per mile, it's about 2-1/2% of the original
but it's the last 2-1/2% that is a very important problem.
It requires substantial--it's really at the borderline of
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technology and has with it a very substantial cost in fuel
economy penalty.

We have to develop our cars to meet .4.

We

have to develop to about .2 of a gram per mile and it's that,
if we had a relaxation from •••
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Mr. Maugh, what • s that tolerance

for if I may interrupt?
MR. MAUGH:

The tolerance is for the variability of

the hardware in production, in the variability of testing and
at the .4 level, we calculate we have to meet about .2 for development objective.

If we could get about another .2 of re-

lief in that development objective and our engineers tell us
that if you go to .6, most of that can be used to increase
their known normal objective, you can eliminate a great many
of the penalties in terms of fuel economy drive that we are
facing and we think that, to a point, if you went to a .6
standard on tail pipe and a .6 standard on evap, you'd have
a 1.2 gram per mile total which is still 94% reduction from
the original uncontrolled levels.

We are dealing with that last

1% of hydrocarbon control as being a very major problem.

And

I guess at this point I have to retreat to the same type of
analysis as was referenced with respect to the air quality and
the medical studies that you just have to use some judgment
with respect to whether or not that last 1% of hydrocarbon
control is really getting the associated benefits in

te~s

of health and air quality improvement in California.

our

judgment is that it is not an adequate trade-off at this
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point in time and with today's technology.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Thank you.·

Why don't we skip over

Mr. Hass and the next three witnesses and go to Mr. Simerline
so that we can get an in-line view of the industry, then come
back to Mr. Hass and go through the rest of our witnesses.
Stffierline.

Mr.

Is that right, Stmerline or Stffierlein?
MR. SIMERLINE:

this thing this time.

Stmerline is right.

I'll try to swallow

In my opening statement, I made a comment

about federal interim emission standards and this gives me an
opportunity to amend that.

I see an error in here and I'd like

to just repeat that for the record.

Under number 5, I said our

proposal is federal interim emission standards of HCO .9, CO 9.0,
NOx 2.0 grams per mile at the 1978 model year and continuing for
five years.

That should have been a comma after that.

california will probably remain at HCO
same period.

.41 ~

Even though

co 9, NOx 5 for the

Volvo's position on this has been for some time that

we think the california emission standards should be 0.9, 9 and
2.0, and the reason for this is that we have this system, which
is being developed and we have some, at least some feelings about
some real good performance data promised.

We feel that with those

emission levels we can maximize fuel economy.
our cost effectiveness and driveability.

We can maximize

By the same token, we

can minimize to a degree HC, CO and NOx emissions, and particularly sulphuric acid emissions.

Another important point about

our freeway catalyst and the feedback system is that as far
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as the consumer is concerned, there is absolutely no point in
tampering with the vehicle.

Tampering with the vehicle will not

improve its fuel economy or drivability.
bly have an adverse effect on it.

In fact, it will proba-

We feel this is the most im-

portant long-range program and when I say long-range, I mean the
customer, for the vehicle's useful life.

By modest maintenance,

such as changing an oxygen sensor, right now at about 15,000 mile
intervals, with very little cost, the owner will be able to maintain this vehicle at that emission level.

As soon as we get to

more stringent hydrocarbons, for instance .41, there is always
the possibility that a catalyst change will be necessary.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:
DR. STARKMAN:

Thank you very much.

Dr. Starkman.

Everything that has been said thus far by

the previous four people I think I would agree with.
of difference are small ones.

The points

That is to say, the base line from

whence we start reducing the emissions from automobiles has changed
and this came about, _you may wonder why, because we've changed
the tests frequently through the past decade since we've started
getting down on the

(inaudible)

starting in California.

But, in any event, the amount of hydrocarbon additionally that
will be removed by going to a 1977 standard in California in our
books is 3% of the total which was allocated to cars before there
were any controls on them at all and I'm not satisfied (inaudible)
additional 10%.

Now, General Motors has said before and I'll
-120-

say it again, that we choose not to quarrel with the State of
California over what the State of California decides is costbeneficial in terms of health, in terms of the kind of cars that
will be available and so when we came to testify last April 29
here, we did not object in any way, manner, or form to California
asking for a waiver.

That's the position we took and I must say

we took a lot of flack along with that because we did take that
position.

We've taken some flack since.

those detriments that the

stat~

From the standpoint of

will suffer, the people of the

state, in terms of fuel economy and in terms of drivability, and
in terms of availability of models, I've already specified that.
What I would like to do here, if I may, and I've been
looking at that blackboard and I haven't had a chance at the
blackboard for awhile yet, but a piece of chalk.

Perhaps Dr.

Stephens can confirm or deny--I'd like to make clear to you
what's going to happen if we pursue the reduction in NOx and the
reduction in hydrocarbons in terms of atmospheric reaction.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

You are going to have to say this

into a microphone.
DR. STARKMAN:

I'll have to say this into a microphone,

if I can find one.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:
DR. STARKMAN:
we will draw a curve.
0

Are you picking him up?

Can you pick me up?

But I'm sure

All right, if we were to draw a curve
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on which we put on the vertical ozone, but I'm going to put
some numbers on here but be careful about the numbers, they're
illustrations.

(inaudible) say that this is going to be 0.1

parts per gram and this is 0.2 and this is 0.3 and then on the
horizontal axis, I'm going to put NOx.

As a matter of fact,

I'll call it N02, if I may, and here I'm going to put .1 and then
I'm going to put .2, here I'm going to put .3.

There is a

region of ozone and of NOx we'd like to avoid.

For ozone, it's

.08, we say we want to get below that area.

There is a region

for NOx also, N02, that's .25 and Ed just read it to you here,
.25 parts per million per one hour and these are the kind of
reactions we're talking about, they are like one hour reactions
so we want to avoid this area over here.

What we want to do

from the standpoint of health, is to stay down in here.
Okay?

Now you say, "Well, where are we right now?"

now we're like so.
up here.

You agree, Ed?

All right?

Well, Ed's right, we're

That's where we are.

in the South Coast Air Basin.

Well, right

We're

~p

This is a bad day

about .25 parts per

million of ozone and we are at about .18-.2 of NOx, N02.
Something of that sort, N02.

Now, if I were to reduce the

amount of N02, I'd move this way.
I get a curve like that.

So, if I keep doing it then

This comes from small chamber work

carried out at Riverside, carried out at GM, carried out
by the EPA, these people that are doing this kind of work.
So this curve looks something like so.
i~g

a little bit.

But in

an~

And I may be exaggerat-

event, let's say that we're
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right here: now, this is for a given concentration of hydrocarbons: this is like the amount of hydrocarbons we've got in
the air right now.

Okay, now I am going to reduce the amount

of hydrocarbon; we are still at the same amount of NOx, I get
a curve that looks like that.
curve that looks like so.

If I reduce it further I get a

Boy, that's a long way down.

What

I'm trying to say is that if we are right ·here and we reduce the
NOx, we might move up to a worse condition.
long ways down.

So, we get it a

As a matter of fact, we might even be down in

here and if we move in this direction we are going to worsen
the condition for a

lo~g

way.

Now, if we reduce the amount of

hydrocarbons, holding the NOx constant, we come down to this
curve and we will be here.
with respect to ozone.

So, we're improving our situation

If we reduce the hydrocarbon enough,

we'll get to here and you say, "Well, why not go to there." but
you can't do it with automobiles alone.

You have got to do

.

it with other things too, the stationary sources.

But the

point that Ed is trying to make is that we could be doing ourselves a disservice by reducing NOx and hydrocarbon at the same
time, in effect, moving in this direction like so.

It depends

on how much distance there is between these curves.

So the

thing that you want to go after first really is not the NOx but
the hydrocarbons.

Now, fortunately, you don't

s~ffer

as much

in drivability, in fuel economy and all these other things we're
trying to avoid if you reduce the hydrocarbon and hold the NOx
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down.

End of lecture.

I hope I didn't confuse the issue worse

than it was.
ASSEMBLYMAN CALVO:

Except, Mr. Chairman, the point

that I tried to bring out and that is that there might be a
resultant problem with NOx that doesn't fit into the hydrocarbon
or ozone factors.
DR. STARKMAN:

I tried to show that.

See, that's the

line that we moved.
ASSEMBLYMAN CALVO:

I recognize that but what you

haven't discussed is that there may be a resultant health problem.
DR. STARKMAN:

Now, we have to talk about concentra-

tions of oxides of nitrogen then that are less than those you've
already established today.

Now, if there is another one that

comes along, I have to agree with you completely.
ASSEMBLYMAN CALVO:

That's the point that we were

discussing awhile ago that there may be some research in that
area may be forthcoming that would then put a different weight
on the NOx other than the ozone or oxidant factors.
DR. STARKMAN:

But in the meantime, we are not making

the situation worse, we're making it better from those things
we know about.
ASSEMBLYMAN WORNUM:

can I ask a question just on

this point?

d.2~

-·-

DR. STARKMAN:

Certainly, Mr. ·Wornum.

ASSEMBLYMAN WORNUM:

Well you have mentioned oxides of

nitrogen and other health effects and someone before said that
the stationary sources gave more oxides of nitrogen than the automobile.

What proportion about is that?
DR. STARKMAN:
DR. CARETTO:

Larry, isn't it about 50/50 right now?
It depends on the air basin. · I think

the last data I saw for the South Coast Air Basin was about 75
automotive, 25 stationary but that was like {inaudible).
ASSEMBLYMAN WORNUM:

Well, then in that case,

the smog boards in the state are getting after the stationary
sources.

In fact, that's all they have jurisdiction for.

what you are

So

saying, assuming we hold this constant {inaudible)

and {inaudible) half the oxides of nitrogen from the stationary
sources, what you are really saying is the ozone problem will
increase, or am I misreading what you are saying?
DR. STARKMAN:

Will you repeat that?

ASSEMBLYMAN WORNUM:

Well, you're saying that if you

reduce the oxides of nitrogen it will go up from the curve and
the ozone problem will get worse, or have I misunderstood?
DR. STARKMAN:

No, you're right, you're right.

Now

what are you going to do with the stationary sources?
ASSEMBLYMAN WORNUM:

Well, I am saying then that all

of the air pollution control districts are getting off of the
· oxides of nitrogen from stationary sources, so presumably, if
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the automobiles don't change, we keep a constant oxides of nitrogen
and then they reduce their oxides of nitrogen from the stationary
sources, the ozone problem will get worse.
DR. STARKMAN:

But let's get down to the lower curve

first {inaudible)
ASSEMBLYMAN WORNUM:
DR. STARKMAN:

That • s up to you guys.

Well, stationary sources, there's sta-

tionary sources, organic material, hydrocarbons, too, that we've
got to look at.
ASSEMBLYMAN WORNUM:

Just one of the problems I have

with all this is every time we get into an agrument is the stationary sources blame the automobile and the automobile blames
the stationary sources and it is sort of back and forth.
DR.

STARKMAN:

Well, we try not.

As I said previously

today, we don't like to throw rocks at the other guy.

We want

to get on with our job.
ASSEMBLYMAN WORNUM:

They• re busy throwing rocks at

you.
DR.

STARKMAN:

What we

ar~

saying is that if you want

to go in a given direction and make the most progress from the
standpoint of the transportation, the mobile sources, then you
are going to make the most progress by working on the hydrocarbon
end as contrasted to working on the oxides of nitrogen, and
that's not forever, that's for the tmmediate future and it
accomplishes the same kind of things that you heard from Charley
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0

0

Heinen and from others here, it allows us time to improve these
systems in the meantime, and we don't think it operates that
adversely on the air.

Now, we have people from the State of

California, experts who agree with this.
this kind of a plan.

The EPA agrees with

I don't know of many people in atmospheric

chemistry, if any, and Ed can correct me, who would argue this
mechanism.

Now, is that true, Ed?
DR. STEPHENS:

A real good argument is to where you

put that initial point.
DR. STARKMAN:

Yes, I realize that and I can't account •••

DR. STEPHENS:

Well, I'll account now.

MR. HEINEN:
another year or two.
~RP

That's one of the benefits of waiting
I don't know if you are acquainted with the

study that was done, basically sponsored by the Coordinating

Research Council, it was done by the State of California, the
various branches of the federal government, on particles in
the air of the City of Los Angeles, that were measured on the
ground (inaudible) by helicopter and by airplane simultaneous l y
and followed across the Los Angeles Basin to see how they were
reacting, when they were reacting and in what concentrations.
Now, that study is presently being run through a series of computer studies to see if we can finally establish the location
of that point.

This is one of those studies that is bound to

germinate in the next year or two and give us a better understanding of just exactly where that point is and that would
make quite a -bit-- of- difference

as -to
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which -d.l.rect:.ion you go.

If, to everybody's surprise it turned out to be on this side,
then it would make sense to go further, but I think the consensus
is that it's just about where Ernie put it.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Dr. caretto, you had a comment on

that point.
DR. CARETTO:

I think most of it, there's one additional

point though, is the whole question of health effects in and unto
itself.

I think the point that Ernie has put up there is appro-

priate in talking about a smoggy day in LOs Angeles, but there
are times in the South coast Air Basin where the N02 concentration
exceeds that .25 parts million per one hour which is the health
standard.

So, there is, in fact, some incentive to lower the

N02 concentration, just on the basis of the health standard for
N02 itself.
DR. STARKMAN:

I've got a point coming out here though,

and that is, persisting with the levels that we have now coming
out '75 and '76 tail pipes, that situation is going to improve,
which we've only got after all about two years of the 3.1 grams
per mile, 2.1 grams per mile left.

And as those cars then get

out into the general vehicular population, we are going to get
away from the .37 N02 incidence, I think.
think so?

Larry, don't you

{several people commenting in background)
DR. CARETTO:
DR. STARKMAN:

Yes.
But I

(inaudible) point to Mr. Wornum

whose suggestion was that N02 control is a mistake at any ttme,
stationary sources or whatever.
ASSEMBLYMAN WORNUM:

I was basing what you said •••
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0~.

STARKMAN:

Yes, my basic reply was that there is

a ration-off of stationary sources, because there are smoke columns
in the South Coast Air

Basin~

where there are a one-hour average

of N02 concentration greater than .25 parts per (inaudible)
ASSEMBLYMAN CALVO:
ASSEMBLYMAN INGALLS:
ASSEMBLYMAN CALVO:

Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Calvo.

Taking that argument one point

further, is it agreed by the chemists and statisticians that if
you reduce your NOx somewhere below 1 point that you will then
get on this downward curve and in this free area?

It seems as

if we back off on that slope, if we are able to somehow achieve
a low concentration of NOx through control of stationary as well
as mobile sources, we will end up underneath the level line
(inaudible) if that curve goes up, so it's proper to argue then
if we seek for real control, that we try to reduce NOx below
one point, below 1, somewhere, so that we will always be in
that safe zone.
DR. STARKMAN:

Assemblyman Calvo, what I was trying

to say was if we held NOx the same, and we reduced the hydrocarbon which is going to excessively lower levels than the
curves there, we finally get to the point then when you reduce
the NOx 1 you can stay below the ozone level all the time.
That's the point.

That's the essential thing.

ASSEMBLYMAN CALVO:

Yeah, but if you're concerned

about the health benefit and unknown potential harmful effects of
NOx, _would it not be _better if we had our
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choic~ and _CQU~~

achieve this, to reduce the NOx to the point along with the
hydrocarbons that were below that flat line.
DR. STARKMAN:

When we know what the effects are of

those other as yet unidentified compounds of nitrogen, I don't
know whether you are referring to nitrosamines as for the new one
we were discussing now or now.

If we are indeed worried about

nitrosamines, why we'd better avoid other things than running
cars.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:
here.

Let's don't get nitrosamines in

I don't think we can handle that too.
ASSEMBLYMAN CALVO:

I don't know what I'm referring to,

except that I think that I can see what you're presenting here
and another viewpoint would be that if we reduced everything down
instead of just the hydrocarbons, that we would be in a much safer
area.

If we could do it just as easily, say, and there wasn't

any more cost involved, or more research involved, if we could
control the same curve by reducing the hydrocarbons as well as
the NOx•
DR. STARKMAN:

A perfectly good point.

It's a question

of what's it going to cost?
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Thank you.

We have twenty more

minutes and we have four more individuals who will have approximately five minutes apiece.

Before we leave you now, Mr. Starkman,

I would like one question answered for the record and I may have
missed it in your presentation.

We, of course, have to deal in

numbers that are somewhat abstract to us and somewhat abstract
to you.

We have various numbers presented before us and where
-130-

0

does Chrysler Corporation fit in, not Chrysler, pardon me, but--

0
I have Chrysler, Ford and Volvo on the record--where does GM fit
in if you had your druthers?
PR. STARKMAN:

Following this there's then, I guess

0

what I am saying is, we would think it would be wise for California
to hold the 2 NOx for the moment and if •••
ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:

For the moment?

0
DR~

!STARKMAN:

Well, until we get a better .definition.

ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:

What are you talking about in

time?

0
DR. STARKMAN:

I'm talking about on the order of three

to five years and in the interim to reduce the hydrocarbons if
this is the direction which the State wishes to go.

There are

still going to be some losses in performance but not nearly the
level that would occur in pursuing the lower levels of oxides
of nitrogren.

At the same time, let me emphasize this, I think

you should pursue the reduction of hydrocarbons from other sources,
including the automobile.

I'm not eliminating the automobile as

a source of hydrocarbons from other places, particularly the
evaporation losses and filling losses and spilling losses.

The

whole picture of reduction of hydrocarbons needs attention.
ASSEMBLYMAN LANTERMAN:

What's this going to do to the

economy?
DR. STARKMAN:

Of the car?

Reducing hydrocarbons will

affect it some but not as much as the numbers I quoted today.
_

Y~q

figure less than . half of the loss as a -consequence of hydrocarbon

control.
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CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

If we're talking about getting down

to .4 hydrocarbons but leaving the NOx alone at the '76 levels,
you are saying that it is less than half of the fuel loss.
DR. STARKMAN:

I would say so.

You are asking me to

give you numbers and relate to a system that we haven't run yet.
We have't run a system at .41 and 9 and 2.0.

But from the other

data, we have, I think, that this would be less of an impact on
fuel economy, driveability costs than the standards that have
been laid out here.
ASSEMBLYMAN CALVO:
CHAIRMAN INGALLS :
MR. HEINEN:

Mr. Chairman ••.
Mr • Calvo •••

Mr. Ingalls, I didn't realize we were

making a table so I think I'd better give you precisely what
I said in numerical terms.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

I think we had you down as .9, 9 and

2, don't we?
DR. STARKMAN:
comments.

Yeah, I would also make some other

I pointed out spill losses which I considered to

be the number one.

I think we ought to hit that one right

away, that would be '77.
would be '78.

Evap losses, using the Shed technique,

Hydrocarbon losses from the exhaust down to .6, if

we've got the technology then, for the exhaust itself would come
in in that particular model year.

In other words, what I am

proposing is hydrocarbons on a sequential basis.

First, spill

hydrocarbons which is a bigger loss than what we have got in the
exhaust: then next, additional evaporative control losses for
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the next year, then on the third year controls on the order of
perhaps .6 as above what he's talking about here.
a number as any.

That's as good

If you are putting it in terms of years, that's

our precise program.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Very good.

Mr. Calvo, we're cutting

into other people's ttme.
ASSEMBLYMAN CALVO:

I recognize that but I do have some

comments on the last two remarks as to spillage, that seems to be
a factor that keeps cropping up.

I don't know whether you gentle-

men are aware and I am sure that you are that San Diego County,
for instance, the district has an ordinance now that eltminates
spillage, not only the refill from tanker to tank but also from
pump to vehicle and the Bay Area District also.

The devices have

not been installed according to schedule but the legislation is
there and they are now in the process of implementation so the
technology is there and the ordinances are already passed so that
is something that the industry really has very little to do with;
if you are talking about the stem pipe and how you build the automobile and the gas tank, that's something else;

but the actual

spillage factor, that is being taken care of by the stationary
districts and the ordinances are already on the books.
is there.

The tech-

The devices are being manufactured and installed.
(Inaudible)

I don't want to prolong this but we

have been working with the nozzle manufacturers and the oil companies
to standardize on that interface between the nozzle and the car
and should be there _pretty darn quick.
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_____ _

CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Good.

Dr. Caretta, since you have

a 3:30 plane to catch, we'll hear from you next and then the last
three witnesses after you.
DR. CARETTO:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Do you want to try to swallow a

microphone while you are talking?
DR. CARETTO:
few remarks to make.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just have a

I think that what I have said before was

that when we start talking about emissions we have to remember
that we can achieve improvements in fuel economy and improvements
in the emission standards simultaneously.

I have a copy of a report which was prepared by the
Technical Advisory Panel to your committee, dated May 8, 1975,
in which our panel generally agreed that the 1977 proposed standards of .41 in grams per mile from hydrocarbons, 9 grams per mile
for CO, and 1.5 grams per mile for oxides of nitrogen were appropriate standards for new cars for California.

We are concerned

about the 1.5 grams per mile because of the health hazard due to
N02, not because of oxidant, and we recognize that in this case
there probably would be little or no change in oxidant due to this
change in NOx.

So far as the oxidant is concerned, we felt that

the .41 gram per mile standard for hydrocarbons was an appropriate
standard.

We investigated the possibility of deferring this stan-

dard; what would happen if this standard came in on 1978 cars rather
than 1977 cars, and it was our conclusion that the •••
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CHAIRMAN INGALLS:
DR. CARETTO:

Hydrocarbon?

Hydrocarbon, I am sorry.

If this standard

was deferred for one year, that the change we made would indeed
be insignificant.

But, we are not sure that one could guarantee

that any potential benefits would be gained from deferring the standard for this year, such as allowing a greater range of vehicles
to be certified in California and improvements in the systems to
have greater fuel economy, would, in fact, be guaranteed.

There-

fore, we felt that it was appropriate that the .41 be necessary
for control of hydrocarbon emissions in the South Coast Air Basin.
We have mentioned that if the standard were deferred for one year,
the standards for 1978 cars should be set as soon as possible.
I would say immediately so that the industry would recognize that
if, in fact, you were to change the standards, that if you were,
indeed, going to be setting standards that would have to be met
at sometime in the future.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Thank you, Dr. Caretta.

Any

questions?
We have

tha~

paper; the Committee has thought that

each of you should have a copy of that paper which, as you all
know, is the position of our advisors to the Committee.

Let's

get back with Mr. Hass, then Mrs. Meade and then finally with
summing it up with Mr. Hart.
MR. HASS:

Mr. Haas.

Mr. Chairman.

Even the statutory require-

ment, both state and federal, that California must meet the

0
~ir qu~~ity stand~rd~,

I can see no basis for contemplatinq re-

ducing the standards and relieving the standards at all.

0
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It has clearly been shown that it is technologically
feasible to meet these standards.

The principal negative factor

seems to be the concern about a probable fuel economy loss of
five to ten percent relative to where we are now.

Now, I know

of no kind of trade-off function where you can say that one percent fuel economy can be traded for one percent hydrocarbon
reduction.

Nothing like that has appeared on the scientific

scene, so I guess that kind of question is a matter of political
judgment.
We do know that there are many other things the manufacturers can and are doing to improve fuel economy, principally
the trend for lighter vehicles and other design features for improving fuel economy.

I think there is a matter of perspective.

One could put the current prospective fuel penalty in comparison
with what has been a remarkable 20 percent fuel economy improvement over the last 2 or 3 model years.

This has been in conjunction

with the sizeable reduction in emissions from motor vehicles,
so the old relationship, the more control, the more fuel penalty,
this has same big discontinuities when you come into an area where
catalysts come on the scene, so, we would still have a sizeable
net beneift from catalysts even if we gave up five or ten percent
of the gain that we would achieve.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Thank you very much, Mr. Hass.

Mrs. Meade.
ASSEMBLYMAN LEWIS:
CHAIRMAN INGALLS :

Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lewis.• ·-
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Pardon, me, (inaudible).

ASSEMBLYMAN LEWIS:

.

We possibly have taken in a lot of

dialogue regarding the federal standards, air quality standards
including .08 parts per million.

There are probably just as

many questions which can be raised about the depth of information
we have available insofar as the lower levels of emission standards are concerned, and the effects of those oxidant levels.
Is the ARB discussing some funding or the need for at least longer
range research that will give us their handle upon health effects?
For example, the N02 question that Mr. Caretto raises is a vital
question, but do we know what .25 means in terms of health effects?

If we don't know, is there some priority in finding out?

Where is the ARB on that?
MR. HASS:

Well, I am not fully informed on this matter,

but I do know that our research granting activity has discussed
with considering whether this sort of information or this sort of
study should be funded; I think the dominant view at the present
time is that it is such a large field of research, so expensive,
so long-term that perhaps the limited resources available to the
Air Resources Board could be best put on more immediate problems.
ASSEMBLYMAN LEWIS:

Well, it just strikes me, excuse

me, and this is really not for you but maybe for the ARB's professional staff, in general, we have been in this business for
thirty years now and we have never had the time to really look at,
you know, the long-range ramifications.

Then, when you start

talking about changing people's life patterns or life style,
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it is pretty significant stuff.

Somewhere, at least in our

history, maybe we should have addressed _ourselves seriously to
that kind of funding.

If we had even begun to put the amount

of money into the air quality we have in water quality, we would
be way ahead of where we are now and I am just wondering where
our priorities are, and if we shouldn't be thinking about ten
years as well as six months.
MR. HASS:

Well, I think another factor related to

your question is that the federal government pretty well dominates
the standard-setting field.

Now, we might decide that a standard

was not all that important to us so we are still bound to meet it
because the federal government decided that it is, as I think the
assessment you're suggesting, really is

mor~

appropriate at the

federal level.
ASSEMBLYMAN LEWIS:

But if we are going to address our-

selves at all, we can afford only to address ourselves to state
agencies, because dealing with the federal government is idiocy
and we (inaudible) involved what their decision. -The least we
could be doing is making strong recommendations to the federal
government over the last ten years.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

We will be looking for your reso-

lution, Mr. Lewis.
MR. LEWIS:

Will you be the first co-author?

CHAIRMAN INGALLS:
MR. HASS:

I will.

Well, the Muskie Committee, as you know,

is reassessing their situation this year but _! haven't

h~ard

any indication that they are going to do anything fundamental
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about air quality standards.
ASSEMBLYMAN WORNUM:
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Mr.

Chairman?

Yes, Mr. Wornum.

ASSEMBLYMAN WORNUM:

I know this is sort of a dull

question, but just for a simple answer.

It is too much of a

matter of confusion to me whether this committee or the Legislature or the ARB sets these standards.

I mean, do you take

our advice and then, you said you are a creature of the Legislature, up until now, I hadn't noticed any member of the Brown
administration being too much of a creature of the Legislature,
if I can put it crudely.

They tend to be a bit like a lion tamer,

so I think if this committee, after much statesman-like consideration, comes to the conclusion that we should have so many of these
figures, the magic three figures that we have got, do you then,
the ARB, dutifully say "'I!hat 1 s what the Legislature wishes." and
adopt it, or do you still go your unhappy way?
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Well, Larry Haas is here; the legis-

lative representative of the Board is here to answer that question.
MR. LARRY HAAS:

Mr.

Wornum and committee members, under

existing law, the ARB has the authority to set both vehicle emission standards and air quality standards for the state. Essentially, the way that this began historically was that the Legislature statutorily set vehicle emission standards for various
model years that occurred several years ago and gave the ARB the
authority to set more stringent standards for future model years
which were shown both to be technologically fe_asible and necessax-y_
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to meet the air quality standards.
Now, with respect to the

sett~ng

of air quality stan-

dards themselves, the ARB has had the authority for, oh, seven
or eight years to set state ambient air quality standards and the
Board has done this.

In most cases, the standards, as a practi-

cal matter are, I think, rather close to the federal standards
that have been set.

There are some differences.

One of them,

for instance, being that there is a .s tate air quality standard
for lead.

There is no corresponding federal standard.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

I might add, Mr. Wornum, that the

Legislature has the power, by statute, to take back that delegation of authority by passing a statutory standard ourselves.
ASSEMBLYMAN WORNUM:

Well, the thing I think is that

we spent several days in Detroit and this committee heard a lot
of people who are present here today give testimony at that time,
and one of the things, as was brought out today is, if you make
the standards too strict, you will take a step backwards because
people don't buy new cars and you have the old cars remain.

Is

that something that is considered by the ARB in setting the
standards however desirable they may be?
MR. HAAS:

Absolutely, Mr. Wornum.

The Board has no

desire for a more stringent standard to be counterproductive.
What we are keeping an eye on, or attempting to keep an eye on,
the bottom line is tonnages of pollutants emitted.

That is

what you have to equate, given the various meterological and
topographic features throughout the state _to the air_ quality
levels and we look at certain changes in the emission standards
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as being related to changes in the tons emitted; in this case,
tonnages emitted from light-duty motor vehicles.

But, we are also

taking a look at, and trying to assess, the implications for such
things as reduced sales and that kind of factor.

These were

mentioned earlier, some allusions to reduced sales of newer vehicles,
but I heard no one point out that the major reason that you have
had reduced vehicle sales has not been the fact that California
has had more stringent standards, but the fact that
through a rather bad economic period these days.
picking up.

~e

have been

Sales are now

The financial press and the media have reported this

during the last couple of months very well.

So I don't think

that particular, perhaps, misconception should be allowed to
continue.
ASSEMBLYMAN WORNUM:

The simple answer to the question,

then at the moment, is that you are setting standards, but the
Legislature does have an overview and a role •••
M~.

HAAS:

The Legislature could repeal the authority

that it has granted the Board to set standards in this area.
ASSEMBLYMAN WORNUM:

Well, let me put it simply, say

this committee did come up with a set of numbers after all this
testimony which is different from the (inaudible) or shall we
say we wanted to keep the federal standards going for a year
and will go along with Ford for awhile--the President, I mean,
not the motor company--would this influence the ARB to keep
changing their standard or, conversely, the other way around?
I don't want to put you in a spot.
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MR. HAAS:

I believe the Board would want to keep the

standards that it has set.

I don't believe I have heard any

sentiment on the part of the Board members to back off on the
'77 light-duty vehicle standards.
ASSEMBLYMAN WORNUM:
MR. HAAS:

The California ones.

The California ones, very clearly though,

we recognize and the Board recognizes that the closer you get
to zero and we obviously are getting much closer now than we
were several years ago, the more it tends to cost to achieve any
particular increment of control, and the smaller those increments
mean in terms of air quality differences.
ASSEMBLYMAN WORNUM:

The California standards on this

thing is what, .41, 9 and 1.5?
MR. HAAS:

That is right.

ASSEMBLYMAN WORNUM:

And the 1.5 is the, somewhat the

point at issue because from what I have heard they are more interested or feel it is best to reduce the hydrocarbons than go
after oxides of nitrogen.
MR. HAAS:

Well, certainly, when you are talking about

oxidant, that is true for_ controlling that particular pollutant.
Hydrocarbons do seem to be the key pollutant to reduce.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:
to have two more witnesses.

Thank you, Mr. Haas.

We are going

If any of you have to leave because

of commitments, I know Dr. Caretto had to catch a plane, feel
free.

We will give five minutes apiece to Mrs. Meade and to

Mr. Hart.

Holding Mrs. Meade to five minutes. is difficult
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but I think we can do it.
MRS. MEADE:

Well, time it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I know there is never enough knowledge available.

We would

always like to have more information in terms of health effects.
More information in terms of the atmospheric chemistry.

Mr.

Starkman's chart on the blackboard there, on the green board is
an old friend.

In fact, Gay Haas and I turned to each other and

said, "There it is again."
you want to go.

It is a question of how far back do

And there can be arguments, as Mr. Calvo pointed

out, in terms of how you approach that.

The federal government

has chosen the reactive hydrocarbon as the method of choice.

Now

they can be turning just a little bit more if this new report that
I mentioned is significant in terms of NOx, but that's my original
point, never enough knowledge.
definite.

But we do have something very

We have air quality standards that are accepted, that

have not been challenged recently, a set of goals perhaps of what
can be challenged in the time schedule to get there, but at least
we have a definition of clean air.
We also, even subjectively, have a definition that
smog is bad for us.

I would challenge anyone in this room to

say that oxidant pollution or smog, such as we endure in the
South Coast Air Basin, is somehow good for people.

I think we

all recognize that it is bad for everybody and we wish it weren't
there.

So, those are two givens that we have and we just ought

to accept that.
What I cannot accept is the discussion of three
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pollutants and we must somehow establish a trade-off between, we
can control two pollutants, but not all three.

This, again, is

an historical kind of argument that brought us to the NOx device
program.

A decision was made to control HC and CO but somehow we

couldn't control NOx so in the 1966 to 1970 vehicles the NOx emissions went wild.

As has been pointed out also, NOx emissions are

not coming just from motor vehicles, they are coming from stationary
sources and if our new oil facilities on shore are built in the
South Coast Air Basin, we will have a tremendous increase in the
tonnage of oxides of nitrogen, so I don't accept that trade-off.
I think we can control all three pollutants.

The National Academy

of Science committees have said so, this committee's own Technical
Advisory Committee has indicated so, and even the General Motors'
testimony at the Resources Board hearing on the '77 emissions standard agreed that all three could be controlled.

Because, if you

go in the other direction and you say we want fuel economy instead,
what guarantee do you have?

I think Mr. Haas pointed this out.

You have emission testing on the assembly line, what kind of guarantee do we have in California in terms of fuel economy?

If you

back off from the '77 standard, that is not going to for sure buy
you a five percent benefit in fuel.

There are no other ways to

to after fuel economy and I listed some of them earlier; waste
being one of the biggest ones; equipment on the car is another.
The whole listing is in the report that I referenced earlier.
In terms of the transformation process of oxides of
nitrogen or N0 2 , this is where we are
-144-

forgett~ng o~

that kind

o~

chart, it has been brought up too, that there is something called

D

nitric acid aerosols.

These are substances we are just getting

into and remember, we may not be monitoring throughout the state,
or even assiduously in the South coast Air Basin for No 2 • Not
all monitoring stations monitor all pollutants or all varieties
of pollutants.

So we may have more of a problem than we are

aware of simply because we are not monitoring all over the place.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Something else that was ignored is

the fact that NOx impacts on different areas of the Basin from
hydrocarbons, most severely in the area I represent.
MRS. MEADE:

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and members

of the committee, I thank you again for the opportunity to appear.

I would recommend no change to you in the 1977 standard

even if you wish to assume the authority to make that change.
I would prefer to see it left as an administrative decision
with the Air Resources Board.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:
MR. HART:

Thank you, Mrs. Meade.

Mr. Hart.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman

and members of the committee.

I will try to keep my remarks to

the minimum of five minutes.
We are unwilling to admit that there is a fuel economy
penalty.

We think this is a straw man erected by the industry in

order to whip-saw the public and the Legislature.

We find it

bizzare to hear Detroit argue that there is a fuel economy penalty while they press the gas guzzlers and the air conditioners
on the public.

I think one of the great differences between us,

is really a philosophical ·di.tfe-rence--and--that i s , - we are quite
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willing to make essential changes in the automobile.
willing to face that terrible thing.

We are

The auto industry, on the

other hand, takes the view that the real world and they use that
phrase, I shouldn't use the pronoun "they", but the industry does
use the phrase, "the real world".

What they mean by the real

world is the market place.
I think we must understand when we talk about what the
absolute vehicle is, which Detroit sees as the product they turn
out at the present time.

We must understand that this vehicle

invades the commons in two areas, air pollution and fuel economy.
Fuel economy is the commons as well, because we all draw from a
common oil pool and air, of course, is common to all of us, and
as you probably know, when we are dealing with matters in the
commons, we find that voluntary controls do not work.
work at all.

They do not

For that reason, we feel that the only reasonable

solution to all our dilemma is to accept the necessity for real
changes in the vehicle.

We don't think the present vehicle is an

absolute and I would like to repeat again the laundry list of
things which I have suggested, no charge to Detroit, for curing
the problem of the fuel economy penalty.
Reduce the size of all vehicles to rational dimensions
and reasonable weights.
missions, fuel injection.

Mandate radial steel tires, manual transEliminate power optionals, no longer

necessary, incidentally, for small cars, including air conditioning.
Improve the fuel system, the location of the gas tank and the
filler pip_e, _the_ ~~bj~ct_ 1 _I _:thi_n_kt for _tl)is afternoon.
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Alternative

0

engine choices, of course, are a much more complex issue but I
am sure that plenty of useful plowing could be done in that field
as well.
I believe I have one more minute.

0

I would like to reply

partially to Mr. Wornum's question about the energy requirement
for new car manufacturing.
0

I would like to make that reply be-

cause it allows me to drag in by the heels the subject that is
very dear to my heart, and that is, there is convincing statistical evidence that larger cars have more accidents than do small

0

cars.

Now, in looking at the statistics, I have tried to reach

for reasons which I thought would justify the results which I
saw very plainly in the data.

It appears to me that one very

important reason is the fact that large cars are frequently bought
for ego-building reasons.

That is really an

over~simplification,

I would say manhood-building reasons.
MR. HART:

No, not really, sir.

Let me expand just

one moment, I think I have one more minute.
ASSEMBLYMAN ANTONOVICH:

Are large families a symptom

of ego?
MR. HART:

I am glad

you asked that question,

Mr;

Antonovich.
ASSEMBLYMAN ANTONOVICH:

I have many Catholic friends

and many Mormon friends who have large egos then.
MR. HART:
)

Do they also have large cars?

ASSEMBLYMAN ANTONOVICH:

You damn bet!

believe it when they have large families.
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You better

0

MR. HART:

You know, it seems strange to me because

if you look at the average car, I think you will find that the
capacity of persons, that is, the number of people in a large
car is usually no greater than it is in the small car.

In

fact, Detroit has produced a miracle, a car which is large on
the outside and small on the inside.

In fact, I think the

automobile which best suits a large family is not an American
car at all.

I don't want to go any further in that direction,

but the point I rna making is, since a large car is bought for
that purpose, it outlives its usefulness very quickly.

It changes

hands more frequently, probably, than the smaller car.

Therefore,

it goes down the hill into poor,

mo~e

poverty-stricken hands.

secondly, because a large car is more difficult to repair, I
mean, financially.
more.

That is, tires cost more, brake jobs cost

They very probably are in poor mechanical condition and,

therefore, my guess is that large cars

pass off the highways

much more rapidly than do small cars ans since they probably,
they certainly cost more to replace, large car for large car in
terms of energy, and since they probably are replaced more frequently, then surely there again is a very large energy drain on
the nation as a whole.

So, with that comment I want to thank

the committee for their tolerence of my bizzare ideas.
CHAIRMAN INGALLS:

Mr. Hart, and other members of the

panel, I want to thank you for what has been probably the most
stimulating discussion we have had while I have been Chairman
of this committee and I enjoy seeing
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disagreement~,

eh~ll

we

0

say, on perspectives from various members of the panel, and
your points of view are very much appreciated and will be taken
into account by the committee when it does its continuing work

0

in this field.

I especially want to thank those of you who came

all the way from Dearborn, that's not Detroit, Dearborn.
a whole week there one night.

I spent

It has been most informative.

I

also want to thank you on behalf of the committee for your hospitality that you showed us while we were visiting you.

And I

want to thank, of course, Dr. Stephens for coming, and Gay for
coming.
Mr. Hart.

And always it is a pleasure to see Gladys and you, too,
Again, thank you all.

It has been most productive.

We have gone far beyond our time, so if there are
those of you in the public who wanted to give testimony, if you
will submit a copy of your written statements, they will be incorporated into the record, but we just don't have the time because we are going to have to move on, after a five-minute break,
into the second panel discussion.
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Again, thank you.
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Emission Control and Fuel Economy Between 1975-80
General Motors Statement to
California Assembly Committee on TrQnsportation
November 17, 1975

A proiection of where we are headed in terms of emission control and fuel economy between
now and 1980 can probably best be put into perspective by reviewing past and present
automotive emission reductions and the penalties associated with these reductions.

Emissions/Fuel Economy Tradeoffs
As you well know, California has historically enforced more stringent automotive emission
standards than has the rest of the nation, and we support this because of a special air pollution
problem in the Los Angeles area. Current models produced for sale in California have
significantly reduced exhaust emissions to levels that are 94% below uncontrolled vehicles
for hydrocarbons, 90% for carbon monoxide, and 60% for oxides of nitrogen.

These more stringent standards in California have not been realized without penalty to the
California customer. Fuel economy data obtained during emissions certification testing by
EPA for the last three years of GM vehicles (1974-5-6 models) show penalties associated with
meeting the stringent California standards. For 1974, this was about 5% ••• for 1975 and
1976 models, a lOOk fuel economy penalty occurred for the average GM California car
compared with its 49-state counterpart.

The more stringent 1977 California standards will require vehicles to have emission reductions
of 97% for hydrocarbons, 90% for carbon monoxide and 700/o for oxides of nitrogen, compared
with the uncontrolled car. This, unfortunately, will require additional expense for the
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California customer for the fuel economy losses over and above the 10% disadvantage
currently experienced in California cars. The results from our prototype cars designed
to meet the 1977 California standards show substantial fuel economy losses of an additional

0

10% or more ••• even up to 200.k additional. Of course, we ar.e working hard to meet
these more stringent standards in the most effective way we can to provide minimum fuel
penalties to California customers. We are no more pleased with this current situation
than is California, and please be assured that we will do our utmost to reduce these losses.
However, we are unaware of any system, or any manufacturer who now can, or will be able

0

in the future, provide cars that will not lose fuel economy at more stringent emission standards.

The 1977 General Motors products for California will include catalytic converters and

0
other emission control hardware similar to that used on present models. The converter has
enabled auto makers to improve gas mileage and driveability by allowing us to re-tune our
engines, since it does such an effective job of reducing emissions. Much of the unjustified
criticism of converters ignores these important points. An additional benefit accrues to
residents of California, particularly to those living ln the Los Angeles Basin. The converter
is especially effective in reducing those hydrocarbons which are the most photochemically
reactive and, therefore, those of most significance in controlling the Los Angeles type of
smogo

In addition to the previously discussed fuel economy penalty that 1977 California vehicles
will experience, it is possible that California new car buyers may incur an additional
expense to cover catalyst change that may be required on some of our 1977 models.
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Because of the key role of the catalytic converter in our

~975

and 1976 control

systems, we were able to recalibrate our engines to achieve a 28% improvement
in fuel economy in our 1975 49-stote cars as compared with 1974. For this model
year, 1976, the improvement in fuel economy increased to 38% over 1974 according
to EPA measurements and computations. We are ·indeed proud of these major
accomplishments. Similarly, fuel economy increased about 31% for the 1976
California model, compared with 1974, even though emission standard changes
were more stringent in California than in the 49 states.

In subsequent model years, we have plans to continue to improve fuel economy by
other alterations to the design of passenger cars. Again, on a sales-weighted basis,
we project more than a 500k fuel economy improvement over 1974 model cars by the
1980 model year for vehicles produced for sale outside of California, assuming
continuation of the 1975 federal auto emission standards. These fuel economy
projections, and the penalties discussed earlier, are shown on the following· page
in Figure 1.
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0
Estimate of the Effects of Product Program and Emission Standards
on GM Sales- Weighted Fuel Economy Improvement
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Figure 1

Figure 1 does not specifically address the penalties associated with meeting standards
more stringent than those established for the 1977 model year in California, but does
show them as a wide range based on data developed to date from experimental systems.
Systems under evaluation at General Motors that have been developed to meet the 1978
statutory standards of .41 g/mi hydrocarbons, 3.4 g/mi carbon monoxide, and .4 g/mi
oxides of nitrogen have thus far no. shown satisfactory durability. Since we have not
defined the system required to achieve these emission levels, it is not possible to predict,
with any degree of certainty, the fuel economy penalty that would be incurred. At least
for the next few years, the internal combustion engine and the catalytic converter clearly
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stand as the best technology to give us both cleaner air and improved fuel economy.
More complete definition of the emission/fuel economy sitUation is included in the
GM testimony of April 29, 1975 at the California Waiver hearing, which is an
attachment to this statement.

Converter Reliability
The catalytic converter system is not only performing its emission control tasks well, while
being responsible for major improvements in fuel economy, d:fveability, and lower auto
maintenance cost for owners, but it is accomplishing these valuable benefits while
accumulating an astonishingly trouble free record of reliability. Based on the evidence
to date, which includes over 35 billion miles of customer driving in converter-equipped
GM cars, the massive effort of installing catalytic converters on the entire 1975 GM
domestic production is an outstanding success. Known converter problems of all kinds
represent only a very small fraction of 1% of General Motors converter car production.
The warranty rate has been no greater than that for mufflers and regular exhaust system
components.

This record has been achieved using a converter that apparently still remains controversial
in the minds of some critics. They suggest that it would be responsible for an inordinate
number of catalyst-related fires ••• this did not materialize.
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Sulfate Emissions
A second criticism of the catalytic converter has resulted from concern for sulfate emissions.
However, it is known from research to date that sulfate emissions from production vehicles
are very small. All of the data available to General Motors point out that at this time
sulfa~e

emissions from catalyst cars are at such low levels that they do not pose any present

health hazard. In fact, for the next several years, the catalytic converter wi II provide
far greater public benefit through reduction of hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide than
it could possibly create a public risk because of sulfates.

Over the past couple of years, several conflicting statements have been made by various
researchers regarding the possible health effect of sulfate emissions from catalytic converters.
Since these conclusions were so diverse, General Motors decided to conduct an extensive
research experiment to determine whether sulfate emissions from catalytic converters on
automobiles could accumulate to harmful levels under localized adverse traffic and weather
conditions. We decided to conduct this experiment because we believe that obtaining
actual atmospheric dispersion data is an absolute necessity before any rational estimate can
be made of the potential impact of catalytic converters on the environment.

In order to obtain data with the widest possible application and maximum acceptability by
the scientific community, GM solicited particpation by the Environmental Protection Agency,
the Department of Transportation, other government agencies including the California Air
Resources Board, other automobile manufacturers, oil companies, and catalyst manufacturers.
This testing has been conducted during October of 1975. In a number of months, when all
data have been obtained and analyzed, GM and EPA will announce the results of the program.
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Further info~tion about the sulfate experiment is included in the attachment entitled
11

Pians for General Motors• Sulfate Dispersion Experiment 11 •

Fuel Economy Legislation
GM has voluntarily pledged a more than 50% fuel economy improvement nationwide for
our 1980 models over the 1974 model average. This pledge, made in the absence of fuel
economy regulation, has resulted and will continue to result in massive GM expenditures.
As Figure 1 shows, much of the resulting improvement in fuel economy that we expect to
make in the next few years from this unprecedented multi-billion dollar program to turn
General Motors• product lineup around, could be essentially wiped out by the Federal
emissions regulations now scheduled to go into effect with the 1978 models.

We will make our very best effort, of course, to improve the fuel economy of our future cars
by all feasible means, regardless of what Congress does about future standards. Our customers
demand improved fuel economy, the national interest requires it, and our success in the
marketplace depends on it. Proposals are now being considered in the U.S. Congress to
force the auto industry to reach prescribed fuel economy standards beginning in 1978,
eventually resulting in the requirement to achieve an average fuel economy of 28 miles
per gallon by 1985. These laws and regulations are not only unnecessary, but would have
severe repercussions on the industry, our employes, our customers, and the country's economy.

California has historically been a leader in environmental concerns, particularly in the
field of vehicular emission control. It can be observed that CCIIifornians, Qs a cons~qvence,
have suffered greater fuel economy penalties than has the rest of the country. In part, the
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disproportionate purchase of smaller cars may have somewhat offset this differential
in fuel usage. However, it still remains a fact that a fuel economy penalty exists

0

as emission control becomes more stringent. We see no relief from this "history 11 of
fuel penalties in the near future, either with conventional or alternate engines.

In summation, our fuel economy and emissions progress are closely linked, and indeed
inter-dependent. The trade-offs discussed in this statement must be considered by all
those involved in the research and development, or in the regulatory process. There
is much at stake, and if mistakes are made, they can be extremely costly to either the
environment or the nation's energy resources, or both.
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s.

Mr . Chairman, my name is Ernest

Starkman.

I am Vice

President, in charge of Environmental Activities Staff for
0

General Motors Corporation.
Nelson, assistant

With me today are Edwin E.

directo~ Automo~ive

Emission Control on the

Environmental Activities Staff and William L. Weber of our
Legal Staff.
We are here today because of the importance of the
0

california market to General Motors, and because the request
for lower emission standards ·for 1977 California models (.41
g/mi hydrocarbons (HC), and 1.5 g/mi oxides of nitrogen (NOx))

0

will have a significant impact upon our California customers if
these lower stan·dards go into effect.
Due to the nature of federal waiver proceedings, we realize
that as a matter of form our comments are being directed to the
Environmental Protection Agency, where Congress has placed the
authority to grant such a waiver.

However, because of the

location and subject matter of these hearings, we appreciate the
fact that the officials and general public of California are
listening.

.

.

.

..

Pursuant to the guidelines which EPA published for these
~~~rings,

my comments will respond to the two major questions

contained in the official hearing announcement.
-160 -
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First, Are the Waiver Standards Required to Meet Compelling
and Extraordinary Conditions in California?

General Motors certainly acknowledges that California has
special air pollution problems that fall within the statutory
criteria of "compelling and

extr~ordinary"

conditions.

Our recent

submissions to the federal government* point out that, while a
carry~over

of 1975 auto emission standards for five years

would still permit achievement of national air quality goals in
virtually every metropolitan area of the country, some locations
in California represent exceptions.

If all sources in California

were controlled to the same degree as is the automobile, it is
still questionable whether air quality goals would be achieved
there.
While we hope that technology will be developed soon to
permit all pollution sources to make their proper contribution
in achieving this objective, we know it is not now technically
feasible in some cases to do so.
I

On the other hand, we also .know

that air qual±ty goals cannot be met by regulating the automobile
alone, even if

10~~

of auto emissions are eliminated.

Nonetheless,

we do not oppose special, more stringent standards for California
than for the rest of the nation, because it may help provide
cleaner air where it is most needed .
*GM statement to House Subcommittee on Public Health and Environment, March 17, 1975, and submission to EPA on Selective
Enforcement Audit, April 17, 1975.
-161-

0

0

-3-

The second EPA question is,_ Are the Waiver Standards Consistent
with Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, Particularly with
Respect to Technological Feasibility in the Lead Time Remaining?,

General Motors believes that it can certify enough
California vehicles to be well represented in the California
market and at the same time meet the proposed 1977 California
standards.

(This does not mean, necessarily,that we can do the

same thing nationwide.)
Our plans are to start certification of 1977 models i n the
summer of this year.
waiver is

g~anted,

Therefore, if California's request for

we intend to market 1977 models in California

in as many size and weight categories as we can under the regulations 1
'
recognizing that some current
engine/transmission combinations now

being offered in

Californi~

may have to be dropped.

Whil e technology and adequate lead time appear to be available
to certify vehicles to t' he very stringent waiver standards, much .
depends on the outcome o f f ederal and California proposed regulations
that are scheduled for t he 1977 model year vehicles.

These proposed

r egulations which are identified as Selective Enforcement Audit (SEA }
and a new evaporat i ve emissions test (SHED} have a direct bearing
on t e c hno l og ica l feas i b i lity, particularly within the short
t ime b e fore 1977 model cert i ficat i on gets underway.
l a tions will be d i scussed later i n more detail .
-162 -
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-4The 1977 General Motors product for California will include
catalytic converters similar to those· used on 1975 GM models.
Although we may appear to be optimistic that we can meet .
.
California 1 s very stringent standards, there are some disadvantages
that we expect to accompany our 1977 models.
Some of these are:

(1) an additional maintenance charge

on GM cars of $60 to $70 for catalyst change which our current
·tests indicate will be unavoidable, and (2)

addi~ional

. expenses for fuel economy losses over and above the 10%
disadvantage currently experien7ed by California cars,
compared to similar federal cars.

At this early point, let me

say we will attempt to solve these problems in the best way we can
to provide the minimum penalties to California customers.
Additional Public Interest Factors
Be that as it may, this hearing provides a valuable public
"

service because it permits a public discu.s sion of all questions
and problems related
to the technology
.required
and--the
.
.
..
.
.
..
. w"a y in
which the consumer interest is involved.

Conservation of

petroleum resources and the impact upon inflation must be
considered by EPA as well as by legislative and administrative
officials in Washington and California.

For these are the people

who must ultimately be concerned with the 'total public welfare in
their requlation of the automobile.
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-sObvious l y, any evaluation of these general public interest

0

factors should include a review of vehicle control systems by
which it is pr ojected that the 1977 wa iver standards will be met.
While other technologies have been evaluated on experimental model s,

0

catalysis is the only method o f control available to GM in the time
remaining before we must begin certifying and producing 1977

0

models which meet the waiver standards.

In fact, because our

catalytic converters help us mimimize fuel economy losses a nd other
disadvantages that will accompany achievement of more stringent
emission standards, they constitu t e a preferred method of control.
Review of Catalytic Conver te r System Performance and the Sulfate
Question

0

Emis s i ons Control
·The catalytic convert e r s used on new 1975 automobiles are
enabling automakers to improve gas mileage and driveability while
also reducing exhaust emissions.

Much of the unjustified criticism

of catalytic converters ignores these important points.
New 1975 models in Californ ia have emissions which are reduced
by 94% for hydrocarbons , 90% for carbon monoxide* and 60% for

.

oxides of nitrogen compar e d to an uncontrolled car.

Under the

- 1 6 4-

*GM b ase line d at a , A Cur en t Study of Au tomotive Air Po llution,
Anr ' l - Oct ober 1972 . His t orv and Chronology Section .
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1977 waiver standards these reductions will be increased to 97%,
90% and 70%, respectively.

As shown in Figure 1, achievement of

these standards will leave only minor fractions of pollutants
remaining.

Moreover, because of the requirement that almost 100%

of new cars must meet the standards, a substantial portion of all
vehicles sold in California have emissions significantly less than
the maximum allowed.

We think this is a record of accomplishment

in air pollution abatement unparalleled by any other industry in
the world!
Figure 1

CALIFORNIA AUTO EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS IN PERCENTAGES
.(STANDARDS IN g/mi)
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There is an additional benefit from catalytic converters which
accrues to residents of California -- particularly those living in
the Los Angeles basin.

That is, the converter is especially effective

in reducing those hydrocarbons which are the most photo-chemically
reactive and t herefore, those of most significance in controlling the
Los Angeles type of smog.
Fuel Economy
In large measure because of the key role the catalytic converter
plays in our 1975 control systems, we were able to recalibrate our
engines to achieve a 28% improvement in fuel economy in our 1975
federal cars over our 1974 federal cars on the EPA urban cycle according to EPA.

We are proud of this major accomplishment.

As

mentioned previously, due to more stringent waiver standards now
applicable in California, our 1975 models sold there achieve 10% less
miles per gallon than comparable 1975 federal cars -- 14 instead of
15.5 mpg.
In subsequent model years, we intend to continue to improve fuel
economy by other alterations to the design of passenger cars.

On a

sales-weighted basis, we project more than a 50% fuel economy improvement over 1974 cars by 1980 models for vehicles produced for sale outsidE
California, assuming continuation of the 1975 federal auto emissions
standards for all states except California.

These fuel economy pro-

jections are shown in Figure 2 based on our forward product planning
programs to make our entire product line more fuel efficient.
catalytic

conv~rter

The

is helping -make this contribution to the

achievement of two of our nation's

g~als,

energy conservation.
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air pollution control and

-aUnfortunately, further losses in fuel economy will result
from the emission control measures needed to meet the proposed
1977 waiver standards.

A comparison between fuel economy levels

for the nation and those for California in 1975 and 1977 can also
be seen in Figure 2.
Figure 2

FUEL ECONOMY
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includes improvements in fuel economy projected for
all GM 1977 models because of design changes in vehicle weight,
aerodynamics, etc., which will offset to some extent the fuel
economy loss projected for 1977 California cars, when compared
to 1975 California cars, because of more stringent exhaust
emission standards.
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-9Sulfate Emissions
c~talytic

Much of the criticism of the

converter has resulted

0
from concern about sulfate emissions.

Particularly disturbing was a

preliminary "Issue Paper" by EPA released to the public in late
0

January.

This study claimed sulfate emissions from cars equipped

with catalytic converters might threaten public health sometime
in the future.
At GM. \'le have examined all the data available on this point
and believe (1) at this time sulfuric acid emissions from catalystequipped cars are at such low levels that they do not pose any present
health hazard and (2) that for the next several years, and probably
for a great many more, the catalytic converter provides far greater
public benefit through reduction of hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide
than it does public risk because of sulfates.
EPA has recently supported these conclusions.

In a new prelirni-

nary EPA report, released April 3rd, information is presented which
lessens the concern over future hazards, by questioning the validity
of the model used in the January report to project possible future
sulfate exposures.

This recent report views sulfate exposure

projections by several other groups, one of which was the
California Air Resources Board.

The April report points out that

even after projecting emissions from ten years of converter-equipped
cars, the sulfate levels in the atmosphere would be'only about one
-

.

-

-

half of the sulfate levels contained in the January report.

Conse-

quently, the April report says of the model used in the January Study:
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-10"The characteristics of the CO dispersion/physical
activity model are such that exposure levels as high
as those ••• are likely to be experienced in the ambient
air very rarely, if at all. •• (emphasis added)
The April report continues that the January Issue

~aper

was

projecting the "upper limit" of potential exposures because of
a number of adverse conditions which were assumed.

Some of the

adverse conditions assumed were:
(1)

A freeway so large that only about 16 miles of
such road exist in the

(2)

u.s .

A commuter who travels on such a road for 30
miles (less than 5% of commuters travel that far) .

(3)

The protracted presence of low wind speeds and
stable atmospheric conditions .

In fact, such con-

ditions are estimated to actually occur only 8 to
15 hours per year.
(4)

A prevailing wind which must blow at such angle as
to cause the maximum build up of sulfates over the
entire 30 miles of the commuter trip.

(5)

Freeway traffic which travels at maximum capacity
over the entire 30 mile commute, and

y~t

which creates

little or no turbulence.
Thus, while there is need for continuing study and monitoring, we
believe that the available evidence and data show there is no present
sulfate-related health danger to a driver, a passenger, a mechanic
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working on a converter-equipped car, or people who live close to
heavily travelled expressways or commuters on them, either individually or collectively.
It would be unfortunate if unfounded health predictions or
other exaggerations
such. as have been reported, succeed
.
in undermining the public's confidence in the catalytic converter.
The catalytic converter is, at present, the most effective and most
fuel-efficient emission control technology available today to take
the automobile out of the nation's air pollution problem.
Comparison of Catalytic Converter Equipped Cars with Alternatives
One final point on the performance of converter technology
should be made.

We think it is incorrect for anyone to presume that

foreign technology on emissions control or fuel economy, or any
other aspect of vehicle performance for that matter, is automatically
superior to that of all domestic manufacturers.
Our engineers and research scientists make every effort to
remain informed on the control technologies ana power plant
alternatives currently discussed in scientific circles.
If any of these technologies or power plants offered a better,
more cost effective way of doing things for the general
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-12u.s. pUblic, we'd incorporate them

but as yet they don't -for the

majority of uses which predominate in the u.s. market.
As an example, it is misleading and a disservice to the American

public for anyone to promote as superior the fuel economy characteristics
of a power plant in a 2,000 pound vehicle, when that fuel economy
is primarily a consequence of very low vehicle weight and not necessarily engine technology.

In fact, u.s.-produced small cars if

matched on an equal weight and equipment basis, demonstrate equal
or better fuel economy than their foreign counterparts.

At the

2,000 pound car level, the .. new-engine technology .. of the foreign
car referred to has no fuel economy superiority.
the EPA record will show otherwise.

If anything,

Within a given EPA weight

class, GM vehicles usually place high and in many cases exhibit
better fuel economy than competition -- domestic or foreign.
Thus far, GM engineers have been able to design at today•s
standards a control system that provides as much fuel economy as
possible, without placing the burden of changing the catalyst on
the owner.

Slightly more fuel economy could have been provided

if, as is already specified on some foreign cars, a catalyst
change were scheduled .

However, we thought the $60 to $70 cost of

changing the pellets in the GM converter (far less than the cost
of· changing the complete converter in such imports) was too large

a consumer burden if it could be avoided.

Unfortunately, as

standards tighten in 1977, it may be necessary on GM cars to
require a catalyst pellet change for that year.
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-13Projection of the Influence of Waiver Standards on the GM 1977 Model
Product Line
Attempting to meet the 1977 California waiver standards will
have a significant impact upon engine and transmission availability
in our product line for 1977, as well as upon individual vehicle
performance in terms of fuel economy and driveability.
As shown by Attachment I, our 1975 California product
line consists of fewer models and engine-transmission-carburetor
combinations, than for the remainder of the nation.

While we

have been able to offer some substitutes for these restricted
models -- substitutes which are .sold only in California -- the
final result is that our California product line is reduced by
more than 30% from our offerings in the other 49 states.
This is partly because we cannot meet the emission requirements and obtain reasonable fuel economy and driveability
with some of our combinations.

With other combinations, business

decisions have indicated that the manpower requirements and costs
for the development and certification programs could not be justified on the basis of projected sales.
It is regrettab l e, that even with the most optimistic proj ections of experimental data for 1977, we expect we will have to
c ut these o fferings back even further.

The unfort~te part about

t his i s tha t many of the models and features which are no longer on
the Cal i fo rni a market are some of those that offer the best fue l
econ o my , s uch as sma l ler engines and carburetor s, several manua l
tr a n s mi ss i o n s , etc.
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-14Present test aata from experimental GM vehicles indicate
that the more stringent 1977 waiver standards are projected
to result in a 10% to 15% fuel economy penalty compared to
present California emission standards .

Our current projections

on fuel economy are depicted on the chart shown previously on
page 8.

Some further losses may be incurred as we calibrate to

account for production variation and certification.
Additional costs are also projected for the California
consumer in 1977.

We estimate that the proposed california waiver

standards for 1977 models will cost the average California customer
in the area of $350 more over 50,000 miles of driving, than if he
were to drive the same, comparably equipped 1977 california new
car, but designed to meet 1975 California emission standards.
While the new car exhaust emission components are not expected
to cost more than $5, in the $350 estimate just stated, the
catalyst bead change which we currently expect to be necessary at
about 30,000 miles will cost $60 to $70 of the total.

The biggest

portion of the additional cost, however, would be the result of
fuel economy loss over 50,000 miles of driving.

This will cost

between $200 and $325 based on the previously mentioned 10% to 15%
fuel economy loss.

In addition, there is the possibility that

special certification tests could be required for California cars
due to the different 1977 waiver standards.

Depending on the

ground rules which apply, these costs could range from nothing
to a high of $45.

Thus the average of the high and low totals

would fall in the area of $350.
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-15Unfortunately, our experimental systems for the 1977
California market still have significant problems in the
11

driveability" area.

are used to define a

Aptong the performance characteristics which
11

driveability" * are freedom from such things

as stalls, surging (engine speed fluctuations that can be felt),
stumbles (car hesitates before it accelerates) and flat spots
(car does not accelerate as accelerator pedal is depressed).
While we are confident improvements will occur, it is unlikely
we can equal the driveability of our federal cars.
The foregoing projections should include one additional
caveat which was suggested in the breakdown of costs to the
consumer.

With new and different standards for California, new

certification procedures ·and costs are undoubtedly going to
accrue.

We are upcertain whether the full extent of these costs,

as projected previously, will actually occur because some carryover of federal certification data to apply in California may make
· it possible to minimize the impact .

If no carry-over is permitted,

· then we feel it will be required that we run a second, completely
independent certification fleet for California, paralleling or
duplicating federal certification costs.

This is another reason

we mi ght be forced to restrict the 1977 model offerings in

*These are discussed at greater length in SAE paper #710137,
"Measuring Vehicle Driveability" by R. L. Everett, GM Research
Laborat o ries, January 11- 15, 1971.
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-16California, since the expense to certify relatively low-volume
models would result in extremely high per vehicle costs.
Significance of Currently Proposed Regulations with Respect
to 1977 Models
OUr comments thus far have been based on the premise that
currently available technology and ·the rules and procedures
involved in certifying our vehicles would not suddenly change.
I have reference to the very fundamental part of standard setting
which derives from test and enforcement procedures.

From a general

viewpoint, it might be said that the enforcement procedures can
result in more stringent standards than the numerical values
which appear in the statutes or regulations.
Selective Enforcement Audit
Specifically, the EPA is now proposing a change in requirements which can easily result in making both federal and California
standards more stringent than the numbers we already face.

These

are the so-called Selective Enforcement Audit procedures (SEA).

If

SEA is activated as now proposed, everything we have said heretofore
becomes far too optimistic.
This would follow, because manufacturing and emission mea suring variations are large in comparison with the current very
low standards.

Because of this fact, we do not know how to en-

sure that our mass produced vehicles would pass the proposed SEA
requirement with current technology at the proposed 1977 california
waiver standards.

It is even possible that we would not be able to

0
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.

meet the current 1975 california standards on a mass production

0

basis.
Incidentally, we think SEA is unnecessary, because the average
car off our assembly lines is already below the required l evels.

0
This is established in california by the audit procedure conducted
at the end of the line at the current Claifornia standards of .9,
9.0 and 2.0 g/mi.

This audit shows our average car is at 0.5 g/mi

HC, 4.6 g/mi co and 1.6 g/mi NOx·

our recent submission to EPA *

contains a·much more complete discussion of the SEA subject.
SHED Test
The recent adoption by California of a new standard and a
revision in the evaporative emission test procedure, intended for
1977 California models,

(from the charcoal trap method to the SHED

test) also results in increased system complexity.

This is relevan t

to this hearing because of the interrelationship between evaporative
control systems and the air-fuel ratio stability of exhaust system
controls .
Additional equipmen t envisioned to meet the SHED test may
ch ange some parts of th e evaporation emission control system used
on GM cars s ince 1 97 0 in Ca l iforn i a and since 1971 nationwide .

It

basica l ly p r ov i des for be t ter ca r buretor bowl vapor containment and

*GM subm i ss i o n t o the En v iro nme n t a l Protection Agency in r esponse
to Propos ed Se l e ctive Enfo rce me nt Au di t ing Procedures, filed April

17,

1 97~

- 1 76 -

- 18modulates canister purge so as to remove more of the HC stored
on the charcoal .

These changes will affect the air-fuel mixture

delivered to the engine which, in turn, will affect exhaust
emission levels and vehicle driveability.

These effects and

the lead time involved with new hardware have not been fully
evaluated at this time.

Therefore, we may not be able to meet

both the more stringent evaporative and e xhaust emission standards
by the 1977 model year.
Sulfate Emission Standard
As I previously

explaine~,

data sufficient to support a sulfate

standard is several years down the road.
never come at all.
rest of the nation.

In fact, such data may

This is true for California as well as for the
However, we trust that the most recent EPA

studies on the subject will eliminate the urgency in establishing
a sulfate standard until adequate information has been developed.
Nevertheless, if a sulfate standard were to be promulgated at an
unrealistically stringent level, such that the oxidizing catalytic
converter could not be used, then it is obvious that neither technical feasibility nor sufficient lead time exist to meet the proposed California standards, consistent with fuel economy and drive ability goals.
The same thing is true if certification testing conditions or
procedures relating to sulfate emissions were made more stringent
be~se of new and/or unnecessarily stringent interpretations of

old provisions.
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-19Conclusion

0

The control of air pollution and conservation of energy,
while yet meeting the public need for cars and trucks (which is
central to this country's transportation system) should be the
primary objective of both government and the auto industry.
We intend to make our contribution, meeting both federal
and California emission standards through use of the best
technology available, while marketing products that are competitive
and genuinely in response to the needs of the total

u.s.

market.

We have indicated some problems that probably will result from
our attempt to achieve this objective.

But you can be assured

of our best efforts to solve these problems in the short time
remaining before start of 1977 certification, so that we can
provide as many models as possible which meet the waiver standards.

* * * * *
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1975 LIGHT DUTY VEHICLES NOT AVAILABlf IN CALIFORNIA

Attachment I

TRANSM!SSION

VEHICLE

ENGINE-CARBURETOR

Vega

140

L4-1

Vega Wagon

140

L4-1

Manual

Monza

140

L4-1

Manual

Vega

140

L4-1

Automatic

Vega Wagon

140

L4-1

Automatic

Monza

140

L4-1

Automatic

Nova

250

L6-1

Manual

Camaro

250

L6-1

Manual

Malibu

250

L6-1

Manual

El Camino

250

L6-1

Manual

Sprint

250

L6-1

Manual

Monzo

262

VB-2

Manual

Nova

262.

VB-2

Manual

Monza

262

VB-2

Automatic

Nova

262

VB-2

Automatic

Nova

350

VS-2

Manual

Camaro

350

VS-2

Manual

Nova

350

VS-2

Automatic

Camaro

350

VS-2

Automatic

350

VS-2

Automatic

Laguna

350

VS-2

Automatic

El Camino

350

VS-2

Automatic

Sprint

350

VS-2

Automatic

Monte Carlo

350

VS-2

Automatic

Malibu Wagon

350

VS-2

Automatic

Bel Air

350

VS-2

Automatic

Impala

350

VS-2

Automatic

Caprice

350

VS-2

Automatic

Malibu

454

VS-4

Automatic

Malibu

.

Manual

.

4/23/75

GM

0

f)J

#23

0

RESEARCH PUBLICATION • GMR-1967

0

PLANS FOR GENERAL MOTORS' SULFATE
DISPERSION EXPERIMENT
Environmental Science Department
September 8, 1975

MAY BE DISTRIBUTED OUTSIDE GENERAL MOTORS ... Not to be Reproduced Without Permissio l
_,an _

GMR-1967
EV #23

Plans for General Motors• Sulfate Dispersion Experiment

September 8, 1975

prepared by
Environmental Science Department
GM Research Laboratories
Warren, Michigan 48090

-181-

0

0

0

INTRODUCTION
General Motors is going to conduct an experiment to measure roadside
sulfate exposures from a fleet of 100 percent catalyst-equipped vehicles.
GM invited the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other government
" of the experiment.
agencies to participate in the planning and conduct
This report describes the detailed plans for the experiment. Sections
describing the Environmental Protection Agency's and the Department of
Transportation's participation are included.
In addition to measuring the dispersion of catalyst sulfate emissio.ns,
measurements of the dispersion of a gas tracer and extensive meteorological
measurements will be made. The experiment will be conducted on a number
of days during October 1975. Since there is the most interest in catalyst
sulfate exposures when cQnditions described as 'worst meteorology'
exist, a major portion of the experiment will be conducted under the
most adverse meteorological conditions available. The extensive meteorological measurements are necessary in order to extrapolate the data
obtained to other meteorological conditions. Since it is not likely
that the experiment can be conducted when conditions described as 'worst
meteorology' exist, enough data must be taken so that a model can be
constructed to predict the results under 'worst meteorology.'
This experiment pt·ovides a unique opportunity to compare the dispersion
of sulfate emissions with that of a gas tracer and to characterize the
physical and chemical nature of catalyst sulfate emissions in the real
world. With this information, the results of the experiment can be
compared with other tracer studies of dispersion from a roadway involving
real-world or wind-tunnel measurements. Finally, the results of the
experiment, measurements at many different heights and distances from
the roadway under a wide range of meteorological conditions, ~ill provid~
a lar.ge data. base to critically assess the val~d_ i~y _of existing dispersion
--'-----------.
models.
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Site Selection
The experiment will be conducted on the North-South Straightaway at the
GM Proving Ground in Milford, Michigan. As indicated in the April 29,
1975 report, "A Proposal to Study Automotive Sulfate Dispersion from a
Simulated Freeway," various sampling sites were considered for this
study. The criteria used in choosing the site are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

High traffic density.
Ability to sample close to and at varying distances from the roadway.
Ability to sample on upwind and downwind sides of roadway.
Winds generally from one side of the roadway.
Adverse meteorology {temperature inversion and low wind speed).
High average vehicle speed.
Low ambient sulfate background.
Level terrain.
Electrical Power availability.
Permission available to sample at the chosen site.

The North-South Straightaway site meets all these criteria.
Site Description
The sampling site is along the 10 km N-S Straightaway, about 2.4 km
north of the south end of the track (Figure 1). The Milford Proving
Ground is located in the gentle, rolling hills and lightly wooded area
of southeastern Michigan, about 50 km northwest of Detroit and 30 km
north of Ann Arbor. The nearest major highways are I-96 {7 km to the
south) and M-23 {6 km to the west). The test track itself is essentially
level, with an elevation range of 296.7 meters to 297.2 meters above sea
level, except for the elevated and banked turns at each end of the
track. Although the test track is three lanes wide in each direction,
there is only room for two lanes of traffic in the turns. Therefore,
the experiment will be conducted using two lanes in each direction
simulating a four-lane freeway. The portion of the track where the
instrumentation will be placed is very flat {Figure 2), with an elevation
range of 295.6 meters to 296.9 meters. The tallest hill in the immediate
area is about 302~4 meters above sea level.
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Topography of Sampling Site

Selection of Test Period
A meteorological station equipped with a propeller anemometer was installed
at the N-S Straightaway in July 1974. The wind speed and direction data
for the fall of 1974 were studied to determine which month or months had
the lowest wind speeds and highest prevalence of winds from the west,
northwest, and southwest. Since October had both the highest percentage
of calms in the morning and the highest percentage of winds from the
three westerly directions, it was decided that the experiment should be
run during October, 1975.
Characterization of Weather at N-S Straightaway during October 1974
The weather data used in the description are the hourly wind direction,
wind speed, temperature, and relative humidity measurements obtained at
the N-S Straightaway during October, 1974.
The 0700 to 0900 wind rose (see Figure 3) shows a calm prevailing 63
percent of the time. Because the threshold response of the propeller
anenometer is about 1.3 m/sec, calm is defined as ~1.3 m/sec. A strong
southwesterly wind component along with a minor northwesterly contribution
is observed. For those directions, the wind speeds are approximately
1.8-2.7 m/sec for half the time and 3.1-4.0 m/sec for the other half.
The speeds may reach 4.5-5.4 m/sec for the southwesterly direction. The
1000 to 1200 wind rose (Figure 4) shows a more pronounced wind directional
dependence, with an increased frequency for the northwesterlies. The
calm period is reduced to 26 percent of the time, and the wind speed is
markedly increased for all wind directions. The 1300-1500 wind rose
(see Figure 5) shows a wind direction pattern similar to the 1000 to
1200 wind rose. The wind speeds are markedly increased for all wind
directions and the calm periods are prevalent for 15 percent of the
time. The 1600 to 18QO wind rose (Figure 6) shows an increased period
of calm, about 39 percent. - The wind speeds -are markedly lower for all
wind directions.
-186-

N

SCALE

20%

0.

%CALM

1.8-2.7 meters/second
3.1-4.0 meters/second
15%

~'\\1

4.5-5.4 meters/second

10%

Figure 3.

0700-0900 Wind · Rose, October 1974
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1000-1200 Wind Rose, October 1974
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The temperature data summary is shown in Table I. In the morning, the
temperature averages 4.4°C and reaches the low teens by the afternoon.
The minimum of -6.7°C is observed in the morning and a maximum of 22.8°C
in the afternoon. The relative humidity (see Taple II) averages 90
percent in the morning and drops to the 60's in the afternoon. Maximum
relative humidity of 100 and minimum of 40 are observed. Precipitation
was observed for seven days of October 1974.
Table I.

Temperature °C

Time

Average

Minimum

Maximum

0700
0800
0900
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
1600
1700
1800

4.2
4.6
6.1
8.1
9.6
11.1
12.0
12. 7
13.3
13.4
13.4
12.8

-6.7
-6.1
-2.8
-1.1
0.6
1.1
1.7
2·. 2
2.2
2.8
3.3
2.8

17.2
17. 2
17.8
18. 3
19.4
20.0
21.1
21.7
22.8
22.2
22.2
21.1

Table II.

Relative Humidity (%)

Time

Average

Minimum

Maximum

0700
0800
0900
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
1600
1700
1800

89.9
90.3
88.7
84.6
77.3
70.1
66.4
64.5
63.3
62.4
62.1
62.8

60
60
58
55
54
43
42
42
41
40
41
45

100
100
100
99
99
99
99
99
98
98
97
96

Description of Sampling Location
Low-volume filter samples and gas samples will be collected, and wind
speed and direction will be recorded at 20 points. These points are
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located at eight different distances from the track, indicated by small
triangles in Figure 7. These points all fall on a line, labeled tower
line in Figure 7, which forms a 72° 45~ angle to the track. This orienta tion was chosen to provide the least possible interference from small
hills, both north and south of the site, and some trees located on the
west side of the track. More sampling points were selected on the east
side of the track than the west since this side is expected to be the
predominately downwind side. Additional samplers will be placed in
close proximity to the tower line.
Both the General Motors• Atmospheric Research Laboratory and a support
van will be at the testing site. These will be located approximately 58
m north of the tower line and will be set back 24m from the roadside.
This position was chosen because it is out of the way of the towers and
thus will not affect the dispersion from the roadway. Additional trailers
present during the test will be located in the same area. This area
allows vehicle access to the trailers from both the N-S Straightaway and
from Hyne Road (Figure 2). Topography prevents placing the trailers
much closer to the roadway than is indicated. However, it will be
possible to place individual instruments in close proximity to the road.
The location of two approximately 10 m towers which will be used by
Department of Transportation (DOT) personnel has also been indicated in
Figures 2 and 7.
To provide for sampling at different heights, towers will be erected at
the six sites closest to the track. The three closest towers are Tri-Ex
Model W-51 •s, while the other three are Tri-Ex Model W-36 s. The model
number refers to the maximum possible height of the towers, in feet. A
1-m-high stand will be placed at the two furthest points (50 m and 100m
east of the road). Figure 8 shows the height of the instruments above
ground on the towers. The temperature sensors will be located only on
the towers 30m east and west of the road. Absolute temperature will be
measured at the 1.5 m level. The_UVW anemometer YJill be a_t 1._5 m and
the samplers at 0.5 mat the 50 m and 100m distances.
1
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Orientation of the instruments on the towers, and of the towers to the
road is shown in Figure 9.
Instrumentation
Sequential Filter Samplers: Ai rborne particulate will be collected
on 47 mm Fluoropore filters with a 1~ pore diameter. Open-faced, plastic
Nuclepore filter holders wi ll be used. The filters will be left open to
the atmosphere and wi l l face upwards. Each sequential filter sampler
consists of six filters connected to a Model 0522 Gast vacuum pump thru
solenoid valves. The solenoid valves wil l be actuated by a control
timer which will start all the sequ~ntial filter samplers simultaneot1sly
and will step thru each of the six filters in succession at a preset
time interval of 30 minutes .
/

A flow rate of about 4 m3/hr will be maintained thru the filters.
test meter wi l l be used to calibrate the flow rates.

A dry

Sequential Gas Samplers: Automatic sequential gas samplers purchased
from Developmental Sciences, Inc. will be used. Gas samples will be
collected continuously during a 30-minute interval in a 30 cc plastic
syringe. A timer incorporated into each instrument initiates the start
of the 30-minute sampling interval for each syringe. Since there are 12
syringes per instrument, six dual samples can be collected which will be
synchronized with the six filter samplers. At the start of an experiment,
the power to the air samplers will be turned on by the central timer
simultaneously with the start of the first filter sample. After the
start, synchronization between filte~ samples and gas samples will
depend on the accuracy of the individual air sampler timers.
Temperature: Both absolute temperature and temperature-difference
(6T) measurements will be made. The temperature sensors will be Model
78-0039-0023 Rosemount single-element platinum resistance thermometers.
Rosemount Model 414L linear bridges are used to provide a millivolt
readout. The platinum resistance thermometers will be mounted in Model
43404 Gill aspirated temperature radiation shields.
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Relative Orientation of Instruments

Calibration of the temperature measurement system will be requ~red
to provide the sensitivity of ±O.Ol°C requil~.?d for the t.T measurements.
These measurements will be made between three heights on two tor'iers.
Wind: Wind speed and direction will be measured using Gill UVW
anemometers equipped with propeller extensions. This instrument consists
of three orthogonally mounted propeller anemometers whi~h drive small de
tachometer generators to provide a voltage output. The output will be
fed thru an operational amplifier and an RC filter to reduce noise, and
a voltage divider to provide for calibration. The instruments ~~ill be
calibrated in place while on the towers. The correction for noncosine
response will be made during data processing.
Data Acquisition: Two data acquisition systems will be used. The
60 channels of UVW anemometer data will be scanned once a second using a
Monitor Labs system. The temperature data and other inputs will be
recorded on a Vidar system every 5 seconds. The two systems will be
synchronized by reading a constant voltage si9nal controlled by the
master timer. The voltage level will be a function of whichever filter
has been actuated by the master timer. These step-changes in the voltage
will occur at precise half-hour intervals.
Other Instruments: The following measur~ments will be made by
instruments located in the General Motors' Atmospheric Research Laboratory:
scalar wind speed and direction, wind sigma, temperature, dew point,
ultra violet intensity, rain, barometric pressure, and visibility.
Four hi-val samplers will be used. Two of these will be equipped with
4-stage Andersen impactor heads for ~izing of aerosols. The hi-vols
will be run for the duration of a given experiment as \~ill four 47 mm
filter samplers.
Additional 47 mm filter samplers will be placed inside six of the test
vehicles. These samplers will run for the duration of a given test. No
smoking will be allowed in these cars. Car heaters \'lill probably be
operating during some of tbe ~esting.
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Two Thermo Systems mobility analyzers will be used for particle-sizing
studies.

0

0

Tracer Release: Sulfur hexaflouride (.SF 6 ), a nonflanmable, nontoxic
gas, will be released continuously from eight vehicles during the experiments, at a known emission rate. The SF 6 is a tracer which can be
accurately measured at concentrations less than 10 ppt and will thus
permit accurate dispersion measurements under all meteorological conditions.
SF 6 release will be from alA cylinder mounted vertically in either a
pickup truck or a van. The flow rate will be controlled by a standard
2-stage regulator and a Condyne Model-100 flow controller. A 12-volt
solenoid valve will allow the driver of the vehicle to turn the flow on
and off at the beginning and end of the experiment. The gas will be run
thru tubing to permit release directly into the exhaust stream.
The eight vehicles will be spaced evenly in the traffic, with four in
each lane. Each vehicle will be the sixth car in an eleven-car pack
(see later description}. At an average speed of about 80 km/hour, a
total of 64 passes by the sampling point will be made by tracerreleasing vehicles during a 30-minute sampling interval.
Analysis of Sulfate: The barium chloranilate method (BCA} will be
used for sulfate analysis. This method has the required sensitivity and
can be performed rapidly. The precision of the method is about 10
percent at the 10 ~g level. The possibility of interferences with this
method cannot be entirely ruled out at this time. However, it is expected
that possible interfering anions, presumably C!-, will be present in the
background at low concentrations and will not be generated by the test
cars. Thus, barring unknown synergistic effects, the background correction
will take care of possible interferences. In addition, the background
level of Cl- will be measured.
The accuracy of the measurement of the automotive-generated sulfate will
be limited by the background correction. For example, if the background

-198-

level is 10 ~g/m 3 , the precision of the technique will limit the observable
increase in sulfate to >l ~g;m 3 .
Cross checks of analytical methodology will be m~de by comparing the
analysis of some samples by the Thorin meth~d, the BCA method, and X-ray
analysis for total sulfur. In addition, the EPA has agreed to exchange
filter samples of known concentrations of so 42- for a cross check of the
analytical methods employed.
Background Measurements: A number of 24-hour hi-vol filter samples
have been collected at a site along the N-S Straightaway, 1 km north of
the sampling line, since May l, 1975. The mean sulfate concentration
for 36 sampling days has been 7 ~g;m 3 , with a range of 2-18 ~g;m 3 and a
median of 6 ~g;m 3 . A series of 21 half-hour lo-vol-filters were run,
and the sulfate concentrations ranged between 2-15 ~g;m 3 with an average
of 6 ~g;m 3 .
Three of the hi-vols were also analyzed for lead and the level in all
three cases was 0. l ~g;m 3 (the sulfate varied from 6-12 ~g;m 3 on these
filters).
The background concentration of ammonia was determined to be 5 ~g/m 3 on
two different days, using the indophenol colorimetric method.
Analysis of Sulfuric Acid: Any analysis of filters for sulfuric
acid may be subject to considerable error due to the in situ conversion
of H2so to NH 4Hso 4 or (NH4 ) 2so 4 caused by passing ambient NH 3 thru the
4
filter during the sampling process or thru interaction with NH 3 during
storage. Despite this problem, some filters will be analyzed for total
strong acids, using the Brasset method. This analysis will probably be
performed by Rockwell International. In addition, some samples will be
collected on Mitex filters to permit analysis for H2so 4 by selectively
extracting the H2so 4 into benzaldehyde and then analyzing the extract
for so4 2-

-19~ -

Analysis: The sulfur hexaflouride will be analyzed by gas
chromatography using an Analog Technology Corporation electron-capture
detector. The sample will be injected from a 1 ml gas sample loop onto
a 60-mesh molecular sieve column using N2 a_s the carrier gas. The
analysis time will be approximately 5 minutes per sample. Two gas
chromatographs will be employed.
~

Environmental Protection Agency Participation
The Environmental Science Research Laboratory (ESRL), RTP of the Office
of Research and Development, EPA, will be involved in characterizing air
quality adjacent to the roadway as its contribution to the scientific
activities during the GM sulfate dispersion experiment. The ESRL measurement
program will be concerned with the chemical composition, size distribution,
visibility characteristics, and sulfate flux of the particles emitted as
sulfuric acid aerosol. The rate of growth of the aerosols and the
degree of neutralization of the sulfuric acid aerosol will be determined
from these measurements. Several mobile laboratories and trailers
equipped with research instrumentation will be utilized as will two
sampler systems at ground level and on towers up and downwind of the
roadway.
Analyses will be made of total sulfur, sulfate, the chemical composition
of the sulfate, the sulfuric acid concentration as well as the concurrent
concentrations of sulfur dioxide and ammonia. The acid forms of the
sulfate particles will be investigated by both in situ and filter collection
procedures. Visibility changes will be followed by use of the integrating
nephelometer. Particle size measurements will include use of the diffusion
battery because of the extremely small size of the emitted sulfuric acid
aerosols.
Some preliminary measurements of background concentrations will be
conducted before the study period in October. During the study period
in October, there will be measurements of background concentrations
before and after the periods during which the fleet of catalytically
equi_pp~d ve_hicles _i s 9Rerated on the a_
djacent section of test track.
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Brief discussions of the individual components of the ESRL measurements
program are given as follows:
1. Operate University of Minnesota Laboratory to measure size distribution
by instrumental and impactor techniques for approximately two weeks
in October 1975 at the Milford Proving Ground. Measurements will
be made at several positions upwind and downwind of the track.
University of Minnesota personnel will reduce the data and report
results to Environmental Science Research Laboratory.
2. Operate EPA mobile laboratory to obtain additional size distribution
data in 0.01 to 1 micron range. Other aerosol equipment will be
operated to collect samples for analysis of sulfuric acid, ammonium
bisulfate, and ammonium sulfate.
3. Operate RTP trailer containing sulfuric acid analyzer, ammonia
analyzer, and high sensitivity sulfur dioxide analyzer from September
24, 1975 thru October.
4. Operate leased passenger vehicle in October equipped with instrumentation and impactors for size distribution, sulfate and sulfuric acid
measurement. This instrumented vehicle will drive in the traffic
pattern and will make measurements of samples immediately outside
as well as inside the vehicle.
5. Measure light scattering as a function of relative humidity.
6. Operate small impactors and streaker samplers on towers.
7. Install by October 1 and operate 8 dichotomous samplers at ground
level near roadway on 1- to 3-hour averages.
8. Operate 6 to 8 automated collectors for determination of flux of
sulfate from the roadway on one-half-hour intervals.
9-. Measurements of turbulent eddy diffusion coefficients near the
roadway.
The above combination of instruments, impactors, and other samplers are
expected to permit characterizing the particle size distribution of the
sulfuric acid or neutralized sulfate particles. Chemical analyses will
include sulfur dioxide, ammonia, total particulate sulfur, water-soluble
sulfate, sulfuric acid, ammonium bisulfate, ammonium sulfate, ammonium
ion, strong acid, nitrogen oxides, and nitrate.
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Department of Transportation Participation
The Transportation Systems Center of the .Department of Transportation
will make continuous measurements of SF6 and CO with a correlation
spectrophotometer. This instrument will be located on one side of the
roadway, with a mirror directly opposite it on the other side. Both the
spectrophotometer and the mirror will be mounted on variable height
platforms which will be adjusted to different heights during an experiment.
Fuel
The test fuel will be Amoco unleaded, with a sulfur content of 0.03 ±
0.005 weight percent.
Vehicles
The test fleet will consist of about 400 vehicles. A few preliminary
emission tests simulating driving on the N-S Straightaway were conducted
with GM catalyst-equipped vehicles without air injection. The sulfate
emissions were very low. So it was decided that all the cars in the
fleet should be equipped with air pumps. This should provide both a
higher and more repeatable emission rate.
Cars are being obtained from several GM divisions as well as other
domestic manufacturers. Both 1975 and 1976 models are being obta i ned.
The breakdown is as follows:
American Motors
20
Chrysler
40
Ford
80
General Motors:
I
•.
Buick
40
Cadi l1 ac
10
Chevrolet
165
Pontiac
45
. ,·'. ..
....

The mileage on the catalyst on the vehicles will be between 1000 and
-5000 miles. This was specified to reduce the number of variables affecting

--
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the fleet sulfate emissions and help ensure that the emission measurements
on a sample of the fleet would be representative of the whole fleet. In
addition, since recent evidence has shown that sulfate emissions decrease
with mileage, the restriction to low mileage vehicles should result in a
higher emission rate. The vehicles will be driven at least 500 miles on
the test fuel before the test. The last 100 to 200 miles of this conditioning will take place during driver training and practicing of the
test schedule on the N-S Straightaway. Some of the 1976 models may not
be made available in time to get 1000 miles· on them before the test
begins. These vehicles will, however, receive the 500 miles conditioning on the test fuel before the test.
Drivers
The drivers will be regular employees of the Proving Ground who have
volunteered for the test.
Conduct of a Typical Experiment
The vehicles will be parked in lot A, which is shown in Figure 1. The
drivers will be bussed to the parking lot and drive the vehicles down to
the test track. The test fleet will consist of 32 packs of eleven
vehicles each. Communications and control of vehicle movement before,
during, and after the test will be maintained by radio communication
with the pack leaders. It is anticipated that it will take between 30
and 45 minutes to get the vehicles into position on the track. The
vehicles will then accelerate slowly up to speed and the sampling will
begin. The pack leaders will be instructed to drive at a steady 80
km/hour along the straightaway portion of the track. The other members
of the pack will be instructed to drive the straightaway as they would
normally drive in traffic and to avoid rapid changes in throttle position.
They are not expected to maintain any specific vehicle spacing, but all
recognize that the total length of the pack must not stretch out so as
to affect the pack behind them. The pack will slow down at the turns to
48 km/h at the south end and 40 km/h at the north end. It is anticipated
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that the test will be run for at least two hours and possibly longer
depending on driver fatigue. A number of preliminary experiments with a
few packs of vehicles have confirmed that this traffic density can be
maintained safely. The traffic density resulting from this arrangement
is about 5600 vehicles per hour.
Experiments will be conducted both in the early morning and later in the
day, although generally not on the same day. For the early morning
runs, the drivers will report at 0700 and it is anticipated that the
test will begin between 0730 and 0800.
Emission Testing
In most instances, the vehicles that are being obtained are in groups of
ten or more of a given engine-control system combination. A 10 percent
sample of each of these groups will be tested for sulfate emissions at
the GM Proving Ground Vehicle Emissions Laboratory (VEL). The driving
schedule was taken from a speed time trace for the sixth vehicle in a
pack measured during one of the preliminary N-S Straightaway tests. In
order to simulate the actual test procedure as closely as possible, the
vehicles being emission tested will be driven from lot A to the VEL by a
route simulating the drive from lot A to the test track. The vehicles
will soak for about 10 minutes, idle for about 5 minutes, accelerate
slowly to speed, and then run the test schedule for two hours.
For each pass by the test track's sampling point, filter samples will be
collected from 0.8 km before the sampling point to 0.8 km after.
Some additional emission tests will be conducted by the GMR Environmental
Science Department. For example, the sensitivity of sulfate emissions
to pack position and driver variation will be investigated.
Length of Experiment
The question of what constitutes a suffJ cient amount of data in thi~
experiment is difficult to answer. It depends strongly on the weather
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conditions encountered during the experimental period, which is beyond
our control.
At least five and preferably about ten experimental runs (in this case a
half-hour observation constitutes one run) are sufficient to characterize
one experimental condition. However, the decision as to what constitutes
an experimental condition is a subjective one. The most important
variables in classifying different experimental conditions are wind
speed, wind direction, and atmospheric stability.
If we classify the wind speed into three categories: 0-1 m/sec, >l-4
m/sec, ~4 m/sec, and wind direction into five categories: 0°-30° (measured
clockwise from the north direction, north being downwind), 30°-60°, 60°1200, 120°-150°, 150°-180° (note that there need not be a reflection
symmetry relative to the plane perpendicular to the roadway because of
the traffic flow directions), and stability into three categories corresponding to: unstable (U), neutral or near neutral (N), and stable (S), then
we shall have a combination of 45 different conditions. If ten runs are
required of each condition, this corresponds to a total of 225 hours of
~ata.
The problems of logistics and the uncertainty in the weather
compel us to set up priorities for the conditions under which data are
to be acquired. Table III shows a tentative grouping of conditions with
priorities assigned -- lower numbers implying higher priorities.
Table II I.

Priorities for Different Experimental Conditions

Wind
Speed
m/sec

Stabi 1it~

0-1

s

N-U

>1-4

N-U

>4

0°-30°
1*
2

30°-60°
7
7

60°-110°
1
2

120°-150°
7
7

150°-180°
1
2

3

s

3*
6*

7
7

6

7
7

3*
6*

s

5
4*

7
7

5
4

7
7

5
4*

N-U

*Likely conditions based on 1974 data.
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The following points should be noted:
1. Since extreme conditions allow us to provide both upper and lower
bounds, these conditions ought to have higher priorities.
2. Since the major purpose of the experiment concerns the prediction
of concentrations under worst meteorological conditions (stable
air, calm wind, etc.), these conditions should receive the highest
priorities.
3. It is hoped that the experiment would cover up to the fourth level
in priority ranking. This would correspond to a total of 60 hours
of data.
In practice, however, it is not expected that all conditions of high
priorities will be encountered with equal likelihood. In particular, in
the Milford-GM Proving Ground area, according to the October 1974 data,
described earlier, winds tend to be from the southwest or northwest
directions. Moreover, low winds tend to occur in the early morning
while high winds tend to occur in the early afternoon. In the former
case, the atmosphere also tends to be stable, while in the latter it
tends to be unstable. So, according to the last year•s data, conditions
that are likely to be encountered are the regions indicated by an asterisk
in Table III. Attempts should be made not to miss the high priority
conditions which are expected to occur infrequently during the experimental
period.
While it remains difficult to tell how many hours of data should be
considered sufficient for the experiment due to the complications discussed
above, there is some hope that different conditions may be combined into
one and thereby reduce the number of runs for these conditions substantially.
For example, if wind directions are found to be irrelevant when the wind
speed is less than 1 m/sec, then classification according to the wind
directior. becomes unnecessary. If stability does not play a major role
in the dispersion near the roadway, then there is no need to distinguish
between different stability categories. Some brief guidelines are:
1.

Carry out as many runs as possible at the early stage of the experiment, maybe up to four hours a aay, covering the period -of early
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morning (say, 0800-1000 EDT), late morning (1000-1200 EDT), and
early afternoon (1300-1500 EDT).
2.

Do not miss the conditions which are expected to be rare.

3.

Classify the results of each run as soon as ·possible to determine
which conditions result in distinctly different results.

4.

Accumulate at least 30 hours of data. Then determine whether
sufficient data for high priority conditions are available.

A decision whether to run the next day will be made each day by 1500.
The decision will be based on the weather forecasts for the next 24
hours, obtained from the National Weather Service and a meteorological
consulting serv,ce.
It should be noted that no experiment will be run when the wind is from
the east, when precipitation is expected, or when the wind is expected
to change course.
Every effort will be made to get as much data as possible with the full
test fleet. However, it may be possible to extend this information with
a series of smaller scale experiments using fewer cars. If the largescale experiments define the difference between the dispersion of sulfate
and SF 6, it may be possible to cover more experimental conditions without
severely disrupting the Proving Ground staff and facilities by running a
series of experiments releasing SF 6 alone.
To determine the feasability of this approach, a series of tracer release
experiments will be conducted after the sampling equipment has been
installed but before the full-scale experiments. The objective will be
to determine the number and arrangement of vehicles around a tracer
release vehicle that are necessary so that the dispersion of the tracer
is the same as that in the large-scale experiment. Once this is determined,
should be possible to run a series of experiments with a smaller
configuration of vehicles and extend the data base by covering a larger
number of conditions. It would also be possible then to determine the
it
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effects of vehicle speed, spacing, and other traffic-related variables
under controlled conditions with a minimum of extra effort.
Data Reduction and Archiving
The data in this experiment will be obtained in a variety of forms. The
meteorological data will be recorded on magnetic tape which will be
returned daily to the GM Research Laboratories for processing. The
filter samples will be returned to the GMR Analytical Chemistry Department
for analysis. The SF 6 analyses will be conducted on the site within a
day of each experiment. The results of specialized tests by GM and EPA
will presumably be made available as soon as each investigator is assured
of its validity. It is anticipated that each block of data would be
made available to both GM and EPA at the same time. GM would maintain a
central data file for each run at the GM Research Laboratories. Once
the data are obtained, simple statistics will be applied to determine
the average wind speeds, wind component variances, Richardson number,
etc. Contours of both wind and concentrations will be constructed.
Ratios of SF 6 to nonambient sulfate aerosols will be determined since
they allow us to assess the importance of deposition for the sulfate
aerosols. All these preliminary analyses of the data are not only
necessary to establish distinct experimental conditions, but are needed
for further data analysis and model construction. It is anticipated
that a joint report by GM and EPA detailing the conduct of the experiment
and containing summaries of the data would be issued and made available
to the general public as soon as possible.
Data Analysis
The complete analysis of the data from this experiment will take some
time. At GM, algorithms are currently being developed for estimating
the dispersion parameters of the Gaussian model a~d for checking the
validity of the model. Algorithms for solving the advection-diffusion
model, using the finite element method, are also in progress. The eddydiffusivity tensor is exp~~t~d to be obtained by equating it to the

0
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eddy-viscosity tensor constructed from the wind data. The temperaturedifference data plus the wind data allow us to establish the Richardson
number as well as the Monin-Obukhov length, from which the dispersion
characteristics of the surface layer beyond the traffic-wake region can
be ascertained. The advection-diffusion model may then be extended
beyond the traffic-wake region. The predicted concentrations from the
model will be checked against the observed values, for both SF 6 and the
sulfate aerosols.
Spectral analysis will also be carried out to study the turbulent characteristics of the traffic wake near the roadway.
As the data analysis progresses, separate reports will be issued as
available.
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Mr . Chairman and members· of the House Subcommittee on
Energy Research, Development and Demonstration, I am James

c.

Holzwarth, technical director, General Motors Research Laboratories .
With me today is Paul D. Agarwal,· head of
Electrical Engineering Department.

We

Re~earch

appr~ciate

Laboratories •
the opportunity

to comment on H.·R. 5470.
As we move toward energy self-sufficiency, when presumably
nearly all of our electric power will be derived from coal and/
or nuclear sources, and large scale use of petroleum and natural
gas by public utilities will no longer
be needed, then the
.
.
electric car may be an important contender in fulfilling our
long-range transportation needs.
We believe that governmental backing could foreshorten the
,.

~

time required for developing .electric propulsion technology to
the stage of commercial feasibility.

Furthermore, the govern-

ment needs to pave the way for electric vehicles through enab l ing
legislation as well as administrative action if electrics are
to be permitted to enter into an existing vehicle population.
GM Alternative Power Plant Research and Development
For many years, General Motors has committed substantial
resources to developing alternatives to the current automobile
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engine.

~~

./

are committing substantial effort and resources

~

to alternate fuel engines, small diesels, gas turbines,
stratified charge engines and oth;rs. (l-ll)

Our total ' alternative

power source research and engineering expenditures for 1975 are
expected to be about 50 million dollars.

These expenditures since

1967 are detailed in Attachment A.·
Our efforts also include a great deal of work on propulsion
systems with potential for the longer term future.
vehicles, of course, are in that categorY.

Electric

At our Research

Laboratories alone, about 30 people are working intensively on
'
.
'
advanced propulsion batteries and fuel cells. We are carrying
on basic research on electrode mechanisms and the electrode
processes that lead to ·deterioration upon_ cycling.

We are also

carrying out research on materials for electrodes, separators and
electrolytes, to minimize battery weight_while achieving adequate
life.

Others in our Electrical Engineering Department at the

General Motors Research Laboratories are looking at optimized
electric drive systems, including traction motors, controls
and electronics needed with these advanced batteries.
General Motors is also concerning itself with advanced
battery design and manufacturing technology and with the
projected costs for making these advanced battery systems.
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Engineers
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at our Engineering Staff and at our Research Laboratories are
carrying out analytical studies to determine the levels of
battery technology required before vehicles of various sizes,
weights, ranges and performance capabilities can be considered.
We feel that we will be prepared on the engineering and manufacturing
details when advanced energy storage devices become feasible for
production vehicles.
GM Electric Car Experience
Over the past decade, we have built and tested a series of
.
electric and hybrid •vehicles using the most advanced state-of-the-art
components, to develop and optimize motor and control systems,
and to gain actual operating experience.

Characteristics of these

cars are documented in Attachment B.
We have also purchased or test driven electric vehicles
manufactured by other companies.

Even though we had high expecta-

tions with respect to these vehicles, the results were frustratingly
disappointing.
One simple and inexorable fact kept bringing us back to
reality with every fresh look.

Existing batteries, including

the most energetic batteries commercially available, couldn't
begin to do an effective job of moving people in comparison with
gasoline.
The best lead-acid batteries available today with appropriate
cycle life for propulsion power in passenger electric cars deliver
only 20 - 30 watt-hours of electrical energy per kilogram, depending
-?1~-
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on the application.

Although the peak efficiency from battery

to wheels (motor, controls and driveline) can be as high as 85%,
it will be no greater than 600~ in ·"stop-and-go traffic in ci ·ty
driving.

Therefore, the lead acid batteries deliver only 12 to

18 watt hours of energy per kilogram at the,wheels.
In contrast, gasoline has an energy density of 13,200 watthours per kilo·g ram.

Even if a conversion efficiency from the

gas tank to the wheels for city driving, were assumed to be as
low as 10%*, it would still deliver 1,300 watt-hours per kilogram
at the wheels or about two orders of magnitude greater than for the
lead-acid batteries.

Even the best batteries envisioned today,

which may be commercially available in the period around 1990 to
2000, will have only a 6- to 8-fold improvement in energy density

,.

•

over lead acid.

To place it in proper perspective, for the same work done at

the wheels as by 20 gallons of gasoline (58 kilograms) in an
internal combustion engine vehicle, one would require

~bout

5,000

kilograms of lead acid batteries or 600-700 kilograms of the
best projected batteries.

It becomes obvious why electric cars

will continue to be much heavier than their internal combustion
engine counterparts designed for the same mission.

*Average tested efficiency (from gas t~n~ to whe_e ls) for all 197 5
cars for EPA urban driving cycle ~ - by EPA laboratories, Ann Arbor,
:Michigan, 11.5%.
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-sBecause of this battery limitation, electric vehicles are
unable to match the performance and range of gasoline powered
vehicles.

They suffer from greater weight, both the battery

weight and necessary added vehicle structure, and this weight
penalty demands more propulsion energy.

In -addition, the original

cost is high, and, when amortization is considered, the operating
cost also is high.
We have learned a great deal from our research on electric
vehicles.

However, the typical electric car of today is sub-

stantially underpowered for safe_driving in existing traffic
situations.

Because of this, the driver's natural inclination

would be to drive it "full-throttle" to try to get up to the maximum
vehicle speed capability, which is usually
at or below urban
,

.

thoroughfare traffic speed.

And when he finally gets to that

speed, he must keep his "foot to the floor" to maintain that
speed.

Because he is now draining the batteries at the "maximum

rate," his operating range falls well below his expectation.

After

relatively few miles, his ability to maintain speed, or to accelerate
again to traffic speed from a stopped position, begins to diminish.
As the battery pack ages, vehicle performance falls off: as the
battery pack loses charge, performance diminishes.

In cold weather,

both range and performance decrease.
In designing batteries for electric vehicles, there are trade offs among specific power, which determines vehicle performance,
specific energy, which affects vehicle range, and battery life,
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which influences vehicle operating cost.

The Electrovair II,

shown on page 1, Attachment B, was built using silver-zinc
batteries as a power source.

It had good performance -- it nearly

matched the gasoline engine Corvair performance -- and this made
it effective in mixing with regular traffic.

But this performance

was attained at serious sacrifice of battery life and range
capability.
Silver-zinc batteries would be impractical for wide transportation use because of high initial cost.

The batteries in

Electrovair II contained about $10,000 worth of silver at today•s
market prices.

But they were chosen for the experiment because

the technology for building them was available.

In addition,

they matched the performance capabilities expected from some

.
~

of the advanced batteries now being developed for use beyond
the next decade.
Our 512 electric vehicle, shown in Attachment B, used
commercially available batteries, had a top speed capability of
only 30-45 miles per hour and could not safely mix with existing
traffic.
Incidentally, neither of the two cars would come close to
meeting current Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards.

If they

were redesigned to conform to these standards, the added weight
would

furt~e~ d~srade

economy.

their performance, range ·and operating

When vehicle weight is added to meet safety and/or

performance requirements, additional weight must be added to
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the chassis, drivetrain, suspension and other components to
maintain vehicle performance and structural integrity.
Have we given up on electric propulsion?

No, indeed!

But

for the present we feel that building more electric vehicles is
a waste of resources.

The real problem --

~nd

really the only

technological roadblock to electric personal transportation -- is
the battery system itself.

No technological breakthroughs are

required for devising electric drive systems, motors, controls,
choppers, inverters or other circuitry, although substantial
engineering effort would be

requ~red

components to individual vehicles.

·td tailor these electrical
There are many ways available

to design and build adequate hardware to fit specific vehicle
needs.

..,.

We are now concentrating our efforts on basic electrochemical
research and on engineering development of advanced batteries.
Zinc-nickel oxide, sodium-sulfur and lithium-sulfur currently
offer at least some promise of providing a reasonable combination
of specific power, specific energy, durability and cost for
f uture electric vehicles.

We have looked at other systems as

well -- l ithium-chlorine, zinc-air and zinc-chlorine, for example,
and have considered these too costly or too impractical.
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"Finding• " of 5470.

Mr. Chairman, Section 2 of H.R. 5470, the "findings" which
0

presumably form the basis for this proposed legislation, contains
a number of statements which are

~pcomplete

or inaccurate.

Thus,

they could provide erroneous conclusions about prevailing conditions and faulty assumptions on which to base legislative action.
I would like to make some ·comments about these findings which, I
hope, will contribute to a more balanced perspective of the role
of battery-powered vehicles:
Finding #1 "travel patterns of

commercia~

and private vehicles

in urban areas are weighted heavily toward short
and predictable trips well within the capability of
electric vehicles of current design;

11

.

In a restricted transportation role, the battery-electric

.

vehicle already has a place in our transportation system.

It

currently serves in golf carts, lift trucks and on-site people
movers.

Commercial urban delivery vehicles and buses for low

speed, short range service with frequent stops are available
and seem to perform satisfactorily in this specialized use.

Down-

town shoppers, commuters and "erranders" as well appear technically
feasible today with lead-acid battery technology.

This is not to

say, however, that present travel patterns in urban areas are within
the capability of electric vehicles of current design.
b~ ~~~embered

that

whe~ larg~

It must

numbers of smalL -personaL trans-

portation vehicles are contemplated for use on streets as
opposed to golf courses, factories and restricted commercial
-?lR-
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met, and this will adversely affect their size, weight and cost.
There are many other unanswered questions about the safety
hazards involved in mixing extremely small, lightweight, low
performance vehicles with today's conventional cars and trucks on
urban streets and freeways.
Finding #2 "our balance of payments and our economic stability
are threatened by the need to import oil for the
production of liquid fuel for gasoline-powered vehicles ..
Automobiles account for only about 13% of total energy use,
and less than

3~/o

of petroleum use.

In 1974, we consumed 1,370 _

million barrels of oil for automobiles and 485 million barrels
for electric power generation.

We imported 2,240 million barrels.

If all automobiles were to be removed

f~om

•

still need to import oil for other uses.
power required

fo~

charging-the

electr~c

the streets, we would
If additional electric

car batteries were

to be generated from oil, rather than nuclear power or coal, any
advantage in reducing oil

irn~~rts

would be substantially reduced.

The question of converting a substantial portion of our
transportation system to

electri~

power cannot be answered in

i solation from other energy policy considerations.

Any appreciable

i mpact on petroleum imports from introducing electric vehicles
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be achieved only gradually and in the long-range future --

if it is found to be desirable as the nation's energy policies
are defined.
Finding #3 "the shortage of fuel for gasoline-powered vehicles
will continue indefinitely;"
It is inappropriate to single out gasoline-p9wered vehicles
in this context so long as there are other uses of petroleum for

which substitutes may be more readily available.
could just as plausibly be amended to read:

This statement

"The shortage of fuel

for gasoline-powered vehicles will continue indefinitely so long
as major quantities of petroleum are used to generate electric
power or for large industrial and commercial boiler fuel."

The

existence or continuation of any gasoliJ!e "shortage" involves
considerations and definitions of present and future energy
policy.
Finding #5 "the strain on individuals' budgets inflicted by liguid
fuel prices mandates the development of an alternative
source of propulsion wherever possible;"
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This statement implies that the cost per mile of electric
vehicle travel will be less than the cost per mile with gasoline.
Our engineering studies indicate that this assumption may not be
true.
~ts

Because an electric vehicle is considerably heavier than

gasoline powered counterpart of equivalent performance,

it requires ab9ut

4~~

more energy at the wheels.

In addition,

the cost to the consumer of energy in the form of electricity is
much higher than the cost of energy as

g~soline

at current prices.

Attachment C, Table I, for example, indicates that one million
BTU's of electricity in the Detroit area in February, 1975, cost
the consumer 1.88 times as much as one million BTU's in gasoline.
However, the onboard energy conversion efficiency
of electric vehicles is over twice (2.3X) that of gasoline
powered vehicles.

The net result is that the energy

cost to the operator of a small electric shopper would be about 15%
more than the cost of gasoline for a similar internal combustion
engined shopper (1.4 X 1.88/2.3 = 1.15).

Attachment D explains

these issues in more detail.
Finding #7 "stationary sources of pollutants are potentially easier
to control than moving vehicles, making it environmental l y
desirable for transportation systems to be powered from
central

sources~"
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Electric utilities that burn fossil fuels do emit pollutants
both oxides of nitrogen and sulfur oxides.

Coal burning power

(12)
plants emit these two pollutants a~ much higher levels.
According
(13)
to EPA data,
sulfur oxides on a pound for pound basis are
considered more injurious to health than

co~ventional

auto emissions.

Thus, while control methodology . may be easier to apply, actual

.

ambient air quality standards would probably be more difficult to
achieve if electric cars supplanted the existing fleet of cars.
Attachment E shows a comparison of the .grams per mile pollution from
gasoline-powered cars meeting 1976 and 1978 standards with electric
cars using power from coal-burning power plants meeting EPA standards.
On a health weighted equivalent basis, using the primary air quality
(13)
standards established by EPA,
the electric car would result in from
2.3 to 12 times as much pollution in the air from power plants as
from the exhaust of the gasoline-powered car.

Of course it must be

recognized that automobile exhaust is emitted close to the ground and
largely in urban areas, while the effect of emissions from electric
power plants depends largely on their location with respect to urban
areas.
A report prepared by William Hamilton under contract to EPA,
entitled "Impacts of Electric Car Use In St. Louis, Philadelphia, and
Los Angeles," shows that an 80% electric car population in these
cities in 1990 would have little effect in reducing hyarocarbon 0r
CO levels, the principal automotive-related pollutants.
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Added

electric power generation, however, would seriously increase sulfur
oxide levels.

This report has been included with our statement as

Attachment F.
Finding #9 "electric-powered vehicles do not emit any -significant
pollutants and are far less noisy than conventiona l
automobiles and trucks;"
While we do not now know of significant pollutants emitted
by battery-powered vehicles, some of the batteries being considered
for future applications use sulfur, chlorine, nickle, zinc, lithium
cadmiurnfsodiurn and other substances which may be introduced into the
environment.

The potential for environmental risk from these sub-

stances should not be dismissed.
Finding #11 "because electric vehicles use little or no energy when
I'
~

stopped in urban traffic, they permit the conservation
of energy currently wasted by conventional automobiles
and trucks; "
This statement is not incorrect; but it is, to some extent,
misleading.

Energy would be required for heating in cold weather, even

when the vehicle is stopped at traffic lights and for vehicle lighting ,
s ignalling, defrosting and other essential uses.

These factors tend

to reduce the miles that can be driven on a unit of fuel.

It i s

a ppropriate, however, to compare the efficiency of electrics and
conventiona l ca:E's an an urban driving cycle. · _Comparisons i n t hi s
testimony have been made on the basis of the EPA urban cyc l e in
which 18% of the time is spent idling.
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-14Finding #12 "the power demands of electric vehicles would promote
energy conservation by loading utilities in off-peak
late night hours, permitting more efficient use of plant
capacity~"

Because electric cars are expected to continue to have limited
range/performance characteristics, they will be relegated to shorttrip shopping

~nd

commuter use.

Most errands of this type are

carried out during daytime hours, and the tendency would be to put
them "on charge" as soon as the mission :i.s completed, to make sure
the vehicle will be ready for the next demand.

If they are to be

used for commuting, charging probably will be accomplished during
the working day.

Thus, while some battery charging would be done

at night during off-peak hours (possibly encouraged by changes in
rate structures favoring off-peak use),

-a

great deal of this

additional load would be likely to come during daylight and
"peak" hours.
Finding #13

11

the depressed
state of the curren t au t omob'l
· d ustry
_
1 e 1n
would be alleviated by the introduction of new technologies more closely matching consumer needs;"

This statement implies that technology exists today to provide
electric powered vehicles that "more closely match consumer needs"
than the vehicles presently available, and if those electric vehicles
were made available, they would sell in large quantities.
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We believe electric vehicles may play an increasing future
role in our transportation· system.
":- •

But there is no basis for

'

the implication that there is an existing market for electric cars
of such magnitude as to alleviate "the depressed state of the current
automobile industry."

Considering the dyna.Itjic nature of the Ameri can

economy, it is inconceivable that if a substantial opportunity to
market electric cars existed, it would long be overlooked by the
automobile industry or by other companies who could provide electric
•. ca;·-

..em. tries.

Commercial Feasibility
One stated purpose of H.R. 5470 is to "demonstrate the cornmercia~

feasibility of electric vehicles."

Implicit in the term

"commercial feasibility" is a dernonstrat,ion of the salability
of· the product.

Does the product fulfill people • s wants and

needs so that they will buy it?

Surely, government subsidies

for private individuals to encourage use of electric vehicles
and government requirements that they be used by the Postal
Service and the General Services Administration hardly demonstrate
that they are desirable, salable products on their own merits .
The Role of the Federal Government in Electric Propulsion R & D
General Motors does not believe that much can be gained
at this time by subsidizing the _sale of electric vehicles.

The

c apabili ty of electric vehicles with state-of-the-art battery
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~echnology

is well known.

· ··-

/

•

Until better batteries are developed,

those capabilities are not likely to be improved drastically.
We believe the production, at· this time, of a significant
number of electric vehicles would:
(a) be costly and without real benefitt
(b) be uninformative regarding· the real problem
the batteries;
(c) mix a low performance vehicle population with the
current automotive population; and
(d) not move us close to energy self-sufficiency in a reasonable time, since some petroleum conserved in the refining
of less gasoline probably would merely be consumed in
extra power plant generation, especially for peaking power.

.,

The 352 electric vehicles currently being readied for the
Postal Service should comprise an adequate sample to demonstrate
capability and determine performance.

Presumably these new

vehicles employ the latest in commerical battery technology and will
provide a test in service best suited to this type of vehicle.
We question the need for the government to subsidize
products for sale in a competitive market.

Private industry

is better equipped and sufficiently motivated to respond to
that phase of the problem.

There is a role for government to

play in supporting research and

developmen~

on advanced battery

and fuel cell technology where the real bottlenecks to commercial
feasibility exist.
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Electrode processes, electrode catalysis, development of
better battery material and improved cell durability are areas
which now represent critical bottlenecks in the industry's
efforts on battery-powered cars.

Government support of research

in these areas would supplement rather than-duplicate the efforts
of industry and thus make real contributions to progress.
The second area for useful government effort concerning
the electric car is directed toward - energy and traffic management
considerations in which the government should and must carry the
major responsibilities.

Some of-these issues and value judgments

are beyond the appropriate role of business.
It is important to understand the social, economic and environ-

.

mental impact of electric vehicles on a pation where a shortage of
electric power capacity is threatened.

Studies of urban traffic

problems and the effects of added congestion resulting from slower
electric vehicles mixing with other vehicles are both necessary and
desirable.
It would be advisable for Congress to have available a better
understanding of a feasible and appropriate role for electric
cars in the nation's energy policy before committing large amounts
of public funds to promote widespread use of electric vehicles.
When nuclear power and coal assume the dominant role in generating
e l ectrical power, then the electric car could- begin to assume a
more effective role in our nation's energy and transportation systems.
-227-

As higher performance batteries with greater durability,
power and energy storage capability at reasonable cost are
developed, combined with increased electric power generati on
capacity based on nuclear power, battery-powered electric cars
should become more competitive with alternates.

When the economics

of electric cars become more favorable, there will be no need
for the expenditure of public funds to promote them.

Our

competitive system will ensure that the products are provided as
the commercial opportunity develops.

#

,

•
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